Matthew Soteriou
Biographic Data
| ID | 1087752 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Matthew Soteriou |
| GIVEN NAMES | Matthew |
| FAMILY NAME | Soteriou |
| SIGNATURE | SOTERIOU M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Warwick |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Dreams, agency, and judgement
Sosa (Proc Addresses Am Philos Assoc 79(2): 7–18, 2005) argues that we should reject the orthodox conception of dreaming—the view that dream states and waking states are “intrinsically alike, though different in their causes and effects” (2005: p. 7). The alternative he proposes is that “to dream is to imagine” (2005: p. 7). According to this imagination model of dreaming, our dreamt conscious beliefs, experiences, affirmations, decisions and int…
Disjunctivism
It is commonly held that the experiences involved in cases of perception, illusion and hallucination all have the same nature. Disjunctivists deny this. They maintain that the kind of experience you have when you perceive the world isn’t one you could be having if you were hallucinating. A number of important debates in the philosophy of mind and epistemology turn on the question of whether this disjunctivist view is tenable. This is the first bo…
Disjunctivism
The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action
Matthew Soteriou provides an original philosophical account of sensory and cognitive aspects of consciousness. He explores distinctions of temporal character in our mental lives - especially in relation to the exercise of agency - and illuminates the more general issue of the place and role of mental action in the metaphysics of mind.
Mental actions
The twelve specially written essays in this volume investigate the neglected topic of mental action, and show its importance for the metaphysics, epistemology, and phenomenology of mind. The essays investigate what mental actions are, how we are aware of them, and what is the relationship between mental and physical action.
The Epistemological Role of Episodic Recollection
In what respects is episodic recollection active, and subject to the will, like perceptual imagination, and in what respects is it passive, like perception, and how do these matters relate to its epistemological role? I present an account of the ontology of episodic recollection that provides answers to these questions. According the account I recommend, an act of episodic recollection is not subject to epistemic evaluation—it is neither justifie…
Content and the Stream of Consciousness
Dreams, agency, and judgement
Sosa (Proc Addresses Am Philos Assoc 79(2): 7–18, 2005) argues that we should reject the orthodox conception of dreaming—the view that dream states and waking states are “intrinsically alike, though different in their causes and effects” (2005: p. 7). The alternative he proposes is that “to dream is to imagine” (2005: p. 7). According to this imagination model of dreaming, our dreamt conscious beliefs, experiences, affirmations, decisions and int…
The Epistemological Role of Episodic Recollection
In what respects is episodic recollection active, and subject to the will, like perceptual imagination, and in what respects is it passive, like perception, and how do these matters relate to its epistemological role? I present an account of the ontology of episodic recollection that provides answers to these questions. According the account I recommend, an act of episodic recollection is not subject to epistemic evaluation—it is neither justifie…
Content and the Stream of Consciousness
Content and the Stream of Consciousness
The Epistemological Role of Episodic Recollection
In what respects is episodic recollection active, and subject to the will, like perceptual imagination, and in what respects is it passive, like perception, and how do these matters relate to its epistemological role? I present an account of the ontology of episodic recollection that provides answers to these questions. According the account I recommend, an act of episodic recollection is not subject to epistemic evaluation—it is neither justifie…
Mental actions
The twelve specially written essays in this volume investigate the neglected topic of mental action, and show its importance for the metaphysics, epistemology, and phenomenology of mind. The essays investigate what mental actions are, how we are aware of them, and what is the relationship between mental and physical action.
The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action
Matthew Soteriou provides an original philosophical account of sensory and cognitive aspects of consciousness. He explores distinctions of temporal character in our mental lives - especially in relation to the exercise of agency - and illuminates the more general issue of the place and role of mental action in the metaphysics of mind.
Disjunctivism
It is commonly held that the experiences involved in cases of perception, illusion and hallucination all have the same nature. Disjunctivists deny this. They maintain that the kind of experience you have when you perceive the world isn’t one you could be having if you were hallucinating. A number of important debates in the philosophy of mind and epistemology turn on the question of whether this disjunctivist view is tenable. This is the first bo…
Disjunctivism
Dreams, agency, and judgement
Sosa (Proc Addresses Am Philos Assoc 79(2): 7–18, 2005) argues that we should reject the orthodox conception of dreaming—the view that dream states and waking states are “intrinsically alike, though different in their causes and effects” (2005: p. 7). The alternative he proposes is that “to dream is to imagine” (2005: p. 7). According to this imagination model of dreaming, our dreamt conscious beliefs, experiences, affirmations, decisions and int…
Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Cognition (3 works) · Consciousness (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Perception (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Action (physics) (2 works)