Do We Know Enough to Make Decisions This Way?
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23733834 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Richard Pettigrew (0000-0003-0822-4300), Richard M Pettigrew (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Pages | 131-154 |
| Publication date | 2019-12-12 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Choosing for Changing Selves (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oso/9780198814962.003.0010 |
| OpenAlex | W3001970319 |
| ISBN | 9780198814962 |
| Language | EN |
This chapter considers two related arguments that, if successful, tell against the Aggregate Utility Solution to the problem of choosing for changing selves. The first is due to L. A. Paul (2014), ‘Voluntary Benefits from Wrongdoing’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 31(4); the second is due to Sarah Moss (2018), Probabilistic Knowledge. Both claim that we cannot know enough to make decisions in the way proposed by the Aggregate Utility Solution. Paul appeals to considerations of authenticity; Moss appeals to knowledge norms for decision-making. The chapter responds to those arguments.
Aggregate (composite) · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Probabilistic logic · Wrongdoing · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy
| Highly cited | No |
|---|