Composition as Identity

Part 1

Dados Bibliográficos

ID5117038
AutoresMegan Wallace (0000-0003-4331-5785, University of Kentucky, autor correspondente)
Ano2011
Volume6
Fascículo11
Páginas804-816
Data de publicação2011-11-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00431.x
OpenAlexW2323484029
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas26
Referências citadas24

Many of us think that ordinary objects - such as tables and chairs - exist. We also think that ordinary objects have parts: my chair has a seat and some legs as parts, for example. But once we are committed to the (seemingly innocuous) thesis that ordinary objects are composed of parts, we then open ourselves up to a whole host of philosophical problems, most of which center on what exactly the composition relation is. Composition as Identity (CI) is the view that the composition relation is the identity relation. While such a view has some advantages, there are many arguments against it. In this essay, I will briefly canvass three different varieties of Composition as Identity, and suggest why one of them should be preferred over the others. Then I will outline several versions of the most common objection against CI. I will suggest how a CI theorist can respond to these charges by maintaining that some of the arguments are invalid. (In part 2, I show how a CI theorist can maintain that the remaining arguments, while valid, are unsound

Aesthetics · Epistemology · Identity function · Linguistics · Pure mathematics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History