Richard Pettigrew
Biographic Data
| ID | 954319 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Richard Pettigrew |
| GIVEN NAMES | Richard |
| FAMILY NAME | Pettigrew |
| SIGNATURE | PETTIGREW R |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Bristol |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0822-4300 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 48 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 180 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 48 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
Consent and the Formation of Preferences
Under ideal conditions, explicit consent and related actions usually change the moral facts in a distinctive way: they make something permissible that was previously impermissible. But they don't do this if the consent is coerced. And it seems they also don't do it if the preferences on which the consent is based were formed in particular ways: if they were formed via certain mechanisms under pressure from unjust social forces, for instance. In t…
Choosing how to choose
Decision theories give guidance about what to do when you face a particular decision. But they also give higher-level advice—depending on how likely you think it is that you’ll face various decision problems, decision theories give advice about the best strategy for picking what to do. For some ways of being uncertain over possible decisions, decision theories that accommodate risk undermine themselves. They simultaneously provide specific advice…
What is the characteristic wrong of testimonial injustice
In this paper, I aim to identify the wrong that is done by the hearer to the testifier in all cases of testimonial injustice. I introduce the concept of testimonial injustice, as well as the existing accounts of this characteristic wrong, and I argue that the latter don’t work. Then I present my favoured account, which adapts Rachel Fraser’s account of the wrong of aesthetic injustice. I argue that this allows us to see that certain putative stoc…
Three Questions for Liberals
In this article, I ask three questions of the liberal. In each, I fill in philosophical detail around a certain sort of complaint raised in current public debates about their position. In the first, I probe the limits of the liberal's tolerance for civil disobedience; in the second, I ask how the liberal can adjudicate the most divisive moral disputes of the age; and in the third, I suggest the liberal faces a problem when there is substantial di…
Updating on the evidence of others
One often learns the opinions of others without getting to hear the evidence behind them. How should you revise your own opinions in such cases? Dietrich (2010) shows that, for opinions about objective chance, the method known as upco effectively adds your interlocutor’s evidence to your own. We provide a simple way of viewing upco that makes properties like Dietrich’s easy to appreciate, and we do three things with it. First, we unify Dietrich’s…
What’s the Point of Authors
In this paper, I want to start to untangle some of the philosophical issues associated with our practices of ascribing authorship for collaborative work, with an eye to formulating better guidelines for authorship. I will focus on the following questions: 1. What epistemic, social, and ethical functions are played by our practices of ascribing authorship for academic papers? 2. What ways of ascribing authorship would best address these functions?…
Bayesian Updating When What You Learn Might Be False (Forthcoming in Erkenntnis)
Rescorla (Erkenntnis, 2020) has recently pointed out that the standard arguments for Bayesian Conditionalization assume that whenever I become certain of something, it is true. Most people would reject this assumption. In response, Rescorla offers an improved Dutch Book argument for Bayesian Conditionalization that does not make this assumption. My purpose in this paper is two-fold. First, I want to illuminate Rescorla’s new argument by giving a …
Nudging for changing selves
When is it legitimate for a government to ‘nudge’ its citizens, in the sense described by Thaler and Sunstein (2008)? In their original work on the topic, Thaler and Sunstein developed the ‘as judged by themselves’ (or AJBT) test to answer this question (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 5). In a recent paper, Paul and Sunstein (2019) raised a concern about this test: it often seems to give the wrong answer in cases in which we are nudged to make a de…
Consequences of Calibration
Drawing on a passage from Ramsey's Truth and Probability, we formulate a simple, plausible constraint on evaluating the accuracy of credences: the Calibration Test. We show that any additive, continuous accuracy measure that passes the Calibration Test will be strictly proper. Strictly proper accuracy measures are known to support the touchstone results of accuracy-first epistemology, for example vindications of probabilism and conditionalization…
Geometric Pooling
Much of our information comes to us indirectly, in the form of conclusions others have drawn from evidence they gathered.When we hear these conclusions, how can we modify our own opinions so as to gain the benefit of their evidence?In this article, we study the method known as geometric pooling.We begin by raising objections to a recent argument in support of this method, and then turn to what we take to be better arguments in its favour; finally…
Radical epistemology, structural explanations, and epistemic weaponry
When is a belief justified? There are three families of arguments we typically use to support different accounts of justification: (1) arguments from our intuitive responses to vignettes that involve the concept; (2) arguments from the theoretical role we would like the concept to play in epistemology; and (3) arguments from the practical, moral, and political uses to which we wish to put the concept. I focus particularly on the third sort (3), a…
Aggregating agents with opinions about different propositions
There are many reasons we might want to take the opinions of various individuals and pool them to give the opinions of the group they constitute. If all the individuals in the group have probabilistic opinions about the same propositions, there is a host of pooling functions we might deploy, such as linear or geometric pooling. However, there are also cases where different members of the group assign probabilities to different sets of proposition…
Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity
Accuracy arguments for the core tenets of Bayesian epistemology differ mainly in the conditions they place on the legitimate ways of measuring the inaccuracy of our credences. The best existing arguments rely on three conditions: Continuity, additivity, and strict propriety. In this paper, I show how to strengthen the arguments based on these conditions by showing that the central mathematical theorem on which each depends goes through without as…
Internalism, Externalism, and the KK Principle
This paper examines the relationship between the KK principle and the epistemological theses of externalism and internalism. In particular we examine arguments from Okasha (Analysis 73(1):80–86, 2013) and Greco (J Philos 111(4):169–197, 2014) which deny that we can derive the denial of the KK principle from externalism.
A note on deterministic updating and van Fraassen’s symmetry argument for conditionalization
In a recent paper, Pettigrew (Philos Stud, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01377-y ) argues that the pragmatic and epistemic arguments for Bayesian updating are based on an unwarranted assumption, which he calls deterministic updating, and which says that your updating plan should be deterministic. In that paper, Pettigrew did not consider whether the symmetry arguments due to Hughes and van Fraassen make the same assumption (Hughes and …
On the pragmatic and epistemic virtues of inference to the best explanation
In a series of papers over the past twenty years, and in a new book, Igor Douven (sometimes in collaboration with Sylvia Wenmackers) has argued that Bayesians are too quick to reject versions of inference to the best explanation that cannot be accommodated within their framework. In this paper, I survey their worries and attempt to answer them using a series of pragmatic and purely epistemic arguments that I take to show that Bayes’ Rule really i…
Logical ignorance and logical learning
According to certain normative theories in epistemology, rationality requires us to be logically omniscient. Yet this prescription clashes with our ordinary judgments of rationality. How should we resolve this tension? In this paper, I focus particularly on the logical omniscience requirement in Bayesian epistemology. Building on a key insight by Hacking (Philos Sci 34(4):311–325, 1967), I develop a version of Bayesianism that permits logical ign…
The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference
In a recent paper in this journal, James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann, and Jon Williamson (henceforth HLWW) argue that the principal principle entails the principle of indifference. In this article, I argue that it does not. Lewis’s version of the principal principle notoriously depends on a notion of admissibility, which Lewis uses to restrict its application. HLWW base their argument on certain intuitions concerning when one pro…
Discounting The Future
This chapter asks whether it is rationally permissible to assign less weight to the values of my other selves in line with the degree of psychological connectedness between us. This draws on Derek Parfit’s (1984, ‘Personal Identity’, in Philosophical Review, 80) rational reconstruction of temporal discounting. The chapter considers an argument by Arif Ahmed (2018, ‘Rationality and Future Discounting’, in Topoi, February) that such weights result …
The Aggregate Utility Solution II
The previous chapter concluded that we should aggregate credences and utilities first. This chapter considers how we should aggregate them. It claims that we should use the individual’s current credence function together with a weighted average of the utility functions of the individual’s past, present, and future selves. It then responds to an objection based on the partition sensitivity of the proposed solution. It proposes that an individual s…
Why Aggregate Using Weighted Averages?
This chapter defends the claim that we should aggregate an individual’s different utility functions at different times by taking a weighted average of them. It introduces the Principle of Minimal Mutilation, which says that an aggregate of a collection of attitudes should lie as close as possible to the attitudes it aggregates. By giving a mathematically precise account of the distance between different utility functions, the chapter appeals to a…
The Nearer The Dearer
This chapter asks whether it is rationally permissible to assign less weight to the values of my other selves in line with the proximity of the values of those other selves to my current values. It argues that it is. It then introduces the Stoicism objection to the Aggregate Utility Solution. This says that you should never be rationally required to change your values in order to increase your utility, and it claims that this is required by the A…
Do We Know Enough to Make Decisions This Way?
This chapter considers two related arguments that, if successful, tell against the Aggregate Utility Solution to the problem of choosing for changing selves. The first is due to L. A. Paul (2014), ‘Voluntary Benefits from Wrongdoing’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 31(4); the second is due to Sarah Moss (2018), Probabilistic Knowledge. Both claim that we cannot know enough to make decisions in the way proposed by the Aggregate Utility Solution. P…
I’ll be Glad I Did It—So, I’ll Do It
This chapter considers a form of practical reasoning explored by Elizabeth Harman (2009, ‘I’ll be glad I did it’ reasoning and the significance of future desires, in Philosophical Perspectives, 23(1)), which she dubs ‘I’ll be glad I did it’ reasoning, and which she rejects in general. In such reasoning, when faced with a choice between two options, if I would later think that one option is better than the other were I to choose that option, that …
Existing Solutions III
This chapter considers the third existing putative solution to the problem of choosing for changing selves. This is the One True Utility Solution and it is based on the objectivist claim that there is a unique, objective utility function, and that an individual’s subjective utility for an outcome should be her expectation of the objective utility of that outcome. The chapter shows, if objectivism about value is granted, this solution will work. B…
An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II
In this article and its prequel, we derive Bayesianism from the following norm: Accuracy—an agent ought to minimize the inaccuracy of her partial beliefs. In the prequel, we make the norm mathematically precise; in this article, we derive its consequences. We show that the two core tenets of Bayesianism follow from Accuracy, while the characteristic claim of Objective Bayesianism follows from Accuracy together with an extra assumption. Finally, w…
An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I
In this article and its sequel, we derive Bayesianism from the following norm: Accuracy—an agent ought to minimize the inaccuracy of her partial beliefs. In this article, we make this norm mathematically precise. We describe epistemic dilemmas an agent might face if she attempts to follow Accuracy and show that the only measures of inaccuracy that do not create these dilemmas are the quadratic inaccuracy measures. In the sequel, we derive Bayesia…
Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle
In “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism,” James M. Joyce attempts to “depragmatize” de Finetti’s prevision argument for the claim that our credences ought to satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus. This article adapts Joyce’s argument to give nonpragmatic vindications of David Lewis’s original Principal Principle as well as recent reformulations due to Ned Hall and Jenann Ismael. Joyce enumerates properties that a function must have…
Choosing for Changing Selves
What we value, like, endorse, want, and prefer changes over the course of our lives. Sometimes this is a result of decisions we make—such as when we choose to become a parent or move to a new country—and sometimes it is caused by forces beyond our control—such as when our political views change as we grow older. This poses a problem for any theory of how we ought to make decisions. Which values and preferences should we appeal to when we are maki…
Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference
Transformative Experience and Decision Theory
I have never eaten Vegemite-should I try it?I currently have no children-should I apply to adopt a child?In each case, one might imagine, whichever choice I make, I can make it rationally by appealing to the principles of decision theory.Not always, says L. A. Paul.In Transformative Experience, Paul issues two challenges to decision theory based upon examples such as these [Paul, 2014].I will show how we might reformulate decision theory in the f…
Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences
Beliefs come in different strengths. An agent's credence in a proposition is a measure of the strength of her belief in that proposition. Various norms for credences have been proposed. Traditionally, philosophers have tried to argue for these norms by showing that any agent who violates them will be lead by her credences to make bad decisions. In this article, we survey a new strategy for justifying these norms. The strategy begins by identifyin…
