Subjectivism about Future Reasons or The Guise of Caring
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10350992 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Yonatan Shemmer (0000-0001-5842-8470, University of Sheffield, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 101 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 630-648 |
| Publication date | 2019-07-24 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phpr.12614 |
| OpenAlex | W2954069026 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 24 |
According to Parfit one of the main weaknesses of subjectivism is its inability to account for our intuition that future reasons have present authority. Parfit is only partly right about the contours of our intuition however he does have a point: sometimes our future reasons do have authority in current deliberation. Subjectivists who grappled with his challenge have organized themselves along two battle lines: those who think that only current desires are fundamental sources of reasons and those who think that future desires are also fundamental sources of reasons. I belong to the first camp but I believe that focusing on the question of fundamentality obscures the real issue. The key to addressing Parfit's challenge is to shift our focus to a different question. We should ask ourselves what are the best policies to adopt towards our future reasons. Using resources developed by Bratman and Raz, and building on the insight that we often fail to recognize our true current concerns, I argue that we are sometimes justified in thinking of, and therefore treating, our future reasons as having present authority
Battle · Deliberation · Epistemology · Intuition · Objectivism · Political science · Sociology · Subjectivism · Ethics in medical practice · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
Ethics
Planning Agency, Autonomous Agency
Valuing and the Will
Temptation Revisited
Moral Thinking
Willing, Wanting, Waiting
Emotion and Decision Making
Chapter 10 Motivated Moral Reasoning
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Free Agency
Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action
The Nature of Rationality
Reasons and the Good
Slaves of the Passions
Why not wait
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings
Self-Constitution
| Highly cited | No |
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