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Eyal Baharad

Biographic Data

ID1100951
NAMEEyal Baharad
GIVEN NAMESEyal
FAMILY NAMEBaharad
SIGNATUREBAHARAD E
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Haifa
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS6
TOTAL CITATIONS20
AUTHOR COUNT6
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2002
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2021
H-INDEX2
  • Judgment Aggregation by a Boundedly Rational Decision-Maker

    Open Access•Eyal Baharad, Ruth Ben-Yashar et al.•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2021

  • The rarity of consistent aggregators

    Open Access•Eyal Baharad, Zvika Neeman et al.•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2020•References: 22

  • The robustness of the optimal weighted majority rule to probability distortion

    Open Access•Eyal Baharad, Ruth Ben-Yashar et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2009•Cited by: 2•References: 19

  • Contest Efforts in Light of Behavioural Considerations

    Open Access•Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2008•Cited by: 3•References: 23

    This study shows that distortion of probabilities is a possible reason for rent under-dissipation in contests with relatively small number of participants. Such distortion may also result, however, in over-dissipation of the contested rent. Focusing on contests with homogeneous contestants and the commonly studied contest success function, our main results clarify under what circumstances ("i") rents are more under-dissipated relative to the stan…

  • Essential alternatives and set-dependent preferences—an axiomatic approach

    Open Access•Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2003•References: 15

  • Ameliorating Majority Decisiveness through Expression of Preference Intensity

    Open Access•Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2002•Cited by: 15•References: 3

    In pairwise voting, when a simple majority rule produces a winner, that winner is robust to the minority's preferences. The typical means of protecting the minority from the decisiveness of the majority is by increasing the required majority or by augmenting the simple majority rule with constitutional constraints. In the former case the required majority q becomes larger than one-half, and this implies that the q-majority rule becomes biased in …

  • Ameliorating Majority Decisiveness through Expression of Preference Intensity

    Open Access•Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2002•Cited by: 15•References: 3

    In pairwise voting, when a simple majority rule produces a winner, that winner is robust to the minority's preferences. The typical means of protecting the minority from the decisiveness of the majority is by increasing the required majority or by augmenting the simple majority rule with constitutional constraints. In the former case the required majority q becomes larger than one-half, and this implies that the q-majority rule becomes biased in …

  • Contest Efforts in Light of Behavioural Considerations

    Open Access•Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2008•Cited by: 3•References: 23

    This study shows that distortion of probabilities is a possible reason for rent under-dissipation in contests with relatively small number of participants. Such distortion may also result, however, in over-dissipation of the contested rent. Focusing on contests with homogeneous contestants and the commonly studied contest success function, our main results clarify under what circumstances ("i") rents are more under-dissipated relative to the stan…

  • The robustness of the optimal weighted majority rule to probability distortion

    Open Access•Eyal Baharad, Ruth Ben-Yashar et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2009•Cited by: 2•References: 19

  • Ameliorating Majority Decisiveness through Expression of Preference Intensity

    Open Access•Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2002•Cited by: 15•References: 3

    In pairwise voting, when a simple majority rule produces a winner, that winner is robust to the minority's preferences. The typical means of protecting the minority from the decisiveness of the majority is by increasing the required majority or by augmenting the simple majority rule with constitutional constraints. In the former case the required majority q becomes larger than one-half, and this implies that the q-majority rule becomes biased in …

  • Essential alternatives and set-dependent preferences—an axiomatic approach

    Open Access•Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2003•References: 15

  • Contest Efforts in Light of Behavioural Considerations

    Open Access•Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2008•Cited by: 3•References: 23

    This study shows that distortion of probabilities is a possible reason for rent under-dissipation in contests with relatively small number of participants. Such distortion may also result, however, in over-dissipation of the contested rent. Focusing on contests with homogeneous contestants and the commonly studied contest success function, our main results clarify under what circumstances ("i") rents are more under-dissipated relative to the stan…

  • The robustness of the optimal weighted majority rule to probability distortion

    Open Access•Eyal Baharad, Ruth Ben-Yashar et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2009•Cited by: 2•References: 19

  • The rarity of consistent aggregators

    Open Access•Eyal Baharad, Zvika Neeman et al.•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2020•References: 22

  • Judgment Aggregation by a Boundedly Rational Decision-Maker

    Open Access•Eyal Baharad, Ruth Ben-Yashar et al.•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2021

Computer Science (5 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (5 works) · Mathematical economics (5 works) · Economics (4 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Political science (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Decision rule (2 works)

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