Forgetting memory skepticism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10345679 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthew Frise (0000-0002-1311-2963, Santa Clara University, corresponding author), Kelly Mccain (0000-0002-2447-4046, University of Alabama at Birmingham) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 103 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 253-263 |
| Publication date | 2020-07-15 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phpr.12715 |
| OpenAlex | W3042447708 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 17 |
Memory skepticism denies our memory beliefs could have any notable epistemic good. One route to memory skepticism is to challenge memory’s epistemic trustworthiness, that is, its functioning in a way necessary for it to provide epistemic justification. In this paper we develop and respond to this challenge. It could threaten memory in such a way that we altogether lack doxastic attitudes. If it threatens memory in this way, then the challenge is importantly self‐defeating. If it does not threaten memory in this way, then the challenge leaves a foundation for an inference to the best explanation response, one we articulate and support
Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Forgetting · Inference · Skepticism · Trustworthiness · Epilepsy research and treatment · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Pharmacological Effects and Toxicity Studies · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,67 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2024 (2) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |