Scepticism and the Imagination Model Of dreaming

Bibliographic Data

ID4351882
AuthorsJonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (0000-0001-5433-7651, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, corresponding author), Jonathan Ichikawa
Year2008
Volume58
Issue232
Pages519-527
Publication date2008-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.546.x
OpenAlexW2030093413
LanguageEN
Citations received14

As a solution to dream scepticism, Ernest Sosa has argued that when we dream, we do not believe the contents of our dreams, but rather imagine them. Thus dreams do not cause false beliefs; so my beliefs cannot be false as a result of being caused by dreams. I argue that even assuming that Sosa is correct about the nature of dream experience, belief in wakefulness on these grounds is epistemically irresponsible. The proper upshot of the imagination model is to recharacterize the way we think about dream scepticism: the sceptical threat is not that we have false beliefs. So even though dreams do not involve false beliefs, they still pose a sceptical threat, which I elaborate

Cognition · Dream · Epistemology · False belief · Psychotherapist · Skepticism · Theory of mind · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Philosophy · Psychology

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