Risk Aversion in Rent‐Seeking and Rent‐Augmenting Games
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9716902 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kai A Konrad (0000-0002-2225-2271, Freie Universität Berlin), Harris Schlesinger (University of Alabama) |
| Year | 1997 |
| Volume | 107 |
| Issue | 445 |
| Pages | 1671-1683 |
| Publication date | 1997-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00074.x |
| OpenAlex | W2015133278 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 27 |
| References cited | 32 |
The effects of risk aversion are examined for two types of expenditures in rent‐seeking contests: (a) Rent‐Seeking Expenditures, which improve the probability that the rent is obtained; and (b)) Rent‐Augmenting Expenditures, which increase the size of the rent to be awarded. Risk aversion is shown to reduce expenditures of type (b) unambiguously, while having an indeterminate effect on those of type (a). These two contrasting results are shown to derive from the very different effects rent‐seeking and rent‐augmenting expenditures have on the riskiness of a player's position
Economics · Expected utility hypothesis · Financial economics · Loss aversion · Microeconomics · Position (finance · Rent-seeking · Risk aversion (psychology · Auction Theory and Applications · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Finance
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| Unique citing works | 27 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 1999 - 2025 (27) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 27 |