Disjunctivism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19901934 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthew Soteriou (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Publication date | 2016-03-31 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Disjunctivism (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Routledge (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.4324/9781315636832 |
| OpenAlex | W4232845360 |
| Open Library | OL39532623M |
| ISBN | 9781315636832 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 37 |
It is commonly held that the experiences involved in cases of perception, illusion and hallucination all have the same nature. Disjunctivists deny this. They maintain that the kind of experience you have when you perceive the world isn’t one you could be having if you were hallucinating. A number of important debates in the philosophy of mind and epistemology turn on the question of whether this disjunctivist view is tenable. This is the first book-length introduction to this contested issue. Matthew Soteriou explains the accounts of perception that disjunctivists seek to defend, such as naïve realism, and the accounts to which they are opposed, such as sense-datum theories and representationalist theories. He goes on to introduce and assess key questions that arise in these debates: Is disjunctivism consistent with what has been established by the science of perception? Does introspective reflection support naïve realism? Can disjunctivism be motivated by appeal to the role that perception plays in enabling us to think demonstratively about mind-independent objects and qualities in our environment? Does disjunctivism offer the best account of perceptual knowledge? What can disjunctivists say about the nature of hallucination and illusion? Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary, this book is an ideal starting point for anyone studying disjunctivism for the first time, as well as for more advanced students and researchers
Critical Theory and Philosophy · Philosophy · Epistemología · Epistemology · Percepción (Filosofía) · Perception · Perception (Philosophie) · Perception (Philosophy) · Théorie de la connaissance · Theory of knowledge
Disjunctivism and the Paradox of Tragedy
The Hard Problem of Access for Epistemological Disjunctivism
Naïve Realism and the Laws of Appearance
A Lemma from Nowhere
The illusion of reality
Naïve realism, imagination and hallucination
Incompetent perceivers, distinguishable hallucinations, and perceptual phenomenology. Some problems for activity views of perception
The harm of humiliation
Self‐Knowledge and the Capacity to Judge
Belief, perception, and the laws of appearance
Interpersonal connection
Phenomenological Reduction and the Nature of Perceptual Experience
Epistemological Disjunctivism and Anti-luminosity Arguments
Idealist Implications of Contemporary Science
Taking Skepticism Seriously
The Common Kind Theory and The Concept of Perceptual Experience
Disjunctivism and the Causal Conditions of Hallucination
Affective Disclosure of Value
What’s so naïve about naïve realism
Perceiving as knowing in the predictive mind
Mundane hallucinations and new wave relationalism
Bad to the bone
Does Negative Epistemic Disjunctivism Solve the Screening Off Problem
Hallucination as Perceptual Synecdoche
A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism
Naïve realism about unconscious perception
Phenomenal character and the epistemic role of perception
Sensing mind-independence
The Monist strategy
The metaphysics and epistemology of conscious perception
Reference in memories from perceptual and non-perceptual experiences
Visual acquaintance, action and the explanatory gap
A representationalist reading of Kantian intuitions
Against Radical Enactivism’s narrowmindedness about phenomenality
Affect, motivational states, and evaluative concepts
Expression, testimony, and other minds
Hallucination and Its Objects
| Unique citing works | 37 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 5,29 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2026 (8) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 37 |