Brian Kierland
Biographic Data
| ID | 1087001 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Brian Kierland |
| GIVEN NAMES | Brian |
| FAMILY NAME | Kierland |
| SIGNATURE | KIERLAND B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Missouri |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Doing for Circular Time What Shoemaker Did for Time without Change
There are possible worlds in which time is circular and finite in duration, forming a loop of, say, 12,000 years. There are also possible worlds in which time is linear and infinite in both directions and in which history is repetitive, consisting of infinitely many 12,000-year epochs, each two of which are exactly alike with respect to all intrinsic, purely qualitative properties. Could one ever have empirical evidence that one inhabits a world …
Cooperation, ‘Ought Morally’, and Principles of Moral Harmony
How to Predict Future Duration From Present Age
The physicist J. Richard Gott has given an argument which, if good, allows one to make accurate predictions for the future longevity of a process, based solely on its present age. We show that there are problems with some of the details of Gott's argument, but we defend the core thesis: in many circumstances, the greater the present age of a process, the more likely a longer future duration
Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs
One's inaccuracy for a proposition is defined as the squared difference between the truth value (1 or 0) of the proposition and the credence (or subjective probability, or degree of belief) assigned to the proposition. One should have the epistemic goal of minimizing the expected inaccuracies of one's credences. We show that the method of minimizing expected inaccuracy can be used to solve certain probability problems involving information loss a…
Supererogatory Superluminality
Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs
One's inaccuracy for a proposition is defined as the squared difference between the truth value (1 or 0) of the proposition and the credence (or subjective probability, or degree of belief) assigned to the proposition. One should have the epistemic goal of minimizing the expected inaccuracies of one's credences. We show that the method of minimizing expected inaccuracy can be used to solve certain probability problems involving information loss a…
How to Predict Future Duration From Present Age
The physicist J. Richard Gott has given an argument which, if good, allows one to make accurate predictions for the future longevity of a process, based solely on its present age. We show that there are problems with some of the details of Gott's argument, but we defend the core thesis: in many circumstances, the greater the present age of a process, the more likely a longer future duration
Supererogatory Superluminality
Supererogatory Superluminality
Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs
One's inaccuracy for a proposition is defined as the squared difference between the truth value (1 or 0) of the proposition and the credence (or subjective probability, or degree of belief) assigned to the proposition. One should have the epistemic goal of minimizing the expected inaccuracies of one's credences. We show that the method of minimizing expected inaccuracy can be used to solve certain probability problems involving information loss a…
Cooperation, ‘Ought Morally’, and Principles of Moral Harmony
How to Predict Future Duration From Present Age
The physicist J. Richard Gott has given an argument which, if good, allows one to make accurate predictions for the future longevity of a process, based solely on its present age. We show that there are problems with some of the details of Gott's argument, but we defend the core thesis: in many circumstances, the greater the present age of a process, the more likely a longer future duration
Doing for Circular Time What Shoemaker Did for Time without Change
There are possible worlds in which time is circular and finite in duration, forming a loop of, say, 12,000 years. There are also possible worlds in which time is linear and infinite in both directions and in which history is repetitive, consisting of infinitely many 12,000-year epochs, each two of which are exactly alike with respect to all intrinsic, purely qualitative properties. Could one ever have empirical evidence that one inhabits a world …
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Physics (3 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy of language (2 works) · Quantum Mechanics and Applications (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works)