Composition as Identity

Part 2

Dados Bibliográficos

ID5118417
AutoresMegan Wallace (0000-0003-4331-5785, University of Kentucky, autor correspondente)
Ano2011
Volume6
Fascículo11
Páginas817-827
Data de publicação2011-11-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00430.x
OpenAlexW1850407913
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas23
Referências citadas23

Many of us think that ordinary objects - such as tables and chairs - exist. We also think that ordinary objects have parts: my chair has a seat and some legs as parts, for example. But once we are committed to the (seemingly innocuous) thesis that ordinary objects are composed of parts, we then open ourselves up to a whole host of philosophical problems, most of which center on what exactly this composition relation is. Composition as Identity (CI) is the view that the composition relation is the identity relation. While such a view has some advantages, there are many arguments against it. In this essay, I discuss several versions of the most common objection against CI, and show how the CI theorist can maintain that these arguments - contrary their initial intuitive appeal - are nonetheless unsound

Aesthetics · Appeal · Epistemology · Identity function · Linguistics · Political science · Pure mathematics · Sociology · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History