Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Biographic Data
| ID | 1098405 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jonathan Jenkins |
| FAMILY NAME | Ichikawa |
| SIGNATURE | ICHIKAWA J J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of British Columbia |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5433-7651 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 34 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Defensiveness and Identity
Criticism can sometimes provoke defensive reactions, particularly when it implicates identities people hold dear. For instance, feminists told they are upholding rape culture might become angry or upset because the criticism conflicts with an identity that is important to them. These kinds of defensive reactions are a primary focus of this paper. What is it to be defensive in this way, and why do some kinds of criticism or implied criticism tend …
Normative Inference Tickets
We argue that stereotypes associated with concepts like he-said–she-said , conspiracy theory , sexual harassment , and those expressed by paradigmatic slurs provide “normative inference tickets”: conceptual permissions to automatic, largely unreflective normative conclusions. These “mental shortcuts” are underwritten by associated stereotypes. Because stereotypes admit of exceptions, normative inference tickets are highly flexible and productive,…
You ought to have known: Positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework
Not What I Agreed To: Content and Consent
Deception sometimes results in nonconsensual sex. A recent body of literature diagnoses such violations as invalidating consent: the agreement is not morally transformative, which is why the sexual contact is a rights violation. We pursue a different explanation for the wrongs in question: there is valid consent, but it is not consent to the sex act that happened. Semantic conventions play a key role in distinguishing deceptions that result in no…
Epistemological Disjunctivism
Duncan Pritchard seeks the “holy grail of epistemology”; he thinks epistemological disjunctivism just might be it. The grail is an approach to perception that satisfies key motivations for both internalism and externalism: externalists emphasize an objective connection between justification and truth, while internalists maintain that subjects have reflective access to the justification for their beliefs. The holy grail would be a correct theory t…
Philosophy Without Intuitions
Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge
How do we know what's (metaphysically) possible and impossible? Arguments from Kripke and Putnam suggest that possibility is not merely a matter of (coherent) conceivability/imaginability. For example, we can coherently imagine that Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct objects even though they are not possibly distinct. Despite this apparent problem, we suggest, nevertheless, that imagination plays an important role in an adequate modal epistemol…
In Defense of a Kripkean Dogma
Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals
Many of the motivations in favor of contextualism about knowledge apply also to a contextualist approach to counterfactuals. I motivate and articulate such an approach, in terms of the context‐sensitive ‘all cases’, in the spirit of David Lewis’s contextualist view about knowledge. The resulting view explains intuitive data, resolves a puzzle parallel to the skeptical paradox, and renders safety and sensitivity, construed as counterfactuals, nece…
Scepticism and the Imagination Model Of dreaming
As a solution to dream scepticism, Ernest Sosa has argued that when we dream, we do not believe the contents of our dreams, but rather imagine them. Thus dreams do not cause false beliefs; so my beliefs cannot be false as a result of being caused by dreams. I argue that even assuming that Sosa is correct about the nature of dream experience, belief in wakefulness on these grounds is epistemically irresponsible. The proper upshot of the imaginatio…
Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals
Many of the motivations in favor of contextualism about knowledge apply also to a contextualist approach to counterfactuals. I motivate and articulate such an approach, in terms of the context‐sensitive ‘all cases’, in the spirit of David Lewis’s contextualist view about knowledge. The resulting view explains intuitive data, resolves a puzzle parallel to the skeptical paradox, and renders safety and sensitivity, construed as counterfactuals, nece…
Scepticism and the Imagination Model Of dreaming
As a solution to dream scepticism, Ernest Sosa has argued that when we dream, we do not believe the contents of our dreams, but rather imagine them. Thus dreams do not cause false beliefs; so my beliefs cannot be false as a result of being caused by dreams. I argue that even assuming that Sosa is correct about the nature of dream experience, belief in wakefulness on these grounds is epistemically irresponsible. The proper upshot of the imaginatio…
Normative Inference Tickets
We argue that stereotypes associated with concepts like he-said–she-said , conspiracy theory , sexual harassment , and those expressed by paradigmatic slurs provide “normative inference tickets”: conceptual permissions to automatic, largely unreflective normative conclusions. These “mental shortcuts” are underwritten by associated stereotypes. Because stereotypes admit of exceptions, normative inference tickets are highly flexible and productive,…
You ought to have known: Positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework
In Defense of a Kripkean Dogma
Scepticism and the Imagination Model Of dreaming
As a solution to dream scepticism, Ernest Sosa has argued that when we dream, we do not believe the contents of our dreams, but rather imagine them. Thus dreams do not cause false beliefs; so my beliefs cannot be false as a result of being caused by dreams. I argue that even assuming that Sosa is correct about the nature of dream experience, belief in wakefulness on these grounds is epistemically irresponsible. The proper upshot of the imaginatio…
Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals
Many of the motivations in favor of contextualism about knowledge apply also to a contextualist approach to counterfactuals. I motivate and articulate such an approach, in terms of the context‐sensitive ‘all cases’, in the spirit of David Lewis’s contextualist view about knowledge. The resulting view explains intuitive data, resolves a puzzle parallel to the skeptical paradox, and renders safety and sensitivity, construed as counterfactuals, nece…
In Defense of a Kripkean Dogma
Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge
How do we know what's (metaphysically) possible and impossible? Arguments from Kripke and Putnam suggest that possibility is not merely a matter of (coherent) conceivability/imaginability. For example, we can coherently imagine that Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct objects even though they are not possibly distinct. Despite this apparent problem, we suggest, nevertheless, that imagination plays an important role in an adequate modal epistemol…
Philosophy Without Intuitions
Epistemological Disjunctivism
Duncan Pritchard seeks the “holy grail of epistemology”; he thinks epistemological disjunctivism just might be it. The grail is an approach to perception that satisfies key motivations for both internalism and externalism: externalists emphasize an objective connection between justification and truth, while internalists maintain that subjects have reflective access to the justification for their beliefs. The holy grail would be a correct theory t…
Not What I Agreed To: Content and Consent
Deception sometimes results in nonconsensual sex. A recent body of literature diagnoses such violations as invalidating consent: the agreement is not morally transformative, which is why the sexual contact is a rights violation. We pursue a different explanation for the wrongs in question: there is valid consent, but it is not consent to the sex act that happened. Semantic conventions play a key role in distinguishing deceptions that result in no…
You ought to have known: Positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework
Normative Inference Tickets
We argue that stereotypes associated with concepts like he-said–she-said , conspiracy theory , sexual harassment , and those expressed by paradigmatic slurs provide “normative inference tickets”: conceptual permissions to automatic, largely unreflective normative conclusions. These “mental shortcuts” are underwritten by associated stereotypes. Because stereotypes admit of exceptions, normative inference tickets are highly flexible and productive,…
Defensiveness and Identity
Criticism can sometimes provoke defensive reactions, particularly when it implicates identities people hold dear. For instance, feminists told they are upholding rape culture might become angry or upset because the criticism conflicts with an identity that is important to them. These kinds of defensive reactions are a primary focus of this paper. What is it to be defensive in this way, and why do some kinds of criticism or implied criticism tend …
Philosophy (9 works) · Epistemology (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (8 works) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (2 works)