Markus Kohl
Biographic Data
| ID | 1075335 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Markus Kohl |
| GIVEN NAMES | Markus |
| FAMILY NAME | Kohl |
| SIGNATURE | KOHL M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9082-8490 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 25 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 35 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 25 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Why is there no Kantian duty to believe in God and Immortality
Kant emphatically denies that we stand under a moral duty to believe in God and (our) immortality. This essay examines how this denial could be consistent with his view that we have a moral duty to promote the highest good and that promoting the highest good requires us to adopt these beliefs. I argue that the key to understanding Kant's denial of a duty to believe lies in his view that not every rational requirement has the special, especially d…
Nietzsche’s Nihilisms
For Nietzsche, we can regard our life as worth living only if we overcome the threat of nihilism. However, it is difficult to determine the nature of this threat since he characterizes the stance of nihilism in multiple, rather different and seemingly incompatible ways. This essay attempts to shed light on this issue by distinguishing three key forms of nihilism that figure centrally in Nietzsche’s thinking and pose different challenges to life a…
Grounding empirical in transcendental reality
Kant on Mind-Dependence
In Kant’s idealism, all spatiotemporal objects depend on the human mind in a certain way. A central issue here is whether the existence of spatiotemporal things requires that these things are, at least at some point, objects of some actual experience or of a merely possible experience. In this essay, I argue (on textual and philosophical grounds) for the latter view: spatiotemporal things exist (or spatiotemporal events occur) if they are objects…
Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency
Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency provides an original, comprehensive interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of freedom. It shows that for Kant absolute transcendental freedom or rational autonomy is the necessary presupposition of all meaningful, norm-governed human agency in its moral, epistemic, and aesthetic dimensions. The book thereby gives a compelling sense to Kant’s estimation that freedom is a “cardinal point,” even the “keystone” of his e…
The World According to Kant
In this excellent book, Anja Jauernig provides an exceptionally clear and illuminating reading of Kant’s critical idealism. Jauernig is explicit from the beginning that she is concerned with Kant’s idealism as a metaphysical doctrine, with “Kant’s account of what there is in the world, understood as the sum total of everything that has reality, including, in particular, his account of appearances and things in themselves and their relation to one…
A priori intuition and transcendental necessity in Kant's idealism
I examine how Kant argues for the transcendental ideality of space. I defend a reading on which Kant accepts the ideality of space because it explains our (actual) knowledge that mathematical judgments are necessarily true. I argue that this reading is preferable over the alternative suggestion that Kant can infer the ideality of space directly from the fact that we have an a priori intuition of space. Moreover, I argue that the reading I propose…
Kants subjektivistische Begründung von Moral und Freiheit im Naturrecht Feyerabend
“Naturrecht Feyerabend” is a collection of student notes taken on a lecture that Kant gave around the time he was working on the Groundwork. I show that these notes portray Kant as proposing a defense of morality and freedom whose “subjectivism” is unparalleled by anything that we find in his major published works. Kant here traces both the normativity of the moral principle that we must treat humanity as an end in itself and the legitimacy of re…
Kant on Cognizing Oneself as a Spontaneous Cognizer
I examine a range of issues concerning Kant's conception of cognitive spontaneity. I consider whether we can cognize or know ourselves as spontaneous cognizers, and why Kant seems to regard the notion of cognitive spontaneity as less problematic than the idea of moral spontaneity. As an organizing theme of my discussion, I use an apparent tension between the A-edition and the B-edition of the first Critique. Against common interpretations, I argu…
Kant’s Standpoint Distinction
I examine what Kant means when he appeals to different standpoints. I argue that Kant seeks to contrast an empirical, anthropocentric standpoint with a normative, more than human standpoint. Against common interpretations, I argue that the normative standpoint is not confined to practical reason, since theoretical reason is concerned with what ought to be as well. Finally, I defend the coherence of Kant’s distinction against important objections
Kant's Critique of Instrumental Reason
