Bradley Monton
Biographic Data
| ID | 1087002 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Bradley Monton |
| GIVEN NAMES | Bradley |
| FAMILY NAME | Monton |
| SIGNATURE | MONTON B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Kentucky |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 84 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
An Empiricist Regarding Science, an Empiricist Regarding Representation
It probably goes without saying that the advent of a new book by Bas van Fraassen is a major event in the world of philosophy of science. Indeed, Scientific Representation does not disappoint. It is full of interesting and erudite discussions, and presents controversial arguments with which philosophers of science will want to come to grips. There are two ways in which one could review a book like this. One could just go through it step by step, …
Time Travel Without Causal Loops
It has sometimes been suggested that backwards time travel always incurs causal loops. I show that this is mistaken, by describing worlds where backwards time travel occurs and yet no causal loops occur. Arguments that backwards time travel can occur without causal loops have been given before in the literature, but I show that those arguments are unconvincing
Quantum Mechanics and 3 N -Dimensional Space
I maintain that quantum mechanics is fundamentally about a system of N particles evolving in three-dimensional space, not the wave function evolving in 3 N -dimensional space
God, Fine-Tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence
The fundamental constants that are involved in the laws of physics which describe our universe are finely tuned for life, in the sense that if some of the constants had slightly different values life could not exist. Some people hold that this provides evidence for the existence of God. I will present a probabilistic version of this fine-tuning argument which is stronger than all other versions in the literature. Nevertheless, I will show that on…
How to Predict Future Duration From Present Age
The physicist J. Richard Gott has given an argument which, if good, allows one to make accurate predictions for the future longevity of a process, based solely on its present age. We show that there are problems with some of the details of Gott's argument, but we defend the core thesis: in many circumstances, the greater the present age of a process, the more likely a longer future duration
Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs
One's inaccuracy for a proposition is defined as the squared difference between the truth value (1 or 0) of the proposition and the credence (or subjective probability, or degree of belief) assigned to the proposition. One should have the epistemic goal of minimizing the expected inaccuracies of one's credences. We show that the method of minimizing expected inaccuracy can be used to solve certain probability problems involving information loss a…
The problem of ontology for spontaneous collapse theories
Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism
James Ladyman has argued that constructive empiricism entails modal realism, and that this renders constructive empiricism untenable. We maintain that constructive empiricism is compatible with modal nominalism. Although the central term ‘observable’ has been analyzed in terms of counterfactuals, and in general counterfactuals do not have objective truth conditions, the property of being observable is not a modal property, and hence there are obj…
The Doomsday Argument without Knowledge of Birth Rank
Journal Article The Doomsday Argument without Knowledge of Birth Rank Get access Bradley Monton Bradley Monton University of Kentucky Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 53, Issue 210, January 2003, Pages 79-82, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00297 Published: 28 April 2003
Wave Function Ontology
Supererogatory Superluminality
Counting Marbles with 'Accessible' Mass Density: A Reply to Bassi and Ghirardi
In a previous article (cf. quant-ph/9905065) we argued that, while Lewis is correct that the enumeration principle fails in dynamical wavepacket reduction theories, one need not following Lewis in rejecting these theories. Because the dynamical reduction process itself prevents the failure of enumeration from ever becoming manifest, and because one can treat the semantics for dynamical reduction theories as not adding anything of ontological impo…
Van Fraassen and Ruetsche on Preparation and Measurement
Ruetsche (1996) has argued that van Fraassen's (1991) Copenhagen Variant of the Modal Interpretation (CVMI) gives unsatisfactory accounts of measurement and of state preparation. I defend the CVMI against Ruetsche's first argument by using decoherence to show that the CVMI does not need to account for the measurement scenario which Ruetsche poses. I then show, however, that there is a problem concerning preparation, and the problem is more seriou…
Losing Your Marbles in Wavefunction Collapse Theories
Peter Lewis ([1997]) has recently argued that the wavefunction collapse theory of GRW (Chirardi, Rimini and Weber [1986]) can only solve the problem of wavefunction tails at the expense of predicting that arithmetic does not apply to ordinary macroscopic objects. More specifically, Lewis argues that the GRW theory must violate the enumeration principle: that 'if marble 1 is in the box and marble 2 is in the box and so on through marble n, then al…
Wave Function Ontology
Quantum Mechanics and 3 N -Dimensional Space
I maintain that quantum mechanics is fundamentally about a system of N particles evolving in three-dimensional space, not the wave function evolving in 3 N -dimensional space
Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism
James Ladyman has argued that constructive empiricism entails modal realism, and that this renders constructive empiricism untenable. We maintain that constructive empiricism is compatible with modal nominalism. Although the central term ‘observable’ has been analyzed in terms of counterfactuals, and in general counterfactuals do not have objective truth conditions, the property of being observable is not a modal property, and hence there are obj…
Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs
One's inaccuracy for a proposition is defined as the squared difference between the truth value (1 or 0) of the proposition and the credence (or subjective probability, or degree of belief) assigned to the proposition. One should have the epistemic goal of minimizing the expected inaccuracies of one's credences. We show that the method of minimizing expected inaccuracy can be used to solve certain probability problems involving information loss a…
The Doomsday Argument without Knowledge of Birth Rank
Journal Article The Doomsday Argument without Knowledge of Birth Rank Get access Bradley Monton Bradley Monton University of Kentucky Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 53, Issue 210, January 2003, Pages 79-82, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00297 Published: 28 April 2003
Counting Marbles with 'Accessible' Mass Density: A Reply to Bassi and Ghirardi
In a previous article (cf. quant-ph/9905065) we argued that, while Lewis is correct that the enumeration principle fails in dynamical wavepacket reduction theories, one need not following Lewis in rejecting these theories. Because the dynamical reduction process itself prevents the failure of enumeration from ever becoming manifest, and because one can treat the semantics for dynamical reduction theories as not adding anything of ontological impo…
God, Fine-Tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence
The fundamental constants that are involved in the laws of physics which describe our universe are finely tuned for life, in the sense that if some of the constants had slightly different values life could not exist. Some people hold that this provides evidence for the existence of God. I will present a probabilistic version of this fine-tuning argument which is stronger than all other versions in the literature. Nevertheless, I will show that on…
Losing Your Marbles in Wavefunction Collapse Theories
Peter Lewis ([1997]) has recently argued that the wavefunction collapse theory of GRW (Chirardi, Rimini and Weber [1986]) can only solve the problem of wavefunction tails at the expense of predicting that arithmetic does not apply to ordinary macroscopic objects. More specifically, Lewis argues that the GRW theory must violate the enumeration principle: that 'if marble 1 is in the box and marble 2 is in the box and so on through marble n, then al…
How to Predict Future Duration From Present Age
The physicist J. Richard Gott has given an argument which, if good, allows one to make accurate predictions for the future longevity of a process, based solely on its present age. We show that there are problems with some of the details of Gott's argument, but we defend the core thesis: in many circumstances, the greater the present age of a process, the more likely a longer future duration
Supererogatory Superluminality
Van Fraassen and Ruetsche on Preparation and Measurement
Ruetsche (1996) has argued that van Fraassen's (1991) Copenhagen Variant of the Modal Interpretation (CVMI) gives unsatisfactory accounts of measurement and of state preparation. I defend the CVMI against Ruetsche's first argument by using decoherence to show that the CVMI does not need to account for the measurement scenario which Ruetsche poses. I then show, however, that there is a problem concerning preparation, and the problem is more seriou…
Van Fraassen and Ruetsche on Preparation and Measurement
Ruetsche (1996) has argued that van Fraassen's (1991) Copenhagen Variant of the Modal Interpretation (CVMI) gives unsatisfactory accounts of measurement and of state preparation. I defend the CVMI against Ruetsche's first argument by using decoherence to show that the CVMI does not need to account for the measurement scenario which Ruetsche poses. I then show, however, that there is a problem concerning preparation, and the problem is more seriou…
Losing Your Marbles in Wavefunction Collapse Theories
Peter Lewis ([1997]) has recently argued that the wavefunction collapse theory of GRW (Chirardi, Rimini and Weber [1986]) can only solve the problem of wavefunction tails at the expense of predicting that arithmetic does not apply to ordinary macroscopic objects. More specifically, Lewis argues that the GRW theory must violate the enumeration principle: that 'if marble 1 is in the box and marble 2 is in the box and so on through marble n, then al…
Counting Marbles with 'Accessible' Mass Density: A Reply to Bassi and Ghirardi
In a previous article (cf. quant-ph/9905065) we argued that, while Lewis is correct that the enumeration principle fails in dynamical wavepacket reduction theories, one need not following Lewis in rejecting these theories. Because the dynamical reduction process itself prevents the failure of enumeration from ever becoming manifest, and because one can treat the semantics for dynamical reduction theories as not adding anything of ontological impo…
Supererogatory Superluminality
Wave Function Ontology
Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism
James Ladyman has argued that constructive empiricism entails modal realism, and that this renders constructive empiricism untenable. We maintain that constructive empiricism is compatible with modal nominalism. Although the central term ‘observable’ has been analyzed in terms of counterfactuals, and in general counterfactuals do not have objective truth conditions, the property of being observable is not a modal property, and hence there are obj…
The Doomsday Argument without Knowledge of Birth Rank
Journal Article The Doomsday Argument without Knowledge of Birth Rank Get access Bradley Monton Bradley Monton University of Kentucky Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 53, Issue 210, January 2003, Pages 79-82, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00297 Published: 28 April 2003
The problem of ontology for spontaneous collapse theories
Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs
One's inaccuracy for a proposition is defined as the squared difference between the truth value (1 or 0) of the proposition and the credence (or subjective probability, or degree of belief) assigned to the proposition. One should have the epistemic goal of minimizing the expected inaccuracies of one's credences. We show that the method of minimizing expected inaccuracy can be used to solve certain probability problems involving information loss a…
Quantum Mechanics and 3 N -Dimensional Space
I maintain that quantum mechanics is fundamentally about a system of N particles evolving in three-dimensional space, not the wave function evolving in 3 N -dimensional space
God, Fine-Tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence
The fundamental constants that are involved in the laws of physics which describe our universe are finely tuned for life, in the sense that if some of the constants had slightly different values life could not exist. Some people hold that this provides evidence for the existence of God. I will present a probabilistic version of this fine-tuning argument which is stronger than all other versions in the literature. Nevertheless, I will show that on…
How to Predict Future Duration From Present Age
The physicist J. Richard Gott has given an argument which, if good, allows one to make accurate predictions for the future longevity of a process, based solely on its present age. We show that there are problems with some of the details of Gott's argument, but we defend the core thesis: in many circumstances, the greater the present age of a process, the more likely a longer future duration
Time Travel Without Causal Loops
It has sometimes been suggested that backwards time travel always incurs causal loops. I show that this is mistaken, by describing worlds where backwards time travel occurs and yet no causal loops occur. Arguments that backwards time travel can occur without causal loops have been given before in the literature, but I show that those arguments are unconvincing
An Empiricist Regarding Science, an Empiricist Regarding Representation
It probably goes without saying that the advent of a new book by Bas van Fraassen is a major event in the world of philosophy of science. Indeed, Scientific Representation does not disappoint. It is full of interesting and erudite discussions, and presents controversial arguments with which philosophers of science will want to come to grips. There are two ways in which one could review a book like this. One could just go through it step by step, …
Computer Science (11 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Epistemology (10 works) · Physics (10 works) · Quantum Mechanics and Applications (9 works) · Mathematics (8 works) · Theoretical physics (6 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (5 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (5 works) · Quantum mechanics (5 works)