Roberto Lo
Biographic Data
| ID | 1092650 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Roberto Lo |
| GIVEN NAMES | Roberto |
| FAMILY NAME | Lo |
| SIGNATURE | LO R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidad Complutense de Madrid |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3470-1799 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Fragmentalism
According to perspectival realism, reality is (at least partially) constituted by ‘purely perspectival’ facts, that is, facts that appear to describe reality only from a given ‘perspective’. Fragmentalism is a form of perspectival realism that maintains both that no perspective is privileged and that perspectival facts constitute reality absolutely. Assuming that reality is sufficiently variegated, fragmentalism entails that reality is absolutely…
Mereological endurantism and being a whole at a time
Damiano Costa has recently offered a novel mereological definition of endurantism based on the idea that for an object to be wholly present at a time is for it to be a whole at that time. In this paper, I argue that Costa’s is not a definition of endurantism, since the idea that every object is a whole at every time it exists can be accepted by endurantists and perdurantists alike
Don’t Stop Believing
Giovanni Merlo has argued that a currently popular way to interpret Kit Fine's fragmentalism about tensed facts (which he calls ‘unstructured fragmentalism’) is threatened by the problem of ‘tensed belief explosion’. I argue that such an explosion of belief poses no problem to unstructured fragmentalists
Somewhere Together
Two notions of fusion and the landscape of extensionality
There are two main ways in which the notion of mereological fusion is usually defined in the current literature in mereology which have been labelled ‘Leśniewski fusion’ and ‘Goodman fusion’. It is well-known that, with Minimal Mereology as the background theory, every Leśniewski fusion also qualifies as a Goodman fusion. However, the converse does not hold unless stronger mereological principles are assumed. In this paper I will discuss how the …
On atomic composition as identity
Open future, supervaluationism and the growing-block theory
Composition, identity and plural ontology
According to ‘Strong Composition as Identity’ (SCAI), if an entity is composed of a plurality of entities, it is identical to them. As it has been argued in the literature, SCAI appears to give rise to some serious problems which seem to suggest that SCAI-theorists should take their plural quantifier to be governed by some ‘weak’ plural comprehension principle and, thus, ‘exclude’ some kinds of pluralities from their plural ontology. The aim of t…
Composition as Identity and the Innocence of Mereology
According to the thesis known as ‘Composition as Identity’ (‘CAI’), every entity is identical to the parts it fuses. Many authors in the literature acknowledge that, in spite of its controversial character, one attractive virtue of CAI is its apparent ability to give a straightforward account of the innocence of mereology. In this paper I will present a simple argument according to which CAI entails that no composite entity can be said to be onto…
A Sudden Collapse to Nihilism
According to Composition is Identity, a whole is literally identical to the plurality of its parts. According to Mereological Nihilism, nothing has proper parts. In this note, it is argued that Composition is Identity can be shown to entail Mereological Nihilism in a much more simple and direct way than the one recently proposed by Claudio Calosi.
Fatalism and the necessity of the present
Journal Article Fatalism and the necessity of the present: reply to Campbell Get access Roberto Loss Roberto Loss University of Nottingham Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 70, Issue 1, January 2010, Pages 76–78, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anp135 Published: 27 October 2009
A Sudden Collapse to Nihilism
According to Composition is Identity, a whole is literally identical to the plurality of its parts. According to Mereological Nihilism, nothing has proper parts. In this note, it is argued that Composition is Identity can be shown to entail Mereological Nihilism in a much more simple and direct way than the one recently proposed by Claudio Calosi.
On atomic composition as identity
Composition, identity and plural ontology
According to ‘Strong Composition as Identity’ (SCAI), if an entity is composed of a plurality of entities, it is identical to them. As it has been argued in the literature, SCAI appears to give rise to some serious problems which seem to suggest that SCAI-theorists should take their plural quantifier to be governed by some ‘weak’ plural comprehension principle and, thus, ‘exclude’ some kinds of pluralities from their plural ontology. The aim of t…
Composition as Identity and the Innocence of Mereology
According to the thesis known as ‘Composition as Identity’ (‘CAI’), every entity is identical to the parts it fuses. Many authors in the literature acknowledge that, in spite of its controversial character, one attractive virtue of CAI is its apparent ability to give a straightforward account of the innocence of mereology. In this paper I will present a simple argument according to which CAI entails that no composite entity can be said to be onto…
Fatalism and the necessity of the present
Journal Article Fatalism and the necessity of the present: reply to Campbell Get access Roberto Loss Roberto Loss University of Nottingham Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 70, Issue 1, January 2010, Pages 76–78, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anp135 Published: 27 October 2009
A Sudden Collapse to Nihilism
According to Composition is Identity, a whole is literally identical to the plurality of its parts. According to Mereological Nihilism, nothing has proper parts. In this note, it is argued that Composition is Identity can be shown to entail Mereological Nihilism in a much more simple and direct way than the one recently proposed by Claudio Calosi.
Two notions of fusion and the landscape of extensionality
There are two main ways in which the notion of mereological fusion is usually defined in the current literature in mereology which have been labelled ‘Leśniewski fusion’ and ‘Goodman fusion’. It is well-known that, with Minimal Mereology as the background theory, every Leśniewski fusion also qualifies as a Goodman fusion. However, the converse does not hold unless stronger mereological principles are assumed. In this paper I will discuss how the …
On atomic composition as identity
Open future, supervaluationism and the growing-block theory
Composition, identity and plural ontology
According to ‘Strong Composition as Identity’ (SCAI), if an entity is composed of a plurality of entities, it is identical to them. As it has been argued in the literature, SCAI appears to give rise to some serious problems which seem to suggest that SCAI-theorists should take their plural quantifier to be governed by some ‘weak’ plural comprehension principle and, thus, ‘exclude’ some kinds of pluralities from their plural ontology. The aim of t…
Composition as Identity and the Innocence of Mereology
According to the thesis known as ‘Composition as Identity’ (‘CAI’), every entity is identical to the parts it fuses. Many authors in the literature acknowledge that, in spite of its controversial character, one attractive virtue of CAI is its apparent ability to give a straightforward account of the innocence of mereology. In this paper I will present a simple argument according to which CAI entails that no composite entity can be said to be onto…
Somewhere Together
Mereological endurantism and being a whole at a time
Damiano Costa has recently offered a novel mereological definition of endurantism based on the idea that for an object to be wholly present at a time is for it to be a whole at that time. In this paper, I argue that Costa’s is not a definition of endurantism, since the idea that every object is a whole at every time it exists can be accepted by endurantists and perdurantists alike
Don’t Stop Believing
Giovanni Merlo has argued that a currently popular way to interpret Kit Fine's fragmentalism about tensed facts (which he calls ‘unstructured fragmentalism’) is threatened by the problem of ‘tensed belief explosion’. I argue that such an explosion of belief poses no problem to unstructured fragmentalists
Fragmentalism
According to perspectival realism, reality is (at least partially) constituted by ‘purely perspectival’ facts, that is, facts that appear to describe reality only from a given ‘perspective’. Fragmentalism is a form of perspectival realism that maintains both that no perspective is privileged and that perspectival facts constitute reality absolutely. Assuming that reality is sufficiently variegated, fragmentalism entails that reality is absolutely…
Philosophy (11 works) · Epistemology (10 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (10 works) · Linguistics (7 works) · Mereology (5 works) · Metaphysics (5 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works)