Jeremy Fantl
Biographic Data
| ID | 1064498 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jeremy Fantl |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jeremy |
| FAMILY NAME | Fantl |
| SIGNATURE | FANTL J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Calgary |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 21 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 190 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 21 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Mary Astell’s Knowledge-Norm of Belief
In A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Mary Astell argues for a knowledge-norm of belief. Her norm states that we are ‘To judge no further than we Perceive, and not to take anything for Truth, we do not evidently Know to be so.’ Astell’s argument for this norm does not rely on what is constitutive of belief, nor on any special disvalue of believing falsehood. Rather, she relies on general facts about blameworthiness, in particular that you are blam…
Knowledge: A Human Interest Story
Imagine a scene from a detective movie. The detective and their team are stumped. They’ve pursued all their leads and gotten nowhere, and all their suspects have been cleared. What do they do? In many such movies, it’s time to go back to the drawing board. “Let’s put on the left side of the board just what we know,” the detective might say. “This revolver was found at the murder scene. There is a palm print on the gun. The victim had a wallet on …
Gambles between obvious truths
Counterexamples to knowledge-action links are cases in which, intuitively, you know some proposition but aren’t rational to act accordingly. For example, it’s hard to plausibly deny knowledge of obvious truths like 2 > 1. But when given a choice between betting on 2 > 1 or disjunctions of obvious truths, it seems only rational to bet on the disjunctions, contrary to what knowledge-action links predict. I defend knowledge-action links against this…
Précis of The Limitations of the Open Mind and Replies to Nathan Ballantyne and Miriam Schleifer McCormick
In this article, I summarize the main takeaways from The Limitations of the Open Mind and reply to concerns raised by Miriam Schleifer McCormick and Nathan Ballantyne. In reply to McCormick, I emphasize potential difficulties involved in helping people change their minds while representing yourself as taking an “objective stance” toward them. In reply to Ballantyne, I clarify my reasons for thinking that open-mindedness is a matter of being willi…
Guidance and mainstream epistemology
Entitlement and misleading evidence
The standard conception of misleading evidence has it that e is misleading evidence that p iff e is evidence that p and p is false. I argue that this conception yields incorrect verdicts when we consider what it is for evidence to be misleading with respect to questions like whether p . Instead, we should adopt a conception of misleading evidence according to which e is misleading with respect to a question only if e is in‐fact irrelevant to that…
Fake News vs. Echo Chambers
I argue that there is a prima facie tension between solutions to the problem of fake news and solutions to the problem presented by various cognitive biases that dispose us to dismiss evidence against our prior beliefs (what might seem to be the driving force behind echo chambers). We can guard against fake news by strengthening belief. But we can exit echo chambers by becoming more sensitive to counterevidence, which seems to require weakening o…
What’s the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology
"What’s the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98(4), p. 834
Evidentialism as an Historical Theory
According to time-slice epistemology, what attitudes you should have at a time supervenes on features of you—like your evidence or mental states—at that time. Evidentialism is commonly assumed to be an instance of time-slice epistemology. I argue that if an influential argument against time-slice epistemology—that responding to evidence takes time—is sound, evidentialism is not an instance of time-slice epistemology. Therefore, evidentialism surv…
The Limitations of the Open Mind
When should you engage with difficult arguments against your cherished controversial beliefs? The primary conclusion of this book is that your obligations to engage with counterarguments are more limited than is often thought. In some standard situations, you shouldn’t engage with difficult counterarguments and, if you do, you shouldn’t engage with them open-mindedly. This conclusion runs counter to aspects of the Millian political tradition and …
Limitations of the Open Mind
Contextualism and Subject‐Sensitivity
Replies to Cohen, Neta and Reed
Précis of Knowledge in an Uncertain World
Knowledge in an Uncertain World
This study explores the relation between knowledge, reasons and justification. It argues that you can rely on what you know since what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on your reasons. But the assumption that knowledge allows for a chance of error makes this a controversial position in epistemology.
Thinking About Knowing
Knowing-How and Knowing-That
You knowthatGeorge W. Bush is the U.S. president, but you knowhowto ride a bicycle. What's the difference? According tointellectualists, not much: either knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing that something is the case or, at the very least, know-how requires a prior bit of theoretical knowledge.Anti-intellectualistsdeny this order of priority: either knowing-how and knowing-that are independent or, at the very least, knowing that so…
On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology
We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth‐related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge‐citatio…
Is Metaethics Morally Neutral
I argue, contra Dreier, Blackburn, and others, that there are no morally neutral metaethical positions. Every metaethical position commits you to the denial of some moral statement. So, for example, the metaethical position that there are no moral properties commits you to the denial of the (quite plausible) moral conjunction of 1) it is right to interfere violently when someone is wrongly causing massive suffering and 2) it is wrong to interfere…
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification
Research Article| January 01 2002 Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification Jeremy Fantl; Jeremy Fantl Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Matthew McGrath Matthew McGrath Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 67–94. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-1-67 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Jeremy Fant…
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification
Research Article| January 01 2002 Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification Jeremy Fantl; Jeremy Fantl Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Matthew McGrath Matthew McGrath Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 67–94. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-1-67 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Jeremy Fant…
On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology
We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth‐related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge‐citatio…
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification
Knowing-How and Knowing-That
You knowthatGeorge W. Bush is the U.S. president, but you knowhowto ride a bicycle. What's the difference? According tointellectualists, not much: either knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing that something is the case or, at the very least, know-how requires a prior bit of theoretical knowledge.Anti-intellectualistsdeny this order of priority: either knowing-how and knowing-that are independent or, at the very least, knowing that so…
Replies to Cohen, Neta and Reed
Is Metaethics Morally Neutral
I argue, contra Dreier, Blackburn, and others, that there are no morally neutral metaethical positions. Every metaethical position commits you to the denial of some moral statement. So, for example, the metaethical position that there are no moral properties commits you to the denial of the (quite plausible) moral conjunction of 1) it is right to interfere violently when someone is wrongly causing massive suffering and 2) it is wrong to interfere…
Contextualism and Subject‐Sensitivity
Précis of Knowledge in an Uncertain World
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification
Research Article| January 01 2002 Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification Jeremy Fantl; Jeremy Fantl Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Matthew McGrath Matthew McGrath Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 67–94. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-1-67 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Jeremy Fant…
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification
Is Metaethics Morally Neutral
I argue, contra Dreier, Blackburn, and others, that there are no morally neutral metaethical positions. Every metaethical position commits you to the denial of some moral statement. So, for example, the metaethical position that there are no moral properties commits you to the denial of the (quite plausible) moral conjunction of 1) it is right to interfere violently when someone is wrongly causing massive suffering and 2) it is wrong to interfere…
On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology
We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth‐related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge‐citatio…
Thinking About Knowing
Knowing-How and Knowing-That
You knowthatGeorge W. Bush is the U.S. president, but you knowhowto ride a bicycle. What's the difference? According tointellectualists, not much: either knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing that something is the case or, at the very least, know-how requires a prior bit of theoretical knowledge.Anti-intellectualistsdeny this order of priority: either knowing-how and knowing-that are independent or, at the very least, knowing that so…
Knowledge in an Uncertain World
This study explores the relation between knowledge, reasons and justification. It argues that you can rely on what you know since what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on your reasons. But the assumption that knowledge allows for a chance of error makes this a controversial position in epistemology.
Contextualism and Subject‐Sensitivity
Replies to Cohen, Neta and Reed
Précis of Knowledge in an Uncertain World
The Limitations of the Open Mind
When should you engage with difficult arguments against your cherished controversial beliefs? The primary conclusion of this book is that your obligations to engage with counterarguments are more limited than is often thought. In some standard situations, you shouldn’t engage with difficult counterarguments and, if you do, you shouldn’t engage with them open-mindedly. This conclusion runs counter to aspects of the Millian political tradition and …
Limitations of the Open Mind
What’s the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology
"What’s the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98(4), p. 834
Evidentialism as an Historical Theory
According to time-slice epistemology, what attitudes you should have at a time supervenes on features of you—like your evidence or mental states—at that time. Evidentialism is commonly assumed to be an instance of time-slice epistemology. I argue that if an influential argument against time-slice epistemology—that responding to evidence takes time—is sound, evidentialism is not an instance of time-slice epistemology. Therefore, evidentialism surv…
Fake News vs. Echo Chambers
I argue that there is a prima facie tension between solutions to the problem of fake news and solutions to the problem presented by various cognitive biases that dispose us to dismiss evidence against our prior beliefs (what might seem to be the driving force behind echo chambers). We can guard against fake news by strengthening belief. But we can exit echo chambers by becoming more sensitive to counterevidence, which seems to require weakening o…
Entitlement and misleading evidence
The standard conception of misleading evidence has it that e is misleading evidence that p iff e is evidence that p and p is false. I argue that this conception yields incorrect verdicts when we consider what it is for evidence to be misleading with respect to questions like whether p . Instead, we should adopt a conception of misleading evidence according to which e is misleading with respect to a question only if e is in‐fact irrelevant to that…
Guidance and mainstream epistemology
Gambles between obvious truths
Counterexamples to knowledge-action links are cases in which, intuitively, you know some proposition but aren’t rational to act accordingly. For example, it’s hard to plausibly deny knowledge of obvious truths like 2 > 1. But when given a choice between betting on 2 > 1 or disjunctions of obvious truths, it seems only rational to bet on the disjunctions, contrary to what knowledge-action links predict. I defend knowledge-action links against this…
Précis of The Limitations of the Open Mind and Replies to Nathan Ballantyne and Miriam Schleifer McCormick
In this article, I summarize the main takeaways from The Limitations of the Open Mind and reply to concerns raised by Miriam Schleifer McCormick and Nathan Ballantyne. In reply to McCormick, I emphasize potential difficulties involved in helping people change their minds while representing yourself as taking an “objective stance” toward them. In reply to Ballantyne, I clarify my reasons for thinking that open-mindedness is a matter of being willi…
Mary Astell’s Knowledge-Norm of Belief
In A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Mary Astell argues for a knowledge-norm of belief. Her norm states that we are ‘To judge no further than we Perceive, and not to take anything for Truth, we do not evidently Know to be so.’ Astell’s argument for this norm does not rely on what is constitutive of belief, nor on any special disvalue of believing falsehood. Rather, she relies on general facts about blameworthiness, in particular that you are blam…
Knowledge: A Human Interest Story
Imagine a scene from a detective movie. The detective and their team are stumped. They’ve pursued all their leads and gotten nowhere, and all their suspects have been cleared. What do they do? In many such movies, it’s time to go back to the drawing board. “Let’s put on the left side of the board just what we know,” the detective might say. “This revolver was found at the murder scene. There is a palm print on the gun. The victim had a wallet on …
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (18 works) · Philosophy (15 works) · Epistemology (12 works) · Computer Science (10 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (9 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Citation (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Epistemology of Wikipedia (4 works) · Library science (4 works)