Is Metaethics Morally Neutral
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8093022 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jeremy Fantl (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 87 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 24-44 |
| Publication date | 2006-02-24 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Pacific philosophical quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0279-0750 • E-ISSN: 1468-0114 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00246.x |
| OpenAlex | W2037627711 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 16 |
I argue, contra Dreier, Blackburn, and others, that there are no morally neutral metaethical positions. Every metaethical position commits you to the denial of some moral statement. So, for example, the metaethical position that there are no moral properties commits you to the denial of the (quite plausible) moral conjunction of 1) it is right to interfere violently when someone is wrongly causing massive suffering and 2) it is wrong to interfere violently when only non‐moral properties are at stake. The argument generalizes to all metaethical positions
Argument (complex analysis · Denial · Economics · Epistemology · Position (finance · Psychoanalysis · Statement (logic · Chemistry · Ethics in medical practice · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2023 (12) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |