Richard M Pettigrew
Biographic Data
| ID | 10830171 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Richard M Pettigrew |
| GIVEN NAMES | Richard M |
| FAMILY NAME | Pettigrew |
| SIGNATURE | PETTIGREW R M |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
The Nearer The Dearer
This chapter asks whether it is rationally permissible to assign less weight to the values of my other selves in line with the proximity of the values of those other selves to my current values. It argues that it is. It then introduces the Stoicism objection to the Aggregate Utility Solution. This says that you should never be rationally required to change your values in order to increase your utility, and it claims that this is required by the A…
Do We Know Enough to Make Decisions This Way?
This chapter considers two related arguments that, if successful, tell against the Aggregate Utility Solution to the problem of choosing for changing selves. The first is due to L. A. Paul (2014), ‘Voluntary Benefits from Wrongdoing’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 31(4); the second is due to Sarah Moss (2018), Probabilistic Knowledge. Both claim that we cannot know enough to make decisions in the way proposed by the Aggregate Utility Solution. P…
I’ll be Glad I Did It—So, I’ll Do It
This chapter considers a form of practical reasoning explored by Elizabeth Harman (2009, ‘I’ll be glad I did it’ reasoning and the significance of future desires, in Philosophical Perspectives, 23(1)), which she dubs ‘I’ll be glad I did it’ reasoning, and which she rejects in general. In such reasoning, when faced with a choice between two options, if I would later think that one option is better than the other were I to choose that option, that …
Existing Solutions III
This chapter considers the third existing putative solution to the problem of choosing for changing selves. This is the One True Utility Solution and it is based on the objectivist claim that there is a unique, objective utility function, and that an individual’s subjective utility for an outcome should be her expectation of the objective utility of that outcome. The chapter shows, if objectivism about value is granted, this solution will work. B…
The Weight of The Past
This chapter asks whether it is ever required or even permissible to give some weight to the values of your past selves. It argues that sometimes, when a past self has made a sacrifice that benefits the current self, it is at least permissible and sometimes required to give weight to the permissible values of that past self. To do this, the chapter introduces a principle descended from H. L. A. Hart’s (1955, ‘Are there any natural rights?’ Philos…
The Problem of Weighting Changing Selves
This chapter summarizes the conclusions of the first part of the book and introduces the work of the second part. The first part proposed the Aggregate Utility Solution to the problem of choosing for changing selves; it argued for a particular version of this solution that aggregates particular utilities using weighted averages; and it defended that version against the objection that the utilities of different selves are incomparable and the obje…
The Road Ahead
This final chapter of the book summarizes the conclusions of the preceding chapters and looks forward to how the Aggregate Utility Solution might be generalized so that it applies not only to the expected utility theory framework, but also to other frameworks for rational decision-making. In particular, it explains how we might extend the Aggregate Utility Solution to the framework of imprecise credences and utilities, and to the framework of ris…
Existing Solutions I
In this chapter, we meet the first of the existing putative solutions to the problem of choosing for changing selves. This is the Unchanging Utility Solution and it claims that, contrary to appearances, our values do not change over time; rather, what changes is what obtains for us the things we value. The chapter argues that this will not work. It considers two objections: first, in many cases, it is not possible to identify what it is that rema…
Can We Compare the Utilities of Different Selves?
This chapter asks whether we can compare the values of different selves of the same individual in such a way that we can measure those values on the same scale using utilities. It surveys a number of different proposals adapted from the literature on interpersonal utility comparisons, and concludes that none of the existing proposals will work. It presents an alternative and argues that it does work. This answers an objection raised by R. A. Brig…
Existing Solutions II
In this chapter, we meet the second putative solution to our problem that has been proposed. This is the Utility of Utility Solution and it claims that, when our past, present, and future utilities disagree, we should choose in line with our current higher-order utilities. The chapter argues that this will not work. It considers two objections: first, since our higher-order utilities often change as our first-order utilities do, the problem of ch…
No prominent works on this page.
The Nearer The Dearer
This chapter asks whether it is rationally permissible to assign less weight to the values of my other selves in line with the proximity of the values of those other selves to my current values. It argues that it is. It then introduces the Stoicism objection to the Aggregate Utility Solution. This says that you should never be rationally required to change your values in order to increase your utility, and it claims that this is required by the A…
Do We Know Enough to Make Decisions This Way?
This chapter considers two related arguments that, if successful, tell against the Aggregate Utility Solution to the problem of choosing for changing selves. The first is due to L. A. Paul (2014), ‘Voluntary Benefits from Wrongdoing’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 31(4); the second is due to Sarah Moss (2018), Probabilistic Knowledge. Both claim that we cannot know enough to make decisions in the way proposed by the Aggregate Utility Solution. P…
I’ll be Glad I Did It—So, I’ll Do It
This chapter considers a form of practical reasoning explored by Elizabeth Harman (2009, ‘I’ll be glad I did it’ reasoning and the significance of future desires, in Philosophical Perspectives, 23(1)), which she dubs ‘I’ll be glad I did it’ reasoning, and which she rejects in general. In such reasoning, when faced with a choice between two options, if I would later think that one option is better than the other were I to choose that option, that …
Existing Solutions III
This chapter considers the third existing putative solution to the problem of choosing for changing selves. This is the One True Utility Solution and it is based on the objectivist claim that there is a unique, objective utility function, and that an individual’s subjective utility for an outcome should be her expectation of the objective utility of that outcome. The chapter shows, if objectivism about value is granted, this solution will work. B…
The Weight of The Past
This chapter asks whether it is ever required or even permissible to give some weight to the values of your past selves. It argues that sometimes, when a past self has made a sacrifice that benefits the current self, it is at least permissible and sometimes required to give weight to the permissible values of that past self. To do this, the chapter introduces a principle descended from H. L. A. Hart’s (1955, ‘Are there any natural rights?’ Philos…
The Problem of Weighting Changing Selves
This chapter summarizes the conclusions of the first part of the book and introduces the work of the second part. The first part proposed the Aggregate Utility Solution to the problem of choosing for changing selves; it argued for a particular version of this solution that aggregates particular utilities using weighted averages; and it defended that version against the objection that the utilities of different selves are incomparable and the obje…
The Road Ahead
This final chapter of the book summarizes the conclusions of the preceding chapters and looks forward to how the Aggregate Utility Solution might be generalized so that it applies not only to the expected utility theory framework, but also to other frameworks for rational decision-making. In particular, it explains how we might extend the Aggregate Utility Solution to the framework of imprecise credences and utilities, and to the framework of ris…
Existing Solutions I
In this chapter, we meet the first of the existing putative solutions to the problem of choosing for changing selves. This is the Unchanging Utility Solution and it claims that, contrary to appearances, our values do not change over time; rather, what changes is what obtains for us the things we value. The chapter argues that this will not work. It considers two objections: first, in many cases, it is not possible to identify what it is that rema…
Can We Compare the Utilities of Different Selves?
This chapter asks whether we can compare the values of different selves of the same individual in such a way that we can measure those values on the same scale using utilities. It surveys a number of different proposals adapted from the literature on interpersonal utility comparisons, and concludes that none of the existing proposals will work. It presents an alternative and argues that it does work. This answers an objection raised by R. A. Brig…
Existing Solutions II
In this chapter, we meet the second putative solution to our problem that has been proposed. This is the Utility of Utility Solution and it claims that, when our past, present, and future utilities disagree, we should choose in line with our current higher-order utilities. The chapter argues that this will not work. It considers two objections: first, since our higher-order utilities often change as our first-order utilities do, the problem of ch…
Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Economics (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Mathematical economics (5 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 works) · Aggregate (composite) (4 works) · Engineering (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works)