Andrea Sauchelli
Biographic Data
| ID | 1063958 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andrea Sauchelli |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andrea |
| FAMILY NAME | Sauchelli |
| SIGNATURE | SAUCHELLI A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Lingnan University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7665-8875 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 16 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Acceptance‐Based or Teaching‐Based Rule Consequentialism
Is an action obligatory if and only if it is prescribed by a code that is the best to be taught to the next generation? This paper discusses whether this version of rule consequentialism is superior to acceptance‐based formulations in some relevant respects. Ultimately, I conclude that, given certain requirements rule consequentialism should ideally meet, teaching‐based formulations are no better than acceptance‐based ones
On the love for humanity and future generations
I argue for a qualified version of the claim that we love humanity. In particular, I suggest that our reactions to a series of scenarios describing different possible futures reveal that, after all, we have a form of direct concern for the survival and flourishing of humanity – and thus also towards future generations – that can be properly characterised as love
Rule Consequentialism and Demandingness: The Wrong Solution(s)
A textbook objection to consequentialism is that it is too demanding—on the assumption that a moral theory which is excessively demanding thereby loses plausibility. In this paper, I assess whether the mechanisms employed by two versions of rule consequentialism, those of Brad Hooker and Tim Mulgan, adequately meet the requirement of not being too demanding. I also examine whether the concept of human nature might help determine what should count…
Axiological pessimism, procreation and collective responsibility
A form of pessimism can support the claim that we have a collective duty to prevent the creation of additional human beings. More specifically, I argue that axiological pessimism, which suggests that human existence is overall bad (for humans) because of a form of evil it causes, implies that we should end human procreation, provided that we do not thereby generate further such evil. In turn, this conclusion can support anti‐natalism, the normati…
Pretending and disbelieving
I formulate and criticise a condition that captures some recent ideas on the nature of pretence, namely, the disbelief condition. According to an initial understanding of this condition, an agent who is pretending that P must also disbelieve that P. I criticise this idea by proposing a counterexample showing that an agent may be in a state of pretence that does not imply disbelief in what is pretended. I also draw some general conclusions about t…
In Defence of the Acquaintance Principle in Aesthetics
Making an adequate aesthetic judgment about an object or an aesthetic property requires first-hand experience of that object or property. Many have suggested that this principle is a valid epistemic norm in the epistemology of the aesthetic. However, some recent philosophers have argued that certain works of conceptual art and other counterexamples disprove the principle in question, even suitably modified. In this paper, I argue that these philo…
Centred worlds, personal identity and imagination
The Centred View offers an account of the connection between imagination and possibility that combines the centred world framework with some allegedly appealing intuitions regarding our persistence over time. In particular, Dilip Ninan suggests that the Centred View has the theoretical advantage of respecting our intuitions about cases of personal identity in certain imaginative scenarios while also being compatible with physicalism. Unfortunatel…
Metaphysical Egoism and Personal Identity
Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry
"Derek Parfit (1942-2017) is widely considered to be one of the most important moral philosophers of the Twentieth Century. Reasons and Persons is arguably the most influential of the two books published in his lifetime and hailed as a classic work of ethics and personal identity. Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry is an outstanding introduction to and assessment of Parfit's book, with chapters by leading sch…
Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry
Personal Identity and Trivial Survival
Your replica is created on Mars and you, on Earth, are destroyed. Parfit claims that your replica may still have what prudentially matters for you – provided that you are psychologically connected and continuous with your replica. If someone accidently destroys the tapes containing your psychological profile used in the production of your replica and this same action fortuitously produces a functionally equivalent tape, Ehring claims that Parfit …
The Will to Make‐Believe: Religious Fictionalism, Religious Beliefs, and the Value of Art
I explore some of the reasons why, under specific circumstances, it may be rational to make‐believe or imagine certain religious beliefs. Adopting a jargon familiar to certain contemporary philosophers, my main concern here is to assess what reasons can be given for adopting a fictionalist stance towards some religious beliefs. My understanding of fictionalism does not involve solely a propositional attitude but a broader stance, which may includ…
The animal, the corpse, and the remnant-person
Functional Beauty, Perception, and Aesthetic Judgements
The concept of functional beauty is analysed in terms of the role played by beliefs, in particular expectations, in our perceptions. After finding various theories of functional beauty unsatisfying, I introduce a novel approach which explains how aesthetic judgements on a variety of different kinds of functional objects (chairs, buildings, cars, etc.) can be grounded in perceptions influenced by beliefs
Functional Beauty, Architecture, And Morality: A Beautiful Konzentrationslager
Some works of architecture have remarkable aesthetic value. According to certain philosophers, part of this value derives from the appearance of such constructions to fulfil the function for which they were built. I argue that one way of understanding the connection between function and aesthetic value resides in the concept of functional beauty. I analyse a number of recent accounts of this notion, then offer a better way of understanding it. I …
Philosophical Perspectives on Fictional Characters
This paper takes up a series of basic philosophical questions about the nature and existence of fictional characters. We begin with realist approaches that hinge on the thesis that at least some claims about fictional characters can be right or wrong because they refer to something that exists, such as abstract objects. Irrealist approaches deny such realist postulations and hold instead that fictional characters are a figment of the human imagin…
Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals: Lewis versus Williamson on modal knowledge
Functional Beauty, Perception, and Aesthetic Judgements
The concept of functional beauty is analysed in terms of the role played by beliefs, in particular expectations, in our perceptions. After finding various theories of functional beauty unsatisfying, I introduce a novel approach which explains how aesthetic judgements on a variety of different kinds of functional objects (chairs, buildings, cars, etc.) can be grounded in perceptions influenced by beliefs
Axiological pessimism, procreation and collective responsibility
A form of pessimism can support the claim that we have a collective duty to prevent the creation of additional human beings. More specifically, I argue that axiological pessimism, which suggests that human existence is overall bad (for humans) because of a form of evil it causes, implies that we should end human procreation, provided that we do not thereby generate further such evil. In turn, this conclusion can support anti‐natalism, the normati…
The animal, the corpse, and the remnant-person
Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals: Lewis versus Williamson on modal knowledge
Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals: Lewis versus Williamson on modal knowledge
Philosophical Perspectives on Fictional Characters
This paper takes up a series of basic philosophical questions about the nature and existence of fictional characters. We begin with realist approaches that hinge on the thesis that at least some claims about fictional characters can be right or wrong because they refer to something that exists, such as abstract objects. Irrealist approaches deny such realist postulations and hold instead that fictional characters are a figment of the human imagin…
Functional Beauty, Architecture, And Morality: A Beautiful Konzentrationslager
Some works of architecture have remarkable aesthetic value. According to certain philosophers, part of this value derives from the appearance of such constructions to fulfil the function for which they were built. I argue that one way of understanding the connection between function and aesthetic value resides in the concept of functional beauty. I analyse a number of recent accounts of this notion, then offer a better way of understanding it. I …
Functional Beauty, Perception, and Aesthetic Judgements
The concept of functional beauty is analysed in terms of the role played by beliefs, in particular expectations, in our perceptions. After finding various theories of functional beauty unsatisfying, I introduce a novel approach which explains how aesthetic judgements on a variety of different kinds of functional objects (chairs, buildings, cars, etc.) can be grounded in perceptions influenced by beliefs
The Will to Make‐Believe: Religious Fictionalism, Religious Beliefs, and the Value of Art
I explore some of the reasons why, under specific circumstances, it may be rational to make‐believe or imagine certain religious beliefs. Adopting a jargon familiar to certain contemporary philosophers, my main concern here is to assess what reasons can be given for adopting a fictionalist stance towards some religious beliefs. My understanding of fictionalism does not involve solely a propositional attitude but a broader stance, which may includ…
The animal, the corpse, and the remnant-person
Personal Identity and Trivial Survival
Your replica is created on Mars and you, on Earth, are destroyed. Parfit claims that your replica may still have what prudentially matters for you – provided that you are psychologically connected and continuous with your replica. If someone accidently destroys the tapes containing your psychological profile used in the production of your replica and this same action fortuitously produces a functionally equivalent tape, Ehring claims that Parfit …
Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry
"Derek Parfit (1942-2017) is widely considered to be one of the most important moral philosophers of the Twentieth Century. Reasons and Persons is arguably the most influential of the two books published in his lifetime and hailed as a classic work of ethics and personal identity. Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry is an outstanding introduction to and assessment of Parfit's book, with chapters by leading sch…
Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry
Metaphysical Egoism and Personal Identity
Centred worlds, personal identity and imagination
The Centred View offers an account of the connection between imagination and possibility that combines the centred world framework with some allegedly appealing intuitions regarding our persistence over time. In particular, Dilip Ninan suggests that the Centred View has the theoretical advantage of respecting our intuitions about cases of personal identity in certain imaginative scenarios while also being compatible with physicalism. Unfortunatel…
In Defence of the Acquaintance Principle in Aesthetics
Making an adequate aesthetic judgment about an object or an aesthetic property requires first-hand experience of that object or property. Many have suggested that this principle is a valid epistemic norm in the epistemology of the aesthetic. However, some recent philosophers have argued that certain works of conceptual art and other counterexamples disprove the principle in question, even suitably modified. In this paper, I argue that these philo…
Pretending and disbelieving
I formulate and criticise a condition that captures some recent ideas on the nature of pretence, namely, the disbelief condition. According to an initial understanding of this condition, an agent who is pretending that P must also disbelieve that P. I criticise this idea by proposing a counterexample showing that an agent may be in a state of pretence that does not imply disbelief in what is pretended. I also draw some general conclusions about t…
Acceptance‐Based or Teaching‐Based Rule Consequentialism
Is an action obligatory if and only if it is prescribed by a code that is the best to be taught to the next generation? This paper discusses whether this version of rule consequentialism is superior to acceptance‐based formulations in some relevant respects. Ultimately, I conclude that, given certain requirements rule consequentialism should ideally meet, teaching‐based formulations are no better than acceptance‐based ones
On the love for humanity and future generations
I argue for a qualified version of the claim that we love humanity. In particular, I suggest that our reactions to a series of scenarios describing different possible futures reveal that, after all, we have a form of direct concern for the survival and flourishing of humanity – and thus also towards future generations – that can be properly characterised as love
Rule Consequentialism and Demandingness: The Wrong Solution(s)
A textbook objection to consequentialism is that it is too demanding—on the assumption that a moral theory which is excessively demanding thereby loses plausibility. In this paper, I assess whether the mechanisms employed by two versions of rule consequentialism, those of Brad Hooker and Tim Mulgan, adequately meet the requirement of not being too demanding. I also examine whether the concept of human nature might help determine what should count…
Axiological pessimism, procreation and collective responsibility
A form of pessimism can support the claim that we have a collective duty to prevent the creation of additional human beings. More specifically, I argue that axiological pessimism, which suggests that human existence is overall bad (for humans) because of a form of evil it causes, implies that we should end human procreation, provided that we do not thereby generate further such evil. In turn, this conclusion can support anti‐natalism, the normati…
Epistemology (14 works) · Philosophy (14 works) · Aesthetics (7 works) · Psychology (7 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Art (3 works)