Contest Efforts in Light of Behavioural Considerations

Bibliographic Data

ID9711315
AuthorsEyal Baharad (University of Haifa), Shmuel Nitzan (0000-0002-5523-7350, Bar-Ilan University)
Year2008
Volume118
Issue533
Pages2047-2059
Publication date2008-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02201.x
OpenAlexW1981394704
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited26

This study shows that distortion of probabilities is a possible reason for rent under-dissipation in contests with relatively small number of participants. Such distortion may also result, however, in over-dissipation of the contested rent. Focusing on contests with homogeneous contestants and the commonly studied contest success function, our main results clarify under what circumstances ("i") rents are more under-dissipated relative to the standard situation where probabilities are not distorted ("ii") rents are under-dissipated, yet less intensely relative to the standard situation where probabilities are not distorted ("iii") rents are over-dissipated and ("iv") the contest does not possess a symmetric interior equilibrium in pure strategies. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2008

CONTEST · Dissipation · Distortion (music · Economic rent · Economics · Function (biology · Homogeneous · Microeconomics · Physics · Political science · Rent-seeking · Statistical physics · Thermodynamics · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Sports Analytics and Performance

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub