Kenneth Koford
Biographic Data
| ID | 1095481 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kenneth Koford |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kenneth |
| FAMILY NAME | Koford |
| SIGNATURE | KOFORD K |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Delaware |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 132 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1982 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1993 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
The median and the competitive equilibrium in one dimension
On Dimensionalizing Roll Call Votes in the U.S. Congress
Two related issues have developed in the scale analysis of voting in the U. S. Congress. One is methodological; it concerns the appropriate dimensionalizing model. The other is more substantive, entailing interpretation of the extent to which voting dimensions carry an ideological component. Kenneth Koford contributed to consideration of these issues in his research note, “Dimensions in Congressional Voting,” in the September 1989 issue of this R…
Different Preferences, Different Politics
Different types of legislative politics are explained in this paper by the distribution of legislators' demands. Demands are legislators' willingness to pay for victory on a bill, with votes on other issues, effort, or work. Different demand distributions require different institutions and "politics" for the legislators to obtain the results they want. \nThe types of politics can be largely identified with Lowi's typology of interest-group intera…
Different Preferences, Different Politics
While Theodore Lowi's typology of issues and policies is widely agreed to distinguish different forms of legislative politics, his explanation for the categories has not been fully persuasive. This paper uses demand theory to analyze the different politics described by Lowi. Demand theory can illuminate many questions in legislative politics; it provides cardinal measures of valuation and methods of estimating those values statistically. Differen…
Dimensions in Congressional Voting
While dimensional studies of congressional voting find a single, ideological dimension, regression estimates find several constituency and party dimensions in addition to ideology. I rescale several unidimensional studies to show their increased classification success over the null hypothesis that votes are not unidimensional. Several null hypotheses are explored. With these null hypotheses, 66%-75% of nonunidimensional roll call votes are nevert…
Scale economies and rent-seeking in legislative parties
Inflation, recession and the federal budget deficit (or, blaming economic problems on a statistical mirage)
Strategic Planning and Forecasting
Reaganomics
Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking
Optimal voting rules under uncertainty
Centralized vote-trading
Dimensions in Congressional Voting
While dimensional studies of congressional voting find a single, ideological dimension, regression estimates find several constituency and party dimensions in addition to ideology. I rescale several unidimensional studies to show their increased classification success over the null hypothesis that votes are not unidimensional. Several null hypotheses are explored. With these null hypotheses, 66%-75% of nonunidimensional roll call votes are nevert…
On Dimensionalizing Roll Call Votes in the U.S. Congress
Two related issues have developed in the scale analysis of voting in the U. S. Congress. One is methodological; it concerns the appropriate dimensionalizing model. The other is more substantive, entailing interpretation of the extent to which voting dimensions carry an ideological component. Kenneth Koford contributed to consideration of these issues in his research note, “Dimensions in Congressional Voting,” in the September 1989 issue of this R…
Centralized vote-trading
Scale economies and rent-seeking in legislative parties
Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking
Optimal voting rules under uncertainty
The median and the competitive equilibrium in one dimension
Different Preferences, Different Politics
While Theodore Lowi's typology of issues and policies is widely agreed to distinguish different forms of legislative politics, his explanation for the categories has not been fully persuasive. This paper uses demand theory to analyze the different politics described by Lowi. Demand theory can illuminate many questions in legislative politics; it provides cardinal measures of valuation and methods of estimating those values statistically. Differen…
Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking
Optimal voting rules under uncertainty
Centralized vote-trading
Reaganomics
Strategic Planning and Forecasting
Inflation, recession and the federal budget deficit (or, blaming economic problems on a statistical mirage)
Scale economies and rent-seeking in legislative parties
Different Preferences, Different Politics
Different types of legislative politics are explained in this paper by the distribution of legislators' demands. Demands are legislators' willingness to pay for victory on a bill, with votes on other issues, effort, or work. Different demand distributions require different institutions and "politics" for the legislators to obtain the results they want. \nThe types of politics can be largely identified with Lowi's typology of interest-group intera…
Different Preferences, Different Politics
While Theodore Lowi's typology of issues and policies is widely agreed to distinguish different forms of legislative politics, his explanation for the categories has not been fully persuasive. This paper uses demand theory to analyze the different politics described by Lowi. Demand theory can illuminate many questions in legislative politics; it provides cardinal measures of valuation and methods of estimating those values statistically. Differen…
Dimensions in Congressional Voting
While dimensional studies of congressional voting find a single, ideological dimension, regression estimates find several constituency and party dimensions in addition to ideology. I rescale several unidimensional studies to show their increased classification success over the null hypothesis that votes are not unidimensional. Several null hypotheses are explored. With these null hypotheses, 66%-75% of nonunidimensional roll call votes are nevert…
On Dimensionalizing Roll Call Votes in the U.S. Congress
Two related issues have developed in the scale analysis of voting in the U. S. Congress. One is methodological; it concerns the appropriate dimensionalizing model. The other is more substantive, entailing interpretation of the extent to which voting dimensions carry an ideological component. Kenneth Koford contributed to consideration of these issues in his research note, “Dimensions in Congressional Voting,” in the September 1989 issue of this R…
The median and the competitive equilibrium in one dimension
Economics (11 works) · Political science (10 works) · Law (9 works) · Politics (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (5 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Public finance (5 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (4 works)