Matthew Frise
Biographic Data
| ID | 1065206 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Matthew Frise |
| GIVEN NAMES | Matthew |
| FAMILY NAME | Frise |
| SIGNATURE | FRISE M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Rochester |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1311-2963 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Reliabilism’s Memory Loss
Generativism about memory justification is the view that memory can generate epistemic justification. Generativism is gaining popularity, but process reliabilists tend to resist it. Process reliabilism explains the justification of beliefs by way of the reliability of the processes they result from. Some advocates of reliabilism deny various forms of generativism. Other reliabilists reject or remain neutral about only the more extreme forms. I ar…
Forgetting memory skepticism
Memory skepticism denies our memory beliefs could have any notable epistemic good. One route to memory skepticism is to challenge memory’s epistemic trustworthiness, that is, its functioning in a way necessary for it to provide epistemic justification. In this paper we develop and respond to this challenge. It could threaten memory in such a way that we altogether lack doxastic attitudes. If it threatens memory in this way, then the challenge is …
Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past
Episodic remembering returns us to events in our personal past. This crisp and impressive book addresses three main questions about it: What exactly is it? How does it enable human knowledge? Why did we evolve to have it? Chapter 1 previews the book's intertwined answers: episodic remembering is a reliable and evolutionarily adaptive kind of imagining. The next two chapters stage-build. Chapter 2 argues that, given the human memory systems that s…
Preservationism in the Epistemology of Memory
Preservationism states that memory preserves the justification of the beliefs it preserves. More precisely: if S formed a justified belief that p at t1 and retains in memory a belief that p until t2, then S's belief that p is prima facie justified via memory at t2. Preservationism is an unchallenged orthodoxy in the epistemology of memory. Advocates include Sven Bernecker, Tyler Burge, Alvin Goldman, Gilbert Harman, Michael Huemer, Matthew McGrat…
What God only knows: A reply to Rob Lovering
Rob Lovering has recently argued that God is not omniscient on the grounds that (1) in order to be omniscient a subject must not only know all truths always but also know what it's like not to know a truth, and (2) God cannot fulfil both of these requirements. I show that Lovering's argument is unsuccessful since he inadequately supports (1) and (2), and since there are several serious doubts about (2). I also show that Lovering does not otherwis…
Speaking freely: On free will and the epistemology of testimony
The Mad, Bad, or God argument explained
According to Stephen Davis's Mad, Bad, or God (MBG) argument, Jesus must be divine since all other leading explanations of his alleged claim to be divine can be ruled out. I criticize Davis's argument and then sketch an ‘inference to best explanation’ MBG argument. I argue that proponents and critics of MBG arguments should focus on mine since it avoids common pitfalls at no cost and it best respects (for better or worse) a massive but too easily…
Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past
Episodic remembering returns us to events in our personal past. This crisp and impressive book addresses three main questions about it: What exactly is it? How does it enable human knowledge? Why did we evolve to have it? Chapter 1 previews the book's intertwined answers: episodic remembering is a reliable and evolutionarily adaptive kind of imagining. The next two chapters stage-build. Chapter 2 argues that, given the human memory systems that s…
Preservationism in the Epistemology of Memory
Preservationism states that memory preserves the justification of the beliefs it preserves. More precisely: if S formed a justified belief that p at t1 and retains in memory a belief that p until t2, then S's belief that p is prima facie justified via memory at t2. Preservationism is an unchallenged orthodoxy in the epistemology of memory. Advocates include Sven Bernecker, Tyler Burge, Alvin Goldman, Gilbert Harman, Michael Huemer, Matthew McGrat…
The Mad, Bad, or God argument explained
According to Stephen Davis's Mad, Bad, or God (MBG) argument, Jesus must be divine since all other leading explanations of his alleged claim to be divine can be ruled out. I criticize Davis's argument and then sketch an ‘inference to best explanation’ MBG argument. I argue that proponents and critics of MBG arguments should focus on mine since it avoids common pitfalls at no cost and it best respects (for better or worse) a massive but too easily…
What God only knows: A reply to Rob Lovering
Rob Lovering has recently argued that God is not omniscient on the grounds that (1) in order to be omniscient a subject must not only know all truths always but also know what it's like not to know a truth, and (2) God cannot fulfil both of these requirements. I show that Lovering's argument is unsuccessful since he inadequately supports (1) and (2), and since there are several serious doubts about (2). I also show that Lovering does not otherwis…
Speaking freely: On free will and the epistemology of testimony
Preservationism in the Epistemology of Memory
Preservationism states that memory preserves the justification of the beliefs it preserves. More precisely: if S formed a justified belief that p at t1 and retains in memory a belief that p until t2, then S's belief that p is prima facie justified via memory at t2. Preservationism is an unchallenged orthodoxy in the epistemology of memory. Advocates include Sven Bernecker, Tyler Burge, Alvin Goldman, Gilbert Harman, Michael Huemer, Matthew McGrat…
Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past
Episodic remembering returns us to events in our personal past. This crisp and impressive book addresses three main questions about it: What exactly is it? How does it enable human knowledge? Why did we evolve to have it? Chapter 1 previews the book's intertwined answers: episodic remembering is a reliable and evolutionarily adaptive kind of imagining. The next two chapters stage-build. Chapter 2 argues that, given the human memory systems that s…
Forgetting memory skepticism
Memory skepticism denies our memory beliefs could have any notable epistemic good. One route to memory skepticism is to challenge memory’s epistemic trustworthiness, that is, its functioning in a way necessary for it to provide epistemic justification. In this paper we develop and respond to this challenge. It could threaten memory in such a way that we altogether lack doxastic attitudes. If it threatens memory in this way, then the challenge is …
Reliabilism’s Memory Loss
Generativism about memory justification is the view that memory can generate epistemic justification. Generativism is gaining popularity, but process reliabilists tend to resist it. Process reliabilism explains the justification of beliefs by way of the reliability of the processes they result from. Some advocates of reliabilism deny various forms of generativism. Other reliabilists reject or remain neutral about only the more extreme forms. I ar…
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Cognitive science (3 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Dilemma (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works)