Knowledge of universals

Bibliographic Data

ID21597686
AuthorsMonima Chadha (0000-0002-5596-0696, University of Oxford, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume33
Issue6
Pages1388-1408
Publication date2025-11-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0960-8788 • E-ISSN: 1469-3526
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09608788.2024.2409205
OpenAlexW4403814595
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited31

The Indian realists argue for the unique claim that universals are perceptible. The possibility of allowing perceptual access to universals puts pressure on the Nyāya theory of perception. The Nyāya philosophers introduced the notion of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa (non-conceptual perception) to accommodate the perceptibility of universals. Since there is no direct introspective evidence for non-conceptual perception, it is difficult, if not impossible, to specify the content of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa or non-conceptual perception. This paper addresses this concern by turning to Ned Block's work in contemporary philosophy of perception. Using Block's arguments, I propose that we have an independent empirical route to specify the content of a non-conceptual perception which is not subject to the ‘myth of the given’ objection

Epistemology · Problem of universals · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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