Thin Mereological Sums, Abstraction, and Interpretational Modalities

Dados Bibliográficos

ID20142387
AutoresGabriele Lando (0000-0003-3474-1598, Dipartimento di Scienze Umane Università degli Studi dell'Aquila, autor correspondente)
Ano2023
Volume89
Fascículo3
Páginas338-355
Data de publicação2023-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoTheoria (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12392
OpenAlexW4213024377
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas29

Some tools introduced by Linnebo to show that mathematical entities are thin objects can also be applied to non‐mathematical entities, which have been thought to be thin as well for a variety of reasons. In this paper, I discuss some difficulties and opportunities concerning the application of abstraction and interpretational modalities to mereological sums. In particular, I show that on one hand some prima facie attractive candidates for the role of an explanatory plural abstraction principle for mereological sums (in terms of pluralities of summed entities) are not really explanatory; on the other hand, singular abstraction principles (in terms of single summed entities) are materially inadequate. Nonetheless, explanatory criteria of identity and conditions of existence for mereological sums are provided by classical extensional mereology independent of abstraction principles. Thus, given classical extensional mereology, the reasons why, according to Linnebo, mathematical abstracted entities are thin also hold for mereological sums. Finally, I contend that interpretational modalities can be used to characterise the process by which a subject adds sums of previously admitted entities to the domain of quantification

Abstraction · Epistemology · Extensional definition · Indeterminacy (philosophy) · Linguistics · Mereology · Metaphysics · Modalities · Object (grammar) · Plural · Sociology · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science