Transcendental and Practical Freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8089878 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Markus Kohl (0000-0001-9082-8490, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 105 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Publication date | 2014-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Kant-Studien (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-8877 • E-ISSN: 1613-1134 |
| Publisher | De Gruyter (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1515/kant-2014-0014 |
| OpenAlex | W2331445037 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
To many readers, it has seemed that Kant’s discussion of the relation between practical and transcendental freedom in the Transcendental Dialectic is inconsistent with his discussion of the same relation in the Canon of Pure Reason. In this paper I argue for a novel way of preserving the consistency of Kant’s view: in both the Dialectic and the Canon, ‘transcendental freedom’ requires the absence of determination by all natural causes, whereas ‘practical freedom’ requires the absence of determination by, specifically, sensuous incentives. However, I argue that the defense of freedom presented in the Canon is abandoned by Kant in the Groundwork when he first develops his conception of the absolute purity of moral motivation
Consistency (knowledge bases · Dialectic · Epistemology · Relation (database · Transcendental number · Transcendental philosophy · Computer Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · War, Ethics, and Justification · Artificial Intelligence · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.4 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2016 - 2025 (10) |
| Highly cited | No |