I argue against the prevalent view that in addition to the categorical imperative of morality, Kant accepts a further law of practical reason, ‘the’ Hypothetical Imperative. Kant rejects the idea that instrumental reason can be a source of a priori , objectively necessary normative requirements. His critique of instrumental reason is a central component of his argument for the supreme rational authority of morality: only moral reason can provide …
The Metaphysical Deduction and the Shadow of Humean Skepticism
I examine the division of labor between the Metaphysical Deduction (MD) and the Transcendental Deduction (TD). Against a common reading, I argue that the MD is insufficient to prove the a priori origin of the categories. For both Kant and his main opponent, namely Hume, the question of whether the categories have an a priori origin in the pure understanding is inseparable from the question of whether they have objective validity. Since the MD doe…
The Normativity of Prudence
Kant’s account of “precepts of prudence” raises a striking interpretive puzzle. On the one hand, he presents such precepts as normative-practical rules; on the other hand, he relegates them to theoretical philosophy. I argue that to render these two strands coherent, we must assume that our empirical nature is a “source of normativity” for us: prudence is normative for us just because we have an “unconditional” empirical desire for obtaining happ…
Kant on Freedom of Empirical Thought
It is standardly assumed that, in Kant, “free agency” is identical to moral agency and requires the will or practical reason. Likewise, it is often held that the concept of “spontaneity” that Kant uses in his theoretical philosophy is very different from, and much thinner than, his idea of practical spontaneity. In this paper I argue for the contrary view: Kant has a rich theory of doxastic free agency, and the spontaneity in empirical thought (w…
Kant and 'Ought Implies Can
Although Kant is often considered the founding father of the controversial principle ‘Ought Implies Can’ (OIC), it is not at all clear how Kant himself understands and defends this principle. This essay provides a substained interpretation of Kant's views on OIC. I argue that Kant endorses two versions of OIC: a version that is concerned with our physical capacities, and a version that posits a link between moral obligation and a volitional power…
Transcendental and Practical Freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason
To many readers, it has seemed that Kant’s discussion of the relation between practical and transcendental freedom in the Transcendental Dialectic is inconsistent with his discussion of the same relation in the Canon of Pure Reason. In this paper I argue for a novel way of preserving the consistency of Kant’s view: in both the Dialectic and the Canon, ‘transcendental freedom’ requires the absence of determination by all natural causes, whereas ‘p…
Kant on the Inapplicability of the Categories to Things in Themselves
This paper addresses the question of what we can legitimately say about things in themselves in Kant's critical doctrine. Many Kant scholars believe that Kant allows that things in themselves can be characterized through the unschematized or ‘pure’ concepts of our understanding such as ‘substance’ or ‘causality’. However, I show that on Kant's view things in themselves do not conform to the unschematized categories (given their standard discursiv…
Substancehood and Subjecthood in Aristotle's Categories
I attempt to answer the question of what Aristotle's criteria for 'being a substance' are in the Categories. On the basis of close textual analysis, I argue that subjecthood, conceived in a certain way, is the criterion that explains why both concrete objects and substance universals must be regarded as substances. It also explains the substantial primacy of concrete objects. But subjecthood can only function as such a criterion if both the subje…
Les Cités grecques et la guerre en Asie mineure à l’époque hellénistique
Les monarchies hellénistiques, en raison de leur puissance financière et militaire, furent les protagonistes majeurs de la diplomatie et des conflits armés en Orient depuis la fin du IVe siècle av. J.-C. jusqu'à l'arrivée de Rome sur la scène régionale aux IIe/Ier siècles av. J.-C. En furent-elles les seuls acteurs ? L'idée a longtemps prévalu, dans l'historiographie contemporaine, d'un abaissement politique irrémédiable des cités grecques à cett…
A. Fouille des abords Nord de l'Artémision
Sgourou Marina, Blondé Francine, Muller Arthur, Beaudry Nicolas, Kohl Markus, Kozeli Tony, Sanidas Giorgos. A. Fouille des abords Nord de l'Artémision. In: Bulletin de correspondance hellénique. Volume 128-129, livraison 2.1, 2004. pp. 734-751
C. Terrain Héraklis Kokkinos
Kohl Markus, Muller Arthur, Sgourou Marina. C. Terrain Héraklis Kokkinos : sondage G (1960 et 2002). In: Bulletin de correspondance hellénique. Volume 127, livraison 2, 2003. pp. 490-493
Das Nikephorion von Pergamon
L’ensemble dudit Nikephorion de Pergame et les fêtes qui s’y déroulaient avec des concours et des sacrifices sont étudiés à l’aide des principales sources écrites et de documents archéologiques. Les Niképhories, qui furent célébrées pour la première fois sous Eumène II, reposent sur une longue tradition de fêtes en l’honneur d’Athéna. Une nouvelle interprétation de la topographie historique de Pergame permet une localisation du Nikephorion, ident…
Thasos
Kohl Markus, Marc Jean-Yves, Viviers Didier. Thasos. In: Bulletin de correspondance hellénique. Volume 125, livraison 2, 2001. pp. 592-608
Thasos
Grandjean Yves, Salviat François, Kohl Markus, Marc Jean-Yves. Thasos. In: Bulletin de correspondance hellénique. Volume 122, livraison 2, 1998. pp. 553-566
Thasos
Grandjean Yves, Kohl Markus, Marc Jean-Yves, Salviat François, Viviers Didier. Thasos. In: Bulletin de correspondance hellénique. Volume 121, livraison 2, 1997. pp. 758-775
Kant on Freedom of Empirical Thought
It is standardly assumed that, in Kant, “free agency” is identical to moral agency and requires the will or practical reason. Likewise, it is often held that the concept of “spontaneity” that Kant uses in his theoretical philosophy is very different from, and much thinner than, his idea of practical spontaneity. In this paper I argue for the contrary view: Kant has a rich theory of doxastic free agency, and the spontaneity in empirical thought (w…
Kant and 'Ought Implies Can
Although Kant is often considered the founding father of the controversial principle ‘Ought Implies Can’ (OIC), it is not at all clear how Kant himself understands and defends this principle. This essay provides a substained interpretation of Kant's views on OIC. I argue that Kant endorses two versions of OIC: a version that is concerned with our physical capacities, and a version that posits a link between moral obligation and a volitional power…
Kant on the Inapplicability of the Categories to Things in Themselves
This paper addresses the question of what we can legitimately say about things in themselves in Kant's critical doctrine. Many Kant scholars believe that Kant allows that things in themselves can be characterized through the unschematized or ‘pure’ concepts of our understanding such as ‘substance’ or ‘causality’. However, I show that on Kant's view things in themselves do not conform to the unschematized categories (given their standard discursiv…
Transcendental and Practical Freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason
To many readers, it has seemed that Kant’s discussion of the relation between practical and transcendental freedom in the Transcendental Dialectic is inconsistent with his discussion of the same relation in the Canon of Pure Reason. In this paper I argue for a novel way of preserving the consistency of Kant’s view: in both the Dialectic and the Canon, ‘transcendental freedom’ requires the absence of determination by all natural causes, whereas ‘p…
Kant on Cognizing Oneself as a Spontaneous Cognizer
I examine a range of issues concerning Kant's conception of cognitive spontaneity. I consider whether we can cognize or know ourselves as spontaneous cognizers, and why Kant seems to regard the notion of cognitive spontaneity as less problematic than the idea of moral spontaneity. As an organizing theme of my discussion, I use an apparent tension between the A-edition and the B-edition of the first Critique. Against common interpretations, I argu…
Kant's Critique of Instrumental Reason
I argue against the prevalent view that in addition to the categorical imperative of morality, Kant accepts a further law of practical reason, ‘the’ Hypothetical Imperative. Kant rejects the idea that instrumental reason can be a source of a priori , objectively necessary normative requirements. His critique of instrumental reason is a central component of his argument for the supreme rational authority of morality: only moral reason can provide …
The Metaphysical Deduction and the Shadow of Humean Skepticism
I examine the division of labor between the Metaphysical Deduction (MD) and the Transcendental Deduction (TD). Against a common reading, I argue that the MD is insufficient to prove the a priori origin of the categories. For both Kant and his main opponent, namely Hume, the question of whether the categories have an a priori origin in the pure understanding is inseparable from the question of whether they have objective validity. Since the MD doe…
The Normativity of Prudence
Kant’s account of “precepts of prudence” raises a striking interpretive puzzle. On the one hand, he presents such precepts as normative-practical rules; on the other hand, he relegates them to theoretical philosophy. I argue that to render these two strands coherent, we must assume that our empirical nature is a “source of normativity” for us: prudence is normative for us just because we have an “unconditional” empirical desire for obtaining happ…
Thasos
Grandjean Yves, Kohl Markus, Marc Jean-Yves, Salviat François, Viviers Didier. Thasos. In: Bulletin de correspondance hellénique. Volume 121, livraison 2, 1997. pp. 758-775
Thasos
Grandjean Yves, Salviat François, Kohl Markus, Marc Jean-Yves. Thasos. In: Bulletin de correspondance hellénique. Volume 122, livraison 2, 1998. pp. 553-566
Thasos
Kohl Markus, Marc Jean-Yves, Viviers Didier. Thasos. In: Bulletin de correspondance hellénique. Volume 125, livraison 2, 2001. pp. 592-608
Das Nikephorion von Pergamon
L’ensemble dudit Nikephorion de Pergame et les fêtes qui s’y déroulaient avec des concours et des sacrifices sont étudiés à l’aide des principales sources écrites et de documents archéologiques. Les Niképhories, qui furent célébrées pour la première fois sous Eumène II, reposent sur une longue tradition de fêtes en l’honneur d’Athéna. Une nouvelle interprétation de la topographie historique de Pergame permet une localisation du Nikephorion, ident…
C. Terrain Héraklis Kokkinos
Kohl Markus, Muller Arthur, Sgourou Marina. C. Terrain Héraklis Kokkinos : sondage G (1960 et 2002). In: Bulletin de correspondance hellénique. Volume 127, livraison 2, 2003. pp. 490-493
Les Cités grecques et la guerre en Asie mineure à l’époque hellénistique
Les monarchies hellénistiques, en raison de leur puissance financière et militaire, furent les protagonistes majeurs de la diplomatie et des conflits armés en Orient depuis la fin du IVe siècle av. J.-C. jusqu'à l'arrivée de Rome sur la scène régionale aux IIe/Ier siècles av. J.-C. En furent-elles les seuls acteurs ? L'idée a longtemps prévalu, dans l'historiographie contemporaine, d'un abaissement politique irrémédiable des cités grecques à cett…
A. Fouille des abords Nord de l'Artémision
Sgourou Marina, Blondé Francine, Muller Arthur, Beaudry Nicolas, Kohl Markus, Kozeli Tony, Sanidas Giorgos. A. Fouille des abords Nord de l'Artémision. In: Bulletin de correspondance hellénique. Volume 128-129, livraison 2.1, 2004. pp. 734-751
Substancehood and Subjecthood in Aristotle's Categories
I attempt to answer the question of what Aristotle's criteria for 'being a substance' are in the Categories. On the basis of close textual analysis, I argue that subjecthood, conceived in a certain way, is the criterion that explains why both concrete objects and substance universals must be regarded as substances. It also explains the substantial primacy of concrete objects. But subjecthood can only function as such a criterion if both the subje…
Transcendental and Practical Freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason
To many readers, it has seemed that Kant’s discussion of the relation between practical and transcendental freedom in the Transcendental Dialectic is inconsistent with his discussion of the same relation in the Canon of Pure Reason. In this paper I argue for a novel way of preserving the consistency of Kant’s view: in both the Dialectic and the Canon, ‘transcendental freedom’ requires the absence of determination by all natural causes, whereas ‘p…
Kant on the Inapplicability of the Categories to Things in Themselves
This paper addresses the question of what we can legitimately say about things in themselves in Kant's critical doctrine. Many Kant scholars believe that Kant allows that things in themselves can be characterized through the unschematized or ‘pure’ concepts of our understanding such as ‘substance’ or ‘causality’. However, I show that on Kant's view things in themselves do not conform to the unschematized categories (given their standard discursiv…
Kant on Freedom of Empirical Thought
It is standardly assumed that, in Kant, “free agency” is identical to moral agency and requires the will or practical reason. Likewise, it is often held that the concept of “spontaneity” that Kant uses in his theoretical philosophy is very different from, and much thinner than, his idea of practical spontaneity. In this paper I argue for the contrary view: Kant has a rich theory of doxastic free agency, and the spontaneity in empirical thought (w…
Kant and 'Ought Implies Can
Although Kant is often considered the founding father of the controversial principle ‘Ought Implies Can’ (OIC), it is not at all clear how Kant himself understands and defends this principle. This essay provides a substained interpretation of Kant's views on OIC. I argue that Kant endorses two versions of OIC: a version that is concerned with our physical capacities, and a version that posits a link between moral obligation and a volitional power…
The Normativity of Prudence
Kant’s account of “precepts of prudence” raises a striking interpretive puzzle. On the one hand, he presents such precepts as normative-practical rules; on the other hand, he relegates them to theoretical philosophy. I argue that to render these two strands coherent, we must assume that our empirical nature is a “source of normativity” for us: prudence is normative for us just because we have an “unconditional” empirical desire for obtaining happ…
Kant’s Standpoint Distinction
I examine what Kant means when he appeals to different standpoints. I argue that Kant seeks to contrast an empirical, anthropocentric standpoint with a normative, more than human standpoint. Against common interpretations, I argue that the normative standpoint is not confined to practical reason, since theoretical reason is concerned with what ought to be as well. Finally, I defend the coherence of Kant’s distinction against important objections
Kant's Critique of Instrumental Reason
I argue against the prevalent view that in addition to the categorical imperative of morality, Kant accepts a further law of practical reason, ‘the’ Hypothetical Imperative. Kant rejects the idea that instrumental reason can be a source of a priori , objectively necessary normative requirements. His critique of instrumental reason is a central component of his argument for the supreme rational authority of morality: only moral reason can provide …
The Metaphysical Deduction and the Shadow of Humean Skepticism
I examine the division of labor between the Metaphysical Deduction (MD) and the Transcendental Deduction (TD). Against a common reading, I argue that the MD is insufficient to prove the a priori origin of the categories. For both Kant and his main opponent, namely Hume, the question of whether the categories have an a priori origin in the pure understanding is inseparable from the question of whether they have objective validity. Since the MD doe…
Kant on Cognizing Oneself as a Spontaneous Cognizer
I examine a range of issues concerning Kant's conception of cognitive spontaneity. I consider whether we can cognize or know ourselves as spontaneous cognizers, and why Kant seems to regard the notion of cognitive spontaneity as less problematic than the idea of moral spontaneity. As an organizing theme of my discussion, I use an apparent tension between the A-edition and the B-edition of the first Critique. Against common interpretations, I argu…
A priori intuition and transcendental necessity in Kant's idealism
I examine how Kant argues for the transcendental ideality of space. I defend a reading on which Kant accepts the ideality of space because it explains our (actual) knowledge that mathematical judgments are necessarily true. I argue that this reading is preferable over the alternative suggestion that Kant can infer the ideality of space directly from the fact that we have an a priori intuition of space. Moreover, I argue that the reading I propose…
Kants subjektivistische Begründung von Moral und Freiheit im Naturrecht Feyerabend
“Naturrecht Feyerabend” is a collection of student notes taken on a lecture that Kant gave around the time he was working on the Groundwork. I show that these notes portray Kant as proposing a defense of morality and freedom whose “subjectivism” is unparalleled by anything that we find in his major published works. Kant here traces both the normativity of the moral principle that we must treat humanity as an end in itself and the legitimacy of re…
The World According to Kant
In this excellent book, Anja Jauernig provides an exceptionally clear and illuminating reading of Kant’s critical idealism. Jauernig is explicit from the beginning that she is concerned with Kant’s idealism as a metaphysical doctrine, with “Kant’s account of what there is in the world, understood as the sum total of everything that has reality, including, in particular, his account of appearances and things in themselves and their relation to one…
Kant on Mind-Dependence
In Kant’s idealism, all spatiotemporal objects depend on the human mind in a certain way. A central issue here is whether the existence of spatiotemporal things requires that these things are, at least at some point, objects of some actual experience or of a merely possible experience. In this essay, I argue (on textual and philosophical grounds) for the latter view: spatiotemporal things exist (or spatiotemporal events occur) if they are objects…
Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency
Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency provides an original, comprehensive interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of freedom. It shows that for Kant absolute transcendental freedom or rational autonomy is the necessary presupposition of all meaningful, norm-governed human agency in its moral, epistemic, and aesthetic dimensions. The book thereby gives a compelling sense to Kant’s estimation that freedom is a “cardinal point,” even the “keystone” of his e…
Grounding empirical in transcendental reality
Why is there no Kantian duty to believe in God and Immortality
Kant emphatically denies that we stand under a moral duty to believe in God and (our) immortality. This essay examines how this denial could be consistent with his view that we have a moral duty to promote the highest good and that promoting the highest good requires us to adopt these beliefs. I argue that the key to understanding Kant's denial of a duty to believe lies in his view that not every rational requirement has the special, especially d…
Nietzsche’s Nihilisms
For Nietzsche, we can regard our life as worth living only if we overcome the threat of nihilism. However, it is difficult to determine the nature of this threat since he characterizes the stance of nihilism in multiple, rather different and seemingly incompatible ways. This essay attempts to shed light on this issue by distinguishing three key forms of nihilism that figure centrally in Nietzsche’s thinking and pose different challenges to life a…
Philosophical Ethics and Theory (16 works) · Epistemology (15 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (9 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Art (6 works) · Ancient Mediterranean Archaeology and History (5 works) · Classical Antiquity Studies (5 works) · Transcendental number (5 works) · Byzantine Studies and History (4 works)