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James R Chelius

Biographic Data

ID1101737
NAMEJames R Chelius
GIVEN NAMESJames R
FAMILY NAMEChelius
SIGNATURECHELIUS J R
AFFILIATIONSAssistant Professor of Industrial Management, School of Industrial Management, Purdue University
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS13
TOTAL CITATIONS18
AUTHOR COUNT13
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1976
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR1992
H-INDEX3
  • Compensation Mechanisms for Job Risks: Wages, Workers' Compensation, and Product Liability

    James Chelius, James R Chelius et al.•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1992

    In this major new work, Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi explore the question, How are workers compensated for exposing themselves to the risk of physical injury while on the job? The authors detail the diverse nature of labor market responses to job risks and the important role played by compensation-for-risk mechanisms. Following an overview of the literature, they present a number of unprecedented results. Comprehensive and systematic discu…

  • Profit Sharing and Employment Stability

    Open Access•James Chelius, James R Chelius et al.•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1990•Cited by: 5•References: 5

    This paper tests the hypothesis that workers whose compensation packages contain a profit-sharing component are less susceptible to layoff in the face of negative shocks to product demand than are workers paid a fixed, time-based wage. The theory is tested on two data sets, one a household survey and the other a survey of small businesses conducted by the authors. The characteristics of profit sharing among small businesses by and large meet the …

  • Government Regulation of Labor-Management Corruption: The Casino Industry Experience in New Jersey

    Barbara A Lee, James Chelius et al.•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1989

    This study evaluates the impact of New Jersey's 1977 law controlling the casino industry and its unions. Based on interviews with casino managers, union representatives, state regulatory agency officials, and attorneys, the authors conclude that the Casino Control Commission has kept casino ownership and management free from organized crime, but only by means of stringent, unpopular regulations, such as licensing requirements that can delay the h…

  • Current Issues in Workers' Compensation

    Philip S Borba, James Chelius et al.•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1988

  • Firm Size and Regulatory Compliance Costs: The Case of Workers' Compensation Insurance

    James R Chelius, Robert S Smith•ARTICLE•Journal of Policy Analysis and…•1987•Cited by: 2

    James R. Chelius, Robert S. Smith, Firm Size and Regulatory Compliance Costs: The Case of Workers' Compensation Insurance, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Winter, 1987), pp. 193-206

  • The Narcotic Effect of Impasse-Resolution Procedures

    James R Chelius, Marian M Extejt•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1985•Cited by: 2

    Two previous studies of bargaining by police and firefighters in New York State, by Kochan and Baderschneider and by Butler and Ehrenberg, agreed there had been a positive narcotic effect in the early years under the state's Taylor Act, but they disagreed over the existence and direction of any narcotic effect during the later years. This paper refines the test for determining the presence and direction of a narcotic effect and applies this test …

  • Deterrence and Compensation: Legal Liability in Occupational Safety and Health

    James Chelius, James R Chelius et al.•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1985

  • Workers' Compensation System in Michigan: A Closed Case Survey

    James R Chelius, H Allan Hunt•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1984

  • The Influence of Workers' Compensation on Safety Incentives

    Open Access•James R Chelius•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1982•Cited by: 6

    This study examines the impact of workers' compensation benefits on the allocation of resources to injury prevention, using unpublished data from OSHA on injury rates in manufacturing industries within 36 states. The analysis shows that higher compensation benefits are associated with lower severity rates of injury, suggesting that higher benefits induce employers to spend more on the prevention of serious injuries. On the other hand, higher bene…

  • An Economic Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration as a Conflict Resolution Device

    Open Access•James R Chelius, James B Dworkin•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1980•Cited by: 3•References: 6

    The purpose of this article is to examine the impact of the availability of final-offer arbitration on the collective bargaining process and its outcomes. If this technique is to act as an effective strike substitute, it should provide bargainers with incentives to negotiate agreements bilaterally and should distribute bargaining power in much the same manner as would the right to strike. Empirical evidence is provided to evaluate the operation o…

  • Employment Hazards: An Investigation of Market Performance

    James R Chelius, W Kip Viscusi•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1980

    The safety of the work place is now a highly visible public issue. Many are calling for tighter regulation to reduce worker risk, while others feel government intervention is ineffective and costly. Here Kip Viscusi explores how well markets for hazardous jobs actually work. According to classical economics, other things being equal, a worker will demand more pay for a hazardous job than a safe one. However, this assumes that job related hazards …

  • Workplace Safety and Health: The Role of Workers' Compensation

    Daniel M Kasper, Daniel Kasper et al.•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1979

  • An Alternative to Workmen's Compensation Comment

    James R Chelius•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1976

  • The Influence of Workers' Compensation on Safety Incentives

    Open Access•James R Chelius•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1982•Cited by: 6

    This study examines the impact of workers' compensation benefits on the allocation of resources to injury prevention, using unpublished data from OSHA on injury rates in manufacturing industries within 36 states. The analysis shows that higher compensation benefits are associated with lower severity rates of injury, suggesting that higher benefits induce employers to spend more on the prevention of serious injuries. On the other hand, higher bene…

  • Profit Sharing and Employment Stability

    Open Access•James Chelius, James R Chelius et al.•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1990•Cited by: 5•References: 5

    This paper tests the hypothesis that workers whose compensation packages contain a profit-sharing component are less susceptible to layoff in the face of negative shocks to product demand than are workers paid a fixed, time-based wage. The theory is tested on two data sets, one a household survey and the other a survey of small businesses conducted by the authors. The characteristics of profit sharing among small businesses by and large meet the …

  • An Economic Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration as a Conflict Resolution Device

    Open Access•James R Chelius, James B Dworkin•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1980•Cited by: 3•References: 6

    The purpose of this article is to examine the impact of the availability of final-offer arbitration on the collective bargaining process and its outcomes. If this technique is to act as an effective strike substitute, it should provide bargainers with incentives to negotiate agreements bilaterally and should distribute bargaining power in much the same manner as would the right to strike. Empirical evidence is provided to evaluate the operation o…

  • Firm Size and Regulatory Compliance Costs: The Case of Workers' Compensation Insurance

    James R Chelius, Robert S Smith•ARTICLE•Journal of Policy Analysis and…•1987•Cited by: 2

    James R. Chelius, Robert S. Smith, Firm Size and Regulatory Compliance Costs: The Case of Workers' Compensation Insurance, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Winter, 1987), pp. 193-206

  • The Narcotic Effect of Impasse-Resolution Procedures

    James R Chelius, Marian M Extejt•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1985•Cited by: 2

    Two previous studies of bargaining by police and firefighters in New York State, by Kochan and Baderschneider and by Butler and Ehrenberg, agreed there had been a positive narcotic effect in the early years under the state's Taylor Act, but they disagreed over the existence and direction of any narcotic effect during the later years. This paper refines the test for determining the presence and direction of a narcotic effect and applies this test …

  • An Alternative to Workmen's Compensation Comment

    James R Chelius•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1976

  • Workplace Safety and Health: The Role of Workers' Compensation

    Daniel M Kasper, Daniel Kasper et al.•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1979

  • An Economic Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration as a Conflict Resolution Device

    Open Access•James R Chelius, James B Dworkin•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1980•Cited by: 3•References: 6

    The purpose of this article is to examine the impact of the availability of final-offer arbitration on the collective bargaining process and its outcomes. If this technique is to act as an effective strike substitute, it should provide bargainers with incentives to negotiate agreements bilaterally and should distribute bargaining power in much the same manner as would the right to strike. Empirical evidence is provided to evaluate the operation o…

  • Employment Hazards: An Investigation of Market Performance

    James R Chelius, W Kip Viscusi•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1980

    The safety of the work place is now a highly visible public issue. Many are calling for tighter regulation to reduce worker risk, while others feel government intervention is ineffective and costly. Here Kip Viscusi explores how well markets for hazardous jobs actually work. According to classical economics, other things being equal, a worker will demand more pay for a hazardous job than a safe one. However, this assumes that job related hazards …

  • The Influence of Workers' Compensation on Safety Incentives

    Open Access•James R Chelius•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1982•Cited by: 6

    This study examines the impact of workers' compensation benefits on the allocation of resources to injury prevention, using unpublished data from OSHA on injury rates in manufacturing industries within 36 states. The analysis shows that higher compensation benefits are associated with lower severity rates of injury, suggesting that higher benefits induce employers to spend more on the prevention of serious injuries. On the other hand, higher bene…

  • Workers' Compensation System in Michigan: A Closed Case Survey

    James R Chelius, H Allan Hunt•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1984

  • The Narcotic Effect of Impasse-Resolution Procedures

    James R Chelius, Marian M Extejt•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1985•Cited by: 2

    Two previous studies of bargaining by police and firefighters in New York State, by Kochan and Baderschneider and by Butler and Ehrenberg, agreed there had been a positive narcotic effect in the early years under the state's Taylor Act, but they disagreed over the existence and direction of any narcotic effect during the later years. This paper refines the test for determining the presence and direction of a narcotic effect and applies this test …

  • Deterrence and Compensation: Legal Liability in Occupational Safety and Health

    James Chelius, James R Chelius et al.•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1985

  • Firm Size and Regulatory Compliance Costs: The Case of Workers' Compensation Insurance

    James R Chelius, Robert S Smith•ARTICLE•Journal of Policy Analysis and…•1987•Cited by: 2

    James R. Chelius, Robert S. Smith, Firm Size and Regulatory Compliance Costs: The Case of Workers' Compensation Insurance, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Winter, 1987), pp. 193-206

  • Current Issues in Workers' Compensation

    Philip S Borba, James Chelius et al.•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1988

  • Government Regulation of Labor-Management Corruption: The Casino Industry Experience in New Jersey

    Barbara A Lee, James Chelius et al.•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1989

    This study evaluates the impact of New Jersey's 1977 law controlling the casino industry and its unions. Based on interviews with casino managers, union representatives, state regulatory agency officials, and attorneys, the authors conclude that the Casino Control Commission has kept casino ownership and management free from organized crime, but only by means of stringent, unpopular regulations, such as licensing requirements that can delay the h…

  • Profit Sharing and Employment Stability

    Open Access•James Chelius, James R Chelius et al.•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1990•Cited by: 5•References: 5

    This paper tests the hypothesis that workers whose compensation packages contain a profit-sharing component are less susceptible to layoff in the face of negative shocks to product demand than are workers paid a fixed, time-based wage. The theory is tested on two data sets, one a household survey and the other a survey of small businesses conducted by the authors. The characteristics of profit sharing among small businesses by and large meet the …

  • Compensation Mechanisms for Job Risks: Wages, Workers' Compensation, and Product Liability

    James Chelius, James R Chelius et al.•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1992

    In this major new work, Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi explore the question, How are workers compensated for exposing themselves to the risk of physical injury while on the job? The authors detail the diverse nature of labor market responses to job risks and the important role played by compensation-for-risk mechanisms. Following an overview of the literature, they present a number of unprecedented results. Comprehensive and systematic discu…

Business (11 works) · Psychology (10 works) · Compensation (psychology) (8 works) · Economics (8 works) · Social Psychology (8 works) · Labour economics (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Workers' compensation (6 works) · Actuarial science (5 works)

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