The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8396992
AutoresRichard Pettigrew (0000-0003-0822-4300, University of Bristol, autor de correspondencia)
Año2020
Volumen71
Número2
Páginas605-619
Fecha de publicación2020-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axx060
OpenAlexW2622829852
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas16

In a recent paper in this journal, James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann, and Jon Williamson (henceforth HLWW) argue that the principal principle entails the principle of indifference. In this article, I argue that it does not. Lewis’s version of the principal principle notoriously depends on a notion of admissibility, which Lewis uses to restrict its application. HLWW base their argument on certain intuitions concerning when one proposition is admissible for another: Conditions 1 and 2. There are two ways of reading their argument, depending on how you understand the status of these conditions. Reading 1: The correct account of admissibility is determined independently of these two principles, and yet these two principles follow from that correct account. Reading 2: The correct account of admissibility is determined in part by these two principles, so that the principles follow from that account but only because the correct account is constrained so that it must satisfy them. HLWW show that given an account of admissibility on which Conditions 1 and 2 hold, the principal principle entails the principle of indifference. I argue that on either reading of the argument, it fails. First, I argue that there is a plausible account of admissibility on which Conditions 1 and 2 are false. That defeats Reading 1. Next, I argue that the intuitions that lead us to assent to Condition 2 also lead us to assent to other very closely related principles that are inconsistent with Condition 2. This, I claim, casts doubt on the reliability of those intuitions, and thus removes our justification for Condition 2. This defeats Reading 2 of the HLWW argument. Thus, the argument fails. 1. Introduction 2. Introducing the Principal Principle 3. Introducing the Principle of Indifference 4. The HLWW Argument 4.1. Reading 1: Admissibility justifies Conditions 1 and 2 4.2. Reading 2: Conditions 1 and 2 constrain admissibility 5. Conclusion

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Linguistics · Mathematical economics · Principal (computer security) · Proposition · Reading (process) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy