An Economic Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration as a Conflict Resolution Device

Bibliographic Data

ID6284235
AuthorsJames R Chelius (Krannert Graduate School of Management Purdue University), James B Dworkin (Krannert Graduate School of Management Purdue University)
Year1980
Volume24
Issue2
Pages293-310
Publication date1980-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/002200278002400208
OpenAlexW2087654459
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited6

The purpose of this article is to examine the impact of the availability of final-offer arbitration on the collective bargaining process and its outcomes. If this technique is to act as an effective strike substitute, it should provide bargainers with incentives to negotiate agreements bilaterally and should distribute bargaining power in much the same manner as would the right to strike. Empirical evidence is provided to evaluate the operation of final-offer arbitration in terms of these attributes. On the basis of this evidence, it would appear that policy-makers should consider final-offer arbitration as an alternative device for resolving conflicts

Arbitration · Bargaining power · