Risk-Averse Rent Seeking With Shared Rents
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9720210 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ngo Van Long (0000-0001-6211-7229, Australian National University), Neil Vousden (Australian National University) |
| Year | 1987 |
| Volume | 97 |
| Issue | 388 |
| Pages | 971 |
| Publication date | 1987-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2233083 |
| OpenAlex | W1970694787 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 33 |
| References cited | 5 |
Risk-Averse Rent Seeking With Shared Rents Get access Ngo Van Long, Ngo Van Long Australian National University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Neil Vousden Neil Vousden Australian National University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 97, Issue 388, 1 December 1987, Pages 971–985, https://doi.org/10.2307/2233083 Published: 01 December 1987
Economic rent · Economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Rent-seeking · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Economic theories and models · Housing Market and Economics · Law
Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers
Modelling rent-seeking contests
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Efficient Status Seeking
Lobbying for protection by heterogeneous firms
Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders
Overbidding in contests – can nudging decrease expenditures? Experimental evidence
Urban Conflict, Rent Seeking, and Corruption Economic and Political Institutions in a Historical Perspective
Rent seeking in a constitutional context
Bootleggers, Baptists, and the risks of rent seeking
A master of two servants
Resource allocation contests
Rent-seeking with non-identical sharing rules
The uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games with risk-averse players
Intellectual foundations of public choice, the forest from the trees
Rent-seeking contest when the prize increases with aggregate efforts
A multi-winner nested rent-seeking contest
Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information
Risk-aversion and prudence in rent-seeking games
Laffer paradox, Leviathan, and political contest
Foreclosure in contests
Free-rider effects in rent-seeking groups competing for public goods
Rent-seeking for pure public goods
Some Implications of Corporate Taxation for Rent-Seeking Activity
Endogenous sharing rules in collective-group rent-seeking
Contests Among Bureaucrats
The Effect of Number and Size of Interest Groups on Social Rent Dissipation
Competitive-share group formation in rent-seeking contests
Changes in budgetary allocations and international comparisons of the social cost of rent-seeking
Risk Aversion in Contests
Rent Seeking and the Provision of Public Goods
Risk Aversion in Rent‐Seeking and Rent‐Augmenting Games
Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests
| Unique citing works | 33 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,85 |
| Citation span | 1987 - 2025 (39) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 33 |