Yonatan Shemmer
Biographic Data
| ID | 1070549 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Yonatan Shemmer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Yonatan |
| FAMILY NAME | Shemmer |
| SIGNATURE | SHEMMER Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Sheffield |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5842-8470 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
It’s common sense – you don’t need to believe to disagree
It is often assumed that disagreement only occurs when there is a clash (e.g., inconsistency) between beliefs. In the philosophical literature, this “narrow” view has sometimes been considered the obvious, intuitively correct view. In this paper, we argue that it should not be. We have conducted two preregistered studies gauging English speakers’ intuitions about whether there is disagreement in a case where the parties have non-clashing beliefs …
The Difficult Choices of Trustworthy People
Disagreement for Dialetheists
Dialetheists believe some sentences are both true and false. Objectors have argued that this makes it unclear how people can disagree with each other because, given the dialetheist’s commitments, if I make a claim and you tell me my claim is false, we might both be correct. Graham Priest (2006a) thinks that people disagree by rejecting or denying what is said rather than ascribing falsehood to it. We build on the work of Julien Murzi and Massimil…
Subjectivism about Future Reasons or The Guise of Caring
According to Parfit one of the main weaknesses of subjectivism is its inability to account for our intuition that future reasons have present authority. Parfit is only partly right about the contours of our intuition however he does have a point: sometimes our future reasons do have authority in current deliberation. Subjectivists who grappled with his challenge have organized themselves along two battle lines: those who think that only current d…
Constructivism in practical philosophy
Full Information, Well-Being, and Reasonable Desires
According to Railton: x is good for me iff my Fully Informed Self (FIS) while contemplating my situation would want me to want x. I offer four interpretations of this view. The first three are inadequate. Their inadequacy rests on the following two facts: (a) my FIS cannot want me to want what would be irrational for me to want, (b) when contemplating what is rational for me to want we must specify a particular way in which I could rationally acq…
Brute Rationality
Book Review| April 01 2008 Brute Rationality Joshua Gert, Brute Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xiii + 230 pp. Yonatan Shemmer Yonatan Shemmer Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 306–310. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-044 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter Li…
Desires as Reasons 1
Humeans believe that at least some of our desires give us reasons for action. This view is widely accepted by social scientists and has some following among philosophers. In recent years important objections were raised against this position by Scanlon, Dancy, and others. The foundations of the Humean view have never been properly defended. In the first part of the paper I discuss some objections to the Humean position. In the second part I attem…
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Desires as Reasons 1
Humeans believe that at least some of our desires give us reasons for action. This view is widely accepted by social scientists and has some following among philosophers. In recent years important objections were raised against this position by Scanlon, Dancy, and others. The foundations of the Humean view have never been properly defended. In the first part of the paper I discuss some objections to the Humean position. In the second part I attem…
Brute Rationality
Book Review| April 01 2008 Brute Rationality Joshua Gert, Brute Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xiii + 230 pp. Yonatan Shemmer Yonatan Shemmer Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 306–310. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-044 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter Li…
Full Information, Well-Being, and Reasonable Desires
According to Railton: x is good for me iff my Fully Informed Self (FIS) while contemplating my situation would want me to want x. I offer four interpretations of this view. The first three are inadequate. Their inadequacy rests on the following two facts: (a) my FIS cannot want me to want what would be irrational for me to want, (b) when contemplating what is rational for me to want we must specify a particular way in which I could rationally acq…
Constructivism in practical philosophy
Subjectivism about Future Reasons or The Guise of Caring
According to Parfit one of the main weaknesses of subjectivism is its inability to account for our intuition that future reasons have present authority. Parfit is only partly right about the contours of our intuition however he does have a point: sometimes our future reasons do have authority in current deliberation. Subjectivists who grappled with his challenge have organized themselves along two battle lines: those who think that only current d…
Disagreement for Dialetheists
Dialetheists believe some sentences are both true and false. Objectors have argued that this makes it unclear how people can disagree with each other because, given the dialetheist’s commitments, if I make a claim and you tell me my claim is false, we might both be correct. Graham Priest (2006a) thinks that people disagree by rejecting or denying what is said rather than ascribing falsehood to it. We build on the work of Julien Murzi and Massimil…
It’s common sense – you don’t need to believe to disagree
It is often assumed that disagreement only occurs when there is a clash (e.g., inconsistency) between beliefs. In the philosophical literature, this “narrow” view has sometimes been considered the obvious, intuitively correct view. In this paper, we argue that it should not be. We have conducted two preregistered studies gauging English speakers’ intuitions about whether there is disagreement in a case where the parties have non-clashing beliefs …
The Difficult Choices of Trustworthy People
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Political science (3 works)