Two types of abstraction for structuralism
If numbers were identified with any of their standard set-theoretic realizations, then they would have various non-arithmetical properties that mathematicians are reluctant to ascribe to them. Dedekind and later structuralists conclude that we should refrain from ascribing to numbers such ‘foreign’ properties. We first rehearse why it is hard to provide an acceptable formulation of this conclusion. Then we investigate some forms of abstraction me…
Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity
Accuracy arguments for the core tenets of Bayesian epistemology differ mainly in the conditions they place on the legitimate ways of measuring the inaccuracy of our credences. The best existing arguments rely on three conditions: Continuity, additivity, and strict propriety. In this paper, I show how to strengthen the arguments based on these conditions by showing that the central mathematical theorem on which each depends goes through without as…
Logical ignorance and logical learning
According to certain normative theories in epistemology, rationality requires us to be logically omniscient. Yet this prescription clashes with our ordinary judgments of rationality. How should we resolve this tension? In this paper, I focus particularly on the logical omniscience requirement in Bayesian epistemology. Building on a key insight by Hacking (Philos Sci 34(4):311–325, 1967), I develop a version of Bayesianism that permits logical ign…
What’s the Point of Authors
In this paper, I want to start to untangle some of the philosophical issues associated with our practices of ascribing authorship for collaborative work, with an eye to formulating better guidelines for authorship. I will focus on the following questions: 1. What epistemic, social, and ethical functions are played by our practices of ascribing authorship for academic papers? 2. What ways of ascribing authorship would best address these functions?…
Remaking the elite university
This article analyses and critiques the discourse around widening participation in elite universities in the UK. One response, from both university administrators and academics, has been to see this as an ‘intractable’ problem which can at best be ameliorated through outreach or marginal work in admissions policy. Another has been to reject the institution of the university completely, and seek to set up alternative models of autonomous higher ed…
On the pragmatic and epistemic virtues of inference to the best explanation
In a series of papers over the past twenty years, and in a new book, Igor Douven (sometimes in collaboration with Sylvia Wenmackers) has argued that Bayesians are too quick to reject versions of inference to the best explanation that cannot be accommodated within their framework. In this paper, I survey their worries and attempt to answer them using a series of pragmatic and purely epistemic arguments that I take to show that Bayes’ Rule really i…
Nudging for changing selves
When is it legitimate for a government to ‘nudge’ its citizens, in the sense described by Thaler and Sunstein (2008)? In their original work on the topic, Thaler and Sunstein developed the ‘as judged by themselves’ (or AJBT) test to answer this question (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 5). In a recent paper, Paul and Sunstein (2019) raised a concern about this test: it often seems to give the wrong answer in cases in which we are nudged to make a de…
Consequences of Calibration
Drawing on a passage from Ramsey's Truth and Probability, we formulate a simple, plausible constraint on evaluating the accuracy of credences: the Calibration Test. We show that any additive, continuous accuracy measure that passes the Calibration Test will be strictly proper. Strictly proper accuracy measures are known to support the touchstone results of accuracy-first epistemology, for example vindications of probabilism and conditionalization…
Geometric Pooling
Much of our information comes to us indirectly, in the form of conclusions others have drawn from evidence they gathered.When we hear these conclusions, how can we modify our own opinions so as to gain the benefit of their evidence?In this article, we study the method known as geometric pooling.We begin by raising objections to a recent argument in support of this method, and then turn to what we take to be better arguments in its favour; finally…
Aggregating incoherent agents who disagree
In this paper, we explore how we should aggregate the degrees of belief of a group of agents to give a single coherent set of degrees of belief, when at least some of those agents might be probabilistically incoherent. There are a number of ways of aggregating degrees of belief, and there are a number of ways of fixing incoherent degrees of belief. When we have picked one of each, should we aggregate first and then fix, or fix first and then aggr…
Aristotle on the Subject Matter of Geometry
I offer a new interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of geometry, which he presents in greatest detail in Metaphysics M 3. On my interpretation, Aristotle holds that the points, lines, planes, and solids of geometry belong to the sensible realm, but not in a straightforward way. Rather, by considering Aristotle's second attempt to solve Zeno's Runner Paradox in Book VIII of the Physics, I explain how such objects exist in the sensibles in a spe…
Aristotle on the Subject Matter of Geometry
I offer a new interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of geometry, which he presents in greatest detail in Metaphysics M 3. On my interpretation, Aristotle holds that the points, lines, planes, and solids of geometry belong to the sensible realm, but not in a straightforward way. Rather, by considering Aristotle's second attempt to solve Zeno's Runner Paradox in Book VIII of the Physics, I explain how such objects exist in the sensibles in a spe…
An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I
In this article and its sequel, we derive Bayesianism from the following norm: Accuracy—an agent ought to minimize the inaccuracy of her partial beliefs. In this article, we make this norm mathematically precise. We describe epistemic dilemmas an agent might face if she attempts to follow Accuracy and show that the only measures of inaccuracy that do not create these dilemmas are the quadratic inaccuracy measures. In the sequel, we derive Bayesia…
An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II
In this article and its prequel, we derive Bayesianism from the following norm: Accuracy—an agent ought to minimize the inaccuracy of her partial beliefs. In the prequel, we make the norm mathematically precise; in this article, we derive its consequences. We show that the two core tenets of Bayesianism follow from Accuracy, while the characteristic claim of Objective Bayesianism follows from Accuracy together with an extra assumption. Finally, w…
Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle
In “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism,” James M. Joyce attempts to “depragmatize” de Finetti’s prevision argument for the claim that our credences ought to satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus. This article adapts Joyce’s argument to give nonpragmatic vindications of David Lewis’s original Principal Principle as well as recent reformulations due to Ned Hall and Jenann Ismael. Joyce enumerates properties that a function must have…
Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences
Beliefs come in different strengths. An agent's credence in a proposition is a measure of the strength of her belief in that proposition. Various norms for credences have been proposed. Traditionally, philosophers have tried to argue for these norms by showing that any agent who violates them will be lead by her credences to make bad decisions. In this article, we survey a new strategy for justifying these norms. The strategy begins by identifyin…
Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference
Two types of abstraction for structuralism
If numbers were identified with any of their standard set-theoretic realizations, then they would have various non-arithmetical properties that mathematicians are reluctant to ascribe to them. Dedekind and later structuralists conclude that we should refrain from ascribing to numbers such ‘foreign’ properties. We first rehearse why it is hard to provide an acceptable formulation of this conclusion. Then we investigate some forms of abstraction me…
Transformative Experience and Decision Theory
I have never eaten Vegemite-should I try it?I currently have no children-should I apply to adopt a child?In each case, one might imagine, whichever choice I make, I can make it rationally by appealing to the principles of decision theory.Not always, says L. A. Paul.In Transformative Experience, Paul issues two challenges to decision theory based upon examples such as these [Paul, 2014].I will show how we might reformulate decision theory in the f…
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences (or degrees of belief). He draws on decision theory in order to justify the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, and sets out a veritistic account of epistemic utility.
Remaking the elite university
This article analyses and critiques the discourse around widening participation in elite universities in the UK. One response, from both university administrators and academics, has been to see this as an ‘intractable’ problem which can at best be ameliorated through outreach or marginal work in admissions policy. Another has been to reject the institution of the university completely, and seek to set up alternative models of autonomous higher ed…
Replies to commentators on Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
Précis of Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
Discounting The Future
This chapter asks whether it is rationally permissible to assign less weight to the values of my other selves in line with the degree of psychological connectedness between us. This draws on Derek Parfit’s (1984, ‘Personal Identity’, in Philosophical Review, 80) rational reconstruction of temporal discounting. The chapter considers an argument by Arif Ahmed (2018, ‘Rationality and Future Discounting’, in Topoi, February) that such weights result …
The Aggregate Utility Solution II
The previous chapter concluded that we should aggregate credences and utilities first. This chapter considers how we should aggregate them. It claims that we should use the individual’s current credence function together with a weighted average of the utility functions of the individual’s past, present, and future selves. It then responds to an objection based on the partition sensitivity of the proposed solution. It proposes that an individual s…
Why Aggregate Using Weighted Averages?
This chapter defends the claim that we should aggregate an individual’s different utility functions at different times by taking a weighted average of them. It introduces the Principle of Minimal Mutilation, which says that an aggregate of a collection of attitudes should lie as close as possible to the attitudes it aggregates. By giving a mathematically precise account of the distance between different utility functions, the chapter appeals to a…
The Nearer The Dearer
This chapter asks whether it is rationally permissible to assign less weight to the values of my other selves in line with the proximity of the values of those other selves to my current values. It argues that it is. It then introduces the Stoicism objection to the Aggregate Utility Solution. This says that you should never be rationally required to change your values in order to increase your utility, and it claims that this is required by the A…
Do We Know Enough to Make Decisions This Way?
This chapter considers two related arguments that, if successful, tell against the Aggregate Utility Solution to the problem of choosing for changing selves. The first is due to L. A. Paul (2014), ‘Voluntary Benefits from Wrongdoing’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 31(4); the second is due to Sarah Moss (2018), Probabilistic Knowledge. Both claim that we cannot know enough to make decisions in the way proposed by the Aggregate Utility Solution. P…
I’ll be Glad I Did It—So, I’ll Do It
This chapter considers a form of practical reasoning explored by Elizabeth Harman (2009, ‘I’ll be glad I did it’ reasoning and the significance of future desires, in Philosophical Perspectives, 23(1)), which she dubs ‘I’ll be glad I did it’ reasoning, and which she rejects in general. In such reasoning, when faced with a choice between two options, if I would later think that one option is better than the other were I to choose that option, that …
Existing Solutions III
This chapter considers the third existing putative solution to the problem of choosing for changing selves. This is the One True Utility Solution and it is based on the objectivist claim that there is a unique, objective utility function, and that an individual’s subjective utility for an outcome should be her expectation of the objective utility of that outcome. The chapter shows, if objectivism about value is granted, this solution will work. B…
The Weight of The Past
This chapter asks whether it is ever required or even permissible to give some weight to the values of your past selves. It argues that sometimes, when a past self has made a sacrifice that benefits the current self, it is at least permissible and sometimes required to give weight to the permissible values of that past self. To do this, the chapter introduces a principle descended from H. L. A. Hart’s (1955, ‘Are there any natural rights?’ Philos…
The Problem of Weighting Changing Selves
This chapter summarizes the conclusions of the first part of the book and introduces the work of the second part. The first part proposed the Aggregate Utility Solution to the problem of choosing for changing selves; it argued for a particular version of this solution that aggregates particular utilities using weighted averages; and it defended that version against the objection that the utilities of different selves are incomparable and the obje…
The Road Ahead
This final chapter of the book summarizes the conclusions of the preceding chapters and looks forward to how the Aggregate Utility Solution might be generalized so that it applies not only to the expected utility theory framework, but also to other frameworks for rational decision-making. In particular, it explains how we might extend the Aggregate Utility Solution to the framework of imprecise credences and utilities, and to the framework of ris…
The Problem of Choosing for Changing Selves
This chapter introduces the problem that the rest of the book seeks to solve, namely, the problem of choosing for changing selves. The chapter presents a series of examples. In each, an individual’s values change over the course of their life, and they must make a decision at a particular time in their life. These examples motivate our problem, and will be drawn on time and again in what follows. The chapter gives an overview of the structure of …
Existing Solutions I
In this chapter, we meet the first of the existing putative solutions to the problem of choosing for changing selves. This is the Unchanging Utility Solution and it claims that, contrary to appearances, our values do not change over time; rather, what changes is what obtains for us the things we value. The chapter argues that this will not work. It considers two objections: first, in many cases, it is not possible to identify what it is that rema…
The Aggregate Utility Solution I
The chapter starts to describe a new solution to the problem of choosing for changing selves. It proposes that we should consider it as a judgement aggregation problem. In a judgement aggregation problem, a collective entity is required to aggregate the beliefs and values of the various entities that make it up before making a decision on the basis of those collective attitudes. In the Aggregate Utility Solution, the individual agent is the colle…
Epistemology (34 works) · Philosophy (34 works) · Computer Science (30 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (25 works) · Mathematics (21 works) · Mathematical economics (20 works) · Economics (12 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (12 works) · Sociology (11 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (10 works)