Tim Friehe
Biographic Data
| ID | 1092690 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Tim Friehe |
| GIVEN NAMES | Tim |
| FAMILY NAME | Friehe |
| SIGNATURE | FRIEHE T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Philipps University of Marburg |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9390-3537 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 35 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 35 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Duality in Contract and Tort
We study situations in which a single investment serves the dual role of increasing the expected value of a contract (a reliance investment) and reducing the expected harm of a post-performance accident (a care investment). We show that failing to account for the duality of the investment leads to inefficient damages for breach of contract and inefficient standards for due care in tort. Conversely, we show that accounting for the duality yields c…
Unemployment’s Life-Satisfaction Cost and Loneliness
Unemployment consistently lowers life satisfaction on average, yet the individual impact of job loss varies significantly. The underlying factors driving this heterogeneity remain a subject of ongoing research. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, we demonstrate a compelling link between unemployment and loneliness, suggesting that a substantial portion of unemployment’s detrimental impact on life satisfaction can be attributed to the…
Punishment for intentions or outcomes
Individuals often evaluate others’ actions based on both their perceived intentions and their resulting outcomes, rewarding favorable actions and punishing unfavorable ones. This study aims to isolate the influence of these factors on punishment. We experimentally demonstrate that, when outcomes are held constant, second movers punish first movers who choose selfish actions more severely than those who select considerate ones. Conversely, when in…
Product liability influences incentives for horizontal mergers
This paper explores how product liability rules affect merger incentives, with consumer risk perception as a key factor. We find a striking contrast: when consumers overestimate product risk, no liability generates the strongest merger incentives, while strict liability and negligence have weaker, similar effects. Conversely, when consumers underestimate risk, strict liability maximizes merger incentives, and no liability minimizes them. We also …
Keep them out of It! How information externalities affect the willingness to sell personal data online
When individuals provide their personal data online, they often disregard that this allows learning about others, too. Our large-scale online experiment reveals that individuals are less willing to provide personal data when sharing can compromise others’ privacy, entailing personalized price discrimination. Compared to a benchmark without data compromise, individuals’ willingness to sell data decreases when others’ data is compromised with 50% o…
Bayesian persuasion in lawyer–client communication
When considering whether to bring a lawsuit, a plaintiff may delegate the decision to her lawyer- better informed about the case’s merits- or consult with her lawyer and decide for herself. Focusing on the latter, we assess how a lawyer communicates with his client about the case’s merits if the client relies on the lawyer’s information to decide whether to bring suit. In some circumstances, the lawyer only partially reveals the case’s merits to …
On the strategic choice of overconfident lawyers
This paper analyzes how the plaintiff selects her lawyer based on lawyers’ confidence in their trial-effort productivity. The plaintiff’s lawyer works on a contingent fee and makes litigation decisions on the plaintiff’s behalf. When the lawyer’s preferences are decisive at both the settlement and the trial stage, the plaintiff must anticipate that a more confident lawyer evaluates settlement compared to trial differently and implies different eq…
Fines versus Damages
This paper studies the differential effects of fines and damages on people’s investment in accident prevention. We report results from a series of experiments in which the level of monetary transfers after an accident is maintained across the two policy instruments such that standard theory predicts the behavioral irrelevance of the choice of instrument. However, we find that fines induce lower investments in care than damages when revenue from f…
A family member's death increases religious activity
Religiosity influences economic behavior in various domains, but what determines religiosity? Using data from the representative Socio‐Economic Panel Study for Germany (SOEP), this paper shows that religious activity increases after a family member's death. The life event's effect is larger after a partner's death when compared to a parent's death. Our results indicate that the influence of a family member's death on religious activity is tempora…
Probing the case for manufacturer liability for harms caused by judgment-proof consumers to others
We study whether it is socially desirable to hold a monopolistic firm liable for the harm its potentially judgment-proof consumers inflict on third parties. Consumers’ judgment-proofness limits potential product differentiation by pooling different consumer types with uniform liability exposure. The firm’s safety choices are distorted in both regimes under consideration: consumer-only liability and residual-manufacturer liability. We find that re…
Liability and the incentive to improve information about risk when injurers may be judgment-proof
We analyze an injurer’s incentives to improve her information about accident risk. In contrast to the preceding literature, injurers can continuously improve their understanding of the expected harm their activity will impose on others. Regarding social incentives, the marginal benefit from improved risk information is increasing, possibly making either no or a perfect understanding of risk socially optimal. Turning to private incentives when the…
Does the Severity of Sanctions Influence Learning about Enforcement Policy? Experimental Evidence
The literature on law enforcement often assumes that the updating of beliefs regarding the probability of detection is a process that is independent from the severity of the sanction. We test this presumption experimentally, using a taking game in which the probability of detection may be either high or low with commonly known probabilities. Individuals gain information about their probability of detection from their experience in the taking game…
Asking for information prior to settlement or trial when misrepresentation of evidence is possible
Fines as enforcers’ rewards or as a transfer to society at large? Evidence on deterrence and enforcement implications
We analyze experimental data to assess whether the deterrent effect of expected fines depends on who receives the fines’ proceeds. We compare behavior in treatments when the revenue is a reward for enforcement agents to the alternative when fines are transferred to society at large. Most important, with a fixed detection probability, potential offenders’ material incentives are held constant across treatments. Our evidence suggests that the deter…
Damage Measures for Contract Breach when Buyers Have Reference-Dependent Preferences
Using the traditional law-and-economics production contract model with a fixed price, this paper analyzes the breach and reliance incentives that result from damage measures for breach of contract when buyers have reference-dependent preferences. We show that buyer's reference-dependent preferences can produce results at odds with the traditional portrayal. Importantly, we find that expectation damages are no longer generally superior to reliance…
Accident avoidance and settlement bargaining
Lost job, lost trust? On the effect of involuntary job loss on trust
Appeasing yourself or others? – The use of self-punishment and compensation and how it influences punishment
Liability, morality, and image concerns in product accidents with third parties
Settlement implications of lawyer advertising
This paper explores how informative attorney advertising influences the settlement probability and/or offer, using a screening framework. Plaintiffs are privately informed about the expected judgment and their level of ability in controlling the lawyer. More attorney advertising increases case filings by plaintiffs with high or low ability to different extents such that the defendant's beliefs about the plaintiff's type change with the level of a…
Opting for the English rule
Care Levels, Settlement Outcomes, and the Sophistication of Present-Biased Plaintiffs
Dans cet article, nous considérons une action en responsabilité civile dans laquelle les parties prenantes au litige (demandeur et défendeur) sont potentiellement victimes du biais d’immédiateté. Il s’agit d’étudier, dans ce cadre, l’effort de précaution de l’auteur du dommage et les incitations des demandeurs, d’une part, à intenter une action en justice et, d’autre part, à être conciliants lors d’un éventuel règlement amiable. Les principaux ré…
Time preferences and political regimes
Overconfidence over the lifespan
Volunteer's Uncertainty Dilemma
Tragic outcomes in emergency situations are commonly attributed to free-riding incentives. We show that uncertainty about the kind of situation (risky or not) can induce tragic outcomes in emergency situations even when free-riding incentives are absent. In equilibrium, potential volunteers rely on their private signals and the anticipated behavior of others when deciding whether to help. We characterize the equilibria and describe the influence …
Fines as enforcers’ rewards or as a transfer to society at large? Evidence on deterrence and enforcement implications
We analyze experimental data to assess whether the deterrent effect of expected fines depends on who receives the fines’ proceeds. We compare behavior in treatments when the revenue is a reward for enforcement agents to the alternative when fines are transferred to society at large. Most important, with a fixed detection probability, potential offenders’ material incentives are held constant across treatments. Our evidence suggests that the deter…
Time preferences and political regimes
Stop watching and start listening! The impact of coaching and peer observation in tournaments
Correlated payoffs in the inspection game
Keep them out of It! How information externalities affect the willingness to sell personal data online
When individuals provide their personal data online, they often disregard that this allows learning about others, too. Our large-scale online experiment reveals that individuals are less willing to provide personal data when sharing can compromise others’ privacy, entailing personalized price discrimination. Compared to a benchmark without data compromise, individuals’ willingness to sell data decreases when others’ data is compromised with 50% o…
Lost job, lost trust? On the effect of involuntary job loss on trust
Appeasing yourself or others? – The use of self-punishment and compensation and how it influences punishment
Correlated payoffs in the inspection game
On the Economics of Contribution Evasion
This paper considers the tax evasion decision when taxes constitute contributions to the financing of social insurance programs, such as unemployment insurance. We call this evasion contribution evasion and establish that critical differences exist between contribution evasion and tax evasion, the central difference being that contributions entitle the contributor to future claims. Furthermore, we derive a recommendation for the reduction of cont…
Tax Evasion, Investment, and Firm Activity
This paper establishes within an intertemporal framework that firm activity is influenced by tax evasion if firms can invest in their long-term competitiveness. Higher investment raises the firm's survival probability, which in turn reduces tax-evasion payoffs, since evaded taxes may also be detected and penalized later on. At the same time, tax evasion in future periods increases future expected profits, making higher investment desirable. Conse…
On being asset-constrained in litigation contests
Contingent fees meet the British rule
Judgment Proofness and the Choice between Monetary and Nonmonetary Care
This paper studies a unilateral accident model in which potentially judgment-proof agents (agents who may have insufficient assets to satisfy a judgment against them) choose levels of both monetary and nonmonetary care. We show that (i) monetary care may exceed its first-best level under both strict liability and negligence, (ii) social costs may be lowered by the incentive effects resulting from the monetary nature of care, (iii) an increase in …
Stop watching and start listening! The impact of coaching and peer observation in tournaments
Optimal Damages Multipliers in Oligopolistic Markets
This paper establishes that tort damages multipliers greater than one can be an instrument to induce imperfectly competitive producers to invest in product safety at socially optimal levels. In their selection of product safety levels, producers seek to maximize profits, neglecting the fact that higher investment in product safety increases consumer welfare; the discrepancy between private and social safety incentives can be remedied by setting d…
Status and Liability
We analyze liability law when the value of the good at risk has an influence on the consumer's social status. It is first established that standard liability rules fail to induce efficient choices. We argue that standard negligence will tend to outperform standard strict liability. Next, we suggest welfare-improving adjustments to strict liability and negligence. An optimally adjusted strict liability rule will require that damages decrease in th…
Volunteer's Uncertainty Dilemma
Tragic outcomes in emergency situations are commonly attributed to free-riding incentives. We show that uncertainty about the kind of situation (risky or not) can induce tragic outcomes in emergency situations even when free-riding incentives are absent. In equilibrium, potential volunteers rely on their private signals and the anticipated behavior of others when deciding whether to help. We characterize the equilibria and describe the influence …
A comparison of simple action-based and outcome-based policies for emergency-like situations
Time preferences and political regimes
Overconfidence over the lifespan
Liability, morality, and image concerns in product accidents with third parties
Settlement implications of lawyer advertising
This paper explores how informative attorney advertising influences the settlement probability and/or offer, using a screening framework. Plaintiffs are privately informed about the expected judgment and their level of ability in controlling the lawyer. More attorney advertising increases case filings by plaintiffs with high or low ability to different extents such that the defendant's beliefs about the plaintiff's type change with the level of a…
Opting for the English rule
Care Levels, Settlement Outcomes, and the Sophistication of Present-Biased Plaintiffs
Dans cet article, nous considérons une action en responsabilité civile dans laquelle les parties prenantes au litige (demandeur et défendeur) sont potentiellement victimes du biais d’immédiateté. Il s’agit d’étudier, dans ce cadre, l’effort de précaution de l’auteur du dommage et les incitations des demandeurs, d’une part, à intenter une action en justice et, d’autre part, à être conciliants lors d’un éventuel règlement amiable. Les principaux ré…
Accident avoidance and settlement bargaining
Lost job, lost trust? On the effect of involuntary job loss on trust
Appeasing yourself or others? – The use of self-punishment and compensation and how it influences punishment
Damage Measures for Contract Breach when Buyers Have Reference-Dependent Preferences
Using the traditional law-and-economics production contract model with a fixed price, this paper analyzes the breach and reliance incentives that result from damage measures for breach of contract when buyers have reference-dependent preferences. We show that buyer's reference-dependent preferences can produce results at odds with the traditional portrayal. Importantly, we find that expectation damages are no longer generally superior to reliance…
Probing the case for manufacturer liability for harms caused by judgment-proof consumers to others
We study whether it is socially desirable to hold a monopolistic firm liable for the harm its potentially judgment-proof consumers inflict on third parties. Consumers’ judgment-proofness limits potential product differentiation by pooling different consumer types with uniform liability exposure. The firm’s safety choices are distorted in both regimes under consideration: consumer-only liability and residual-manufacturer liability. We find that re…
Liability and the incentive to improve information about risk when injurers may be judgment-proof
We analyze an injurer’s incentives to improve her information about accident risk. In contrast to the preceding literature, injurers can continuously improve their understanding of the expected harm their activity will impose on others. Regarding social incentives, the marginal benefit from improved risk information is increasing, possibly making either no or a perfect understanding of risk socially optimal. Turning to private incentives when the…
Does the Severity of Sanctions Influence Learning about Enforcement Policy? Experimental Evidence
The literature on law enforcement often assumes that the updating of beliefs regarding the probability of detection is a process that is independent from the severity of the sanction. We test this presumption experimentally, using a taking game in which the probability of detection may be either high or low with commonly known probabilities. Individuals gain information about their probability of detection from their experience in the taking game…
Asking for information prior to settlement or trial when misrepresentation of evidence is possible
Economics (29 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (21 works) · Business (19 works) · Political science (17 works) · Law (16 works) · Microeconomics (16 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (13 works) · Psychology (12 works) · Law and economics (10 works) · Social Psychology (10 works)