Composition, identity and plural ontology

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10807253
AutoresRoberto Lo (0000-0003-3470-1799, Universität Hamburg, autor correspondente)
Ano2021
Volume198
Fascículo10
Páginas9193-9210
Data de publicação2021-10-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoSynthese (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
EditoraSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-020-02628-w
OpenAlexW3013240119
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas4
Referências citadas38

According to ‘Strong Composition as Identity’ (SCAI), if an entity is composed of a plurality of entities, it is identical to them. As it has been argued in the literature, SCAI appears to give rise to some serious problems which seem to suggest that SCAI-theorists should take their plural quantifier to be governed by some ‘weak’ plural comprehension principle and, thus, ‘exclude’ some kinds of pluralities from their plural ontology. The aim of this paper is to argue that, contrary to what may appear at first sight, the assumption of a weak plural comprehension principle is perfectly compatible with plural logic and the common uses of plural quantification. As I aim to show, SCAI-theorists can simply claim that their theory must be understood as formulated by means of the most ‘joint-carving’ plural quantifier, thus leaving open the possibility of other, less joint-carving, ‘unrestricted’ plural quantifiers. In the final part of the paper I will also suggest that SCAI-theorists should not only allow for singular quantification over pluralities of entities, but also for plural quantification over ‘super-pluralities’ of entities

Epistemology · Identity (music) · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Ontology · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Plural · Quantifier (linguistics) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science