Monima Chadha
Biographic Data
| ID | 1075677 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Monima Chadha |
| GIVEN NAMES | Monima |
| FAMILY NAME | Chadha |
| SIGNATURE | CHADHA M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Monash University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5596-0696 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 16 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
On the Ontology of Composites in Abhidharma Buddhism
Abhidharma Buddhism maintains that the only ultimately real ( paramārtha ) entities in the universe are dharmas , which are simples. What then is the ontological status of composites on this theory? One possibility is that Abhidharma Buddhists deny the reality of composites. We argue, however, that Abhidharma Buddhists affirm the reality of some composites, based on the causal efficacy of the composites. This depends on distinguishing between two…
Knowledge of universals
The Indian realists argue for the unique claim that universals are perceptible. The possibility of allowing perceptual access to universals puts pressure on the Nyāya theory of perception. The Nyāya philosophers introduced the notion of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa (non-conceptual perception) to accommodate the perceptibility of universals. Since there is no direct introspective evidence for non-conceptual perception, it is difficult, if not impossible…
Rethinking responsibility: An Abhidharma Buddhist view
If reductionism about personal identity is true, “no one ever deserves to be punished for anything they did.” I call this the Responsible Agency Challenge. This paper addresses the question: How should we respond to this challenge? My response is inspired by the famous fifth century Buddhist Abhidharma philosopher, Vasubandhu, and the historical roots of the denial of personal identity in Buddhist philosophy, which points towards a new impersonal…
Gratitude Without a Self
Western psychology primarily studies human emotions via physiological reactions to external stimuli. Research suggests that cultural variations lead East Asians and Western-heritage individuals to experience distinct emotional patterns beyond bodily responses. A more thorough understanding of affect, involving culturally influenced emotions, remains unexplored in cross-cultural contexts. Influenced by Confucianism, East Asian cultures show unique…
Self-Control without a Self
Self-control is essential to the Buddhist soteriological project, but it is not immediately clear how we can make sense of it in light of the doctrine of no-self. Exercising control over our actions, thoughts, volitions, and emotions seems to presuppose a conception of self and agency that is not available to the Buddhist. Thus, there seems to be a fundamental mismatch in the practical instructions for exercising control in the Buddhist texts and…
Vows without a self
Vows play a central role in Buddhist thought and practice. Monastics are obliged to know and conform to hundreds of vows. Although it is widely recognized that vows are important for guiding practitioners on the path to enlightenment, we argue that they have another overlooked but equally crucial role to play. A second function of the vows, we argue, is to facilitate group harmony and cohesion to ensure the perpetuation of the dhamma and the saṅg…
O Carma E O Problema Do Mal: Uma Resposta a Kaufman
A doutrina do carma, conforme elaborada nas tradições religiosas hindu, budista e jainista, oferece um poderoso relato explicativo das grandes questões humanas e, em particular, do sofrimento humano aparentemente imerecido. Whitley R. P. Kaufman (2005) tem razão em apontar que em alguns pontos, como o sofrimento de crianças, a ocorrência de desastres naturais e a possibilidade de salvação universal, a teoria do carma parece, pelo menos inicialmen…
Eliminating Selves and Persons
The Buddhist no-self and no-person revisionary metaphysics aims to produce a better structure that is motivated by the normative goal of eliminating, or at least reducing, suffering. The revised structure, in turn, entails a major reconsideration of our ordinary everyday person-related concerns and practices and interpersonal attitudes, such as moral responsibility, praise and blame, compensation, and social treatment. This essay explores the ext…
Reflections on Human Inquiry: Science, Philosophy, and Common Life
"Reflections on Human Inquiry: Science, Philosophy, and Common Life." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 99(1), p. 209
Experiential Unity without a Self: The Case of Synchronic Synthesis
The manifest fact of experiential unity—namely, that a single experience often seems to be composed of multiple features and multiple objects—was lodged as a key objection to the Buddhist no-self view by Nyāya philosophers in the classical Indian tradition. We revisit the Nyāya-Buddhist debate on this issue. The early Nyāya experiential unity arguments depend on diachronic unification of experiences in memory, but later Nyāya philosophers explici…
Attention, Not Self
Jonardon Ganeri's Attention, Not Self is groundbreaking. It shows a way to transform the rich theoretical vocabulary in Pāli commentarial tradition for concepts of mind, consciousness, and conscious states into an empirically informed philosophy of mind. The book is focused on commentaries attributed to a single philosopher, the fifth-century Theravāda monk Buddhaghosa. The title of the book should not mislead one into thinking that it is yet ano…
The Abhidharma Version of No-Self Theory
This paper elucidates the Abhidharma attempt to revise our ordinary ways of thinking and our ordinary conceptual scheme in which the self (minimally conceived of as the referent of ‘I’) occupies a prime position. This revisionary metaphysics provides an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world that lacks such a self. The no-self theory is no doubt deeply counter-intuitive. In response to this some contemporary scholars offer a we…
A Buddhist Epistemological Framework for Mindfulness Meditation
One of the major aims of this article is to provide the theoretical account of mindfulness provided by the systematic Abhidharma epistemology of conscious states. I do not claim to present the one true version of mindfulness, because there is not one version of it in Buddhism; in addition to the Abhidharma model, there is, for example, the nondual Mahāmudrā tradition. A better understanding of a Buddhist philosophical framework will not only help…
A Buddhist Explanation of Episodic Memory: From Self to Mind
In this paper, I argue that some of the work to be done by the concept of self is done by the concept of mind in Buddhist philosophy. For the purposes of this paper, I shall focus on an account of memory and its ownership. The task of this paper is to analyse Vasubandhu’s heroic effort to defend the no-self doctrine against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in order to bring to the fore the Buddhist model of mind. For this, I will discuss Vasubandhu’s theory …
The Self in Early Nyāya: A Minimal Conclusion
In this paper I revisit the early Nyāya argument for the existence of a self. In section 1, I reconstruct the argument in Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.10 as an argument from recognition following the interpretation in the Nyāyasūtra-Bhāṣya and the Nyāya-Vārttika. In Section 2, I reassess the plausibility of the Nyāya argument from memory/recognition in the Bhāṣya and the Vārttika in the light of recent empirical research. I conclude that the early Nyāya versi…
An independent, empirical route to nonconceptual content
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An independent, empirical route to nonconceptual content
The Self in Early Nyāya: A Minimal Conclusion
In this paper I revisit the early Nyāya argument for the existence of a self. In section 1, I reconstruct the argument in Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.10 as an argument from recognition following the interpretation in the Nyāyasūtra-Bhāṣya and the Nyāya-Vārttika. In Section 2, I reassess the plausibility of the Nyāya argument from memory/recognition in the Bhāṣya and the Vārttika in the light of recent empirical research. I conclude that the early Nyāya versi…
A Buddhist Explanation of Episodic Memory: From Self to Mind
In this paper, I argue that some of the work to be done by the concept of self is done by the concept of mind in Buddhist philosophy. For the purposes of this paper, I shall focus on an account of memory and its ownership. The task of this paper is to analyse Vasubandhu’s heroic effort to defend the no-self doctrine against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in order to bring to the fore the Buddhist model of mind. For this, I will discuss Vasubandhu’s theory …
A Buddhist Epistemological Framework for Mindfulness Meditation
One of the major aims of this article is to provide the theoretical account of mindfulness provided by the systematic Abhidharma epistemology of conscious states. I do not claim to present the one true version of mindfulness, because there is not one version of it in Buddhism; in addition to the Abhidharma model, there is, for example, the nondual Mahāmudrā tradition. A better understanding of a Buddhist philosophical framework will not only help…
The Abhidharma Version of No-Self Theory
This paper elucidates the Abhidharma attempt to revise our ordinary ways of thinking and our ordinary conceptual scheme in which the self (minimally conceived of as the referent of ‘I’) occupies a prime position. This revisionary metaphysics provides an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world that lacks such a self. The no-self theory is no doubt deeply counter-intuitive. In response to this some contemporary scholars offer a we…
Attention, Not Self
Jonardon Ganeri's Attention, Not Self is groundbreaking. It shows a way to transform the rich theoretical vocabulary in Pāli commentarial tradition for concepts of mind, consciousness, and conscious states into an empirically informed philosophy of mind. The book is focused on commentaries attributed to a single philosopher, the fifth-century Theravāda monk Buddhaghosa. The title of the book should not mislead one into thinking that it is yet ano…
Eliminating Selves and Persons
The Buddhist no-self and no-person revisionary metaphysics aims to produce a better structure that is motivated by the normative goal of eliminating, or at least reducing, suffering. The revised structure, in turn, entails a major reconsideration of our ordinary everyday person-related concerns and practices and interpersonal attitudes, such as moral responsibility, praise and blame, compensation, and social treatment. This essay explores the ext…
Reflections on Human Inquiry: Science, Philosophy, and Common Life
"Reflections on Human Inquiry: Science, Philosophy, and Common Life." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 99(1), p. 209
Experiential Unity without a Self: The Case of Synchronic Synthesis
The manifest fact of experiential unity—namely, that a single experience often seems to be composed of multiple features and multiple objects—was lodged as a key objection to the Buddhist no-self view by Nyāya philosophers in the classical Indian tradition. We revisit the Nyāya-Buddhist debate on this issue. The early Nyāya experiential unity arguments depend on diachronic unification of experiences in memory, but later Nyāya philosophers explici…
O Carma E O Problema Do Mal: Uma Resposta a Kaufman
A doutrina do carma, conforme elaborada nas tradições religiosas hindu, budista e jainista, oferece um poderoso relato explicativo das grandes questões humanas e, em particular, do sofrimento humano aparentemente imerecido. Whitley R. P. Kaufman (2005) tem razão em apontar que em alguns pontos, como o sofrimento de crianças, a ocorrência de desastres naturais e a possibilidade de salvação universal, a teoria do carma parece, pelo menos inicialmen…
Gratitude Without a Self
Western psychology primarily studies human emotions via physiological reactions to external stimuli. Research suggests that cultural variations lead East Asians and Western-heritage individuals to experience distinct emotional patterns beyond bodily responses. A more thorough understanding of affect, involving culturally influenced emotions, remains unexplored in cross-cultural contexts. Influenced by Confucianism, East Asian cultures show unique…
Self-Control without a Self
Self-control is essential to the Buddhist soteriological project, but it is not immediately clear how we can make sense of it in light of the doctrine of no-self. Exercising control over our actions, thoughts, volitions, and emotions seems to presuppose a conception of self and agency that is not available to the Buddhist. Thus, there seems to be a fundamental mismatch in the practical instructions for exercising control in the Buddhist texts and…
Vows without a self
Vows play a central role in Buddhist thought and practice. Monastics are obliged to know and conform to hundreds of vows. Although it is widely recognized that vows are important for guiding practitioners on the path to enlightenment, we argue that they have another overlooked but equally crucial role to play. A second function of the vows, we argue, is to facilitate group harmony and cohesion to ensure the perpetuation of the dhamma and the saṅg…
Knowledge of universals
The Indian realists argue for the unique claim that universals are perceptible. The possibility of allowing perceptual access to universals puts pressure on the Nyāya theory of perception. The Nyāya philosophers introduced the notion of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa (non-conceptual perception) to accommodate the perceptibility of universals. Since there is no direct introspective evidence for non-conceptual perception, it is difficult, if not impossible…
Rethinking responsibility: An Abhidharma Buddhist view
If reductionism about personal identity is true, “no one ever deserves to be punished for anything they did.” I call this the Responsible Agency Challenge. This paper addresses the question: How should we respond to this challenge? My response is inspired by the famous fifth century Buddhist Abhidharma philosopher, Vasubandhu, and the historical roots of the denial of personal identity in Buddhist philosophy, which points towards a new impersonal…
On the Ontology of Composites in Abhidharma Buddhism
Abhidharma Buddhism maintains that the only ultimately real ( paramārtha ) entities in the universe are dharmas , which are simples. What then is the ontological status of composites on this theory? One possibility is that Abhidharma Buddhists deny the reality of composites. We argue, however, that Abhidharma Buddhists affirm the reality of some composites, based on the causal efficacy of the composites. This depends on distinguishing between two…
Philosophy (14 works) · Epistemology (13 works) · Psychology (11 works) · Buddhism (9 works) · Indian and Buddhist Studies (8 works) · Theology (8 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (6 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Law (4 works)