Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9712686
AutoresJosse Delfgaauw (0000-0002-8450-7989, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute), Robert Dur (0000-0001-9081-4179, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Tinbergen Institute and CESifo)
Ano2008
Volume118
Fascículo525
Páginas171-191
Data de publicação2008-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02108.x
OpenAlexW3122375241
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas41
Referências citadas39

Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions. When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public sector highly attractive and may crowd out workers with a public service motivation. When effort is verifiable, the government optimally attracts motivated workers as well as the economy's laziest workers by offering separating contracts, which are both distorted. Even though contract distortions reduce aggregate welfare, a majority of society may be better off as public goods come at a lower cost

Business · Civil servants · Civil service · Economics · Economy · Government (linguistics · Incentive · Labour economics · Laziness · Microeconomics · Political science · Public economics · Public relations · Public sector · Public service · Public Service Motivation · Reputation · Stereotype (UML · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Taxation and Compliance Studies