Robert Dur
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1101296 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Robert Dur |
| PRENOMES | Robert |
| SOBRENOME | Dur |
| ASSINATURA | DUR R |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Erasmus University Rotterdam |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9081-4179 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 16 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 46 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 16 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2001 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Policy evaluation and the causal analysis of public support
Support for initially unpopular policies may grow over time
Who's Afraid of Policy Experiments
In many public policy areas, randomised policy experiments can greatly contribute to our knowledge of the effects of policies and can thus help to improve public policy. However, policy experiments are not very common. This paper studies whether a lack of appreciation for policy experiments among voters may be the reason for this. Collecting survey data representative of the Dutch electorate, we find clear evidence contradicting this view. Voters…
Macroeconomic Conditions When Young Shape Job Preferences for Life
Preferences for monetary and nonmonetary job attributes are important for understanding workers' motivation and the organization of work. Little is known, however, about how those job preferences are formed. We study how macroeconomic conditions when young shape workers' job preferences for life. Using variation in income-per-capita across U.S. regions and over time since the 1920s, we find that job preferences vary in systematic ways with experi…
How to reduce discrimination? Evidence from a field experiment in amateur soccer
A rich literature shows that ethnic discrimination is an omnipresent and highly persistent phenomenon. Little is known, however, about how to reduce discrimination. This study reports the results of a large-scale field experiment we ran together with the Norwegian Football Federation. The federation sent an email to a random selection of about 500 amateur soccer coaches, pointing towards the important role that soccer can play in promoting inclus…
Team incentives, task assignment, and performance
How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy
Working for a Good Cause
A rich literature in public administration has shown that public sector employees have stronger altruistic motivations than private sector employees. Recent economic theories stress the importance of mission preferences and predict that altruistic people sort into the public sector when they subscribe to its mission. This article uses data from a representative survey of more than 30,000 employees from 50 countries to test this prediction. The au…
Public sector employees
Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
The desire for impact
Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector
Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions. When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public s…
Why does centralisation fail to internalise policy externalities
Producing and Manipulating Information
To reduce the chances of policy failures, policy makers need information about the effects of policies. Sometimes, policy makers can rely on agents who already possess the information. Often, the information has yet to be produced. This raises two problems. First, for a policy maker it is hard to ascertain how much effort an expert has put in acquiring information. Second, when the expert has an interest in the policy outcome, she may manipulate …
The Credibility Problem in Unemployment-Insurance Policy
This paper studies the interaction between trade unions, which set wages, and a policymaker, who decides on the level of unemployment benefits and taxes. If the policymaker cannot commit to future policies, taxes and benefits are excessively high in equilibrium. Moreover, employment and output are inefficiently low. Appointing a policymaker who is more conservative than the median voter may solve the credibility problem. Alternatively, increasing…
Why do Policy Makers Stick to Inefficient Decisions
Wage–Setting Institutions, Unemployment, and Voters’ Demand for Redistribution Policy
This paper examines unemployment, wages, and voters’ demand for redistribution policy under three different labour market structures: laissez–faire, wage–setting by company or industrial unions, and wage–setting by a central union. Decisions on the level of taxes and benefits are made by majority rule. Taxes, wages, and unemployment are lowest under competitive wage–setting and highest with decentralised unions. A higher degree of centralisation …
Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector
Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions. When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public s…
Why do Policy Makers Stick to Inefficient Decisions
How to reduce discrimination? Evidence from a field experiment in amateur soccer
A rich literature shows that ethnic discrimination is an omnipresent and highly persistent phenomenon. Little is known, however, about how to reduce discrimination. This study reports the results of a large-scale field experiment we ran together with the Norwegian Football Federation. The federation sent an email to a random selection of about 500 amateur soccer coaches, pointing towards the important role that soccer can play in promoting inclus…
Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy
Why does centralisation fail to internalise policy externalities
Producing and Manipulating Information
To reduce the chances of policy failures, policy makers need information about the effects of policies. Sometimes, policy makers can rely on agents who already possess the information. Often, the information has yet to be produced. This raises two problems. First, for a policy maker it is hard to ascertain how much effort an expert has put in acquiring information. Second, when the expert has an interest in the policy outcome, she may manipulate …
The desire for impact
Who's Afraid of Policy Experiments
In many public policy areas, randomised policy experiments can greatly contribute to our knowledge of the effects of policies and can thus help to improve public policy. However, policy experiments are not very common. This paper studies whether a lack of appreciation for policy experiments among voters may be the reason for this. Collecting survey data representative of the Dutch electorate, we find clear evidence contradicting this view. Voters…
Wage–Setting Institutions, Unemployment, and Voters’ Demand for Redistribution Policy
This paper examines unemployment, wages, and voters’ demand for redistribution policy under three different labour market structures: laissez–faire, wage–setting by company or industrial unions, and wage–setting by a central union. Decisions on the level of taxes and benefits are made by majority rule. Taxes, wages, and unemployment are lowest under competitive wage–setting and highest with decentralised unions. A higher degree of centralisation …
The Credibility Problem in Unemployment-Insurance Policy
This paper studies the interaction between trade unions, which set wages, and a policymaker, who decides on the level of unemployment benefits and taxes. If the policymaker cannot commit to future policies, taxes and benefits are excessively high in equilibrium. Moreover, employment and output are inefficiently low. Appointing a policymaker who is more conservative than the median voter may solve the credibility problem. Alternatively, increasing…
Why do Policy Makers Stick to Inefficient Decisions
Wage–Setting Institutions, Unemployment, and Voters’ Demand for Redistribution Policy
This paper examines unemployment, wages, and voters’ demand for redistribution policy under three different labour market structures: laissez–faire, wage–setting by company or industrial unions, and wage–setting by a central union. Decisions on the level of taxes and benefits are made by majority rule. Taxes, wages, and unemployment are lowest under competitive wage–setting and highest with decentralised unions. A higher degree of centralisation …
Why does centralisation fail to internalise policy externalities
Producing and Manipulating Information
To reduce the chances of policy failures, policy makers need information about the effects of policies. Sometimes, policy makers can rely on agents who already possess the information. Often, the information has yet to be produced. This raises two problems. First, for a policy maker it is hard to ascertain how much effort an expert has put in acquiring information. Second, when the expert has an interest in the policy outcome, she may manipulate …
The desire for impact
Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector
Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions. When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public s…
Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
Public sector employees
How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy
Working for a Good Cause
A rich literature in public administration has shown that public sector employees have stronger altruistic motivations than private sector employees. Recent economic theories stress the importance of mission preferences and predict that altruistic people sort into the public sector when they subscribe to its mission. This article uses data from a representative survey of more than 30,000 employees from 50 countries to test this prediction. The au…
Team incentives, task assignment, and performance
Macroeconomic Conditions When Young Shape Job Preferences for Life
Preferences for monetary and nonmonetary job attributes are important for understanding workers' motivation and the organization of work. Little is known, however, about how those job preferences are formed. We study how macroeconomic conditions when young shape workers' job preferences for life. Using variation in income-per-capita across U.S. regions and over time since the 1920s, we find that job preferences vary in systematic ways with experi…
How to reduce discrimination? Evidence from a field experiment in amateur soccer
A rich literature shows that ethnic discrimination is an omnipresent and highly persistent phenomenon. Little is known, however, about how to reduce discrimination. This study reports the results of a large-scale field experiment we ran together with the Norwegian Football Federation. The federation sent an email to a random selection of about 500 amateur soccer coaches, pointing towards the important role that soccer can play in promoting inclus…
Policy evaluation and the causal analysis of public support
Support for initially unpopular policies may grow over time
Who's Afraid of Policy Experiments
In many public policy areas, randomised policy experiments can greatly contribute to our knowledge of the effects of policies and can thus help to improve public policy. However, policy experiments are not very common. This paper studies whether a lack of appreciation for policy experiments among voters may be the reason for this. Collecting survey data representative of the Dutch electorate, we find clear evidence contradicting this view. Voters…
Economics (13 obras) · Business (11 obras) · Political science (10 obras) · Microeconomics (9 obras) · Labour economics (7 obras) · Public economics (7 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (6 obras) · Law (6 obras) · Macroeconomics (6 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras)