Different Preferences, Different Politics
A Demand-and-Structure Explanation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10877481 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kenneth Koford (University of Delaware, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 9-31 |
| Publication date | 1989-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Western Political Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0043-4078 • E-ISSN: 2325-8675 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/106591298904200103 |
| OpenAlex | W2055048259 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 21 |
Different types of legislative politics are explained in this paper by the distribution of legislators' demands. Demands are legislators' willingness to pay for victory on a bill, with votes on other issues, effort, or work. Different demand distributions require different institutions and "politics" for the legislators to obtain the results they want. \nThe types of politics can be largely identified with Lowi's typology of interest-group interaction. Distributive politics combines many individual projects, each with a small intensely favorable minority and a large, slightly opposed majority. Since no one project could pass on its own, compound bills are created that benefit all legislators (Weingast 1979). \nRedistributive issues have two large intensely opposed groups. Their politics are conflict, mobilizations of one's partisans, and efforts to obtain the votes of the few indifferents (Schneider 1979). \nRegulative politics have two forms. Simple regulative issues have small intense groups for and against the bill, and a vast majority of indifferents. Each side appeals to the indifferents, creating a natural arena for vote-trading. Complex regulative issues allow the distribution of demand to change as the bill proposal is modified. They often involve novel legislation, whose consequences are not clear. Those dominating the agenda control the nature of the bill to maximize their gains and assure a majority for passage (Shepsle and Weingast 1984). Vote-trading also occurs, since most legislators are indifferent
Economics · Political science · Politics · Economic Theory and Institutions · Law · Merger and Competition Analysis · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Pork barrel politics
Party Loyalty Among Congressmen
Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting
Agendas, alternatives, and public policies
The Calculus of Consent
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees
The Logic of Collective Action
Making Regulatory Policy
Scale economies and rent-seeking in legislative parties
Decision Making vs. Policy Making
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory
The Budget Process and the Size of the Budget
A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis
Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel
A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms
Political Solutions to Market Problems
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.03 |
| Citation span | 1993 - 1993 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |