Composition as Identity and the Innocence of Mereology

Bibliographic Data

ID10349279
AuthorsRoberto Lo (0000-0003-3470-1799, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume105
Issue1
Pages128-143
Publication date2021-07-07
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phpr.12806
OpenAlexW3181197587
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited28

According to the thesis known as ‘Composition as Identity’ (‘CAI’), every entity is identical to the parts it fuses. Many authors in the literature acknowledge that, in spite of its controversial character, one attractive virtue of CAI is its apparent ability to give a straightforward account of the innocence of mereology. In this paper I will present a simple argument according to which CAI entails that no composite entity can be said to be ontologically innocent in the relevant sense. After having shown that said argument is independent from the problems surrounding the infamous ‘Collapse Principle’, I will conclude that CAI‐theorists should endorse a suitably ‘restricted’ version of CAI. In the final part of the paper I will then argue that the best restricted version of CAI is the theory according to which every composite entity is identical to the plurality of its atomic parts

Aesthetics · Argument (complex analysis · Character (mathematics · Composition (language · Epistemology · Identity (music · Innocence · Linguistics · Mereology · Psychoanalysis · Simple (philosophy · Virtue · Chemistry · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology

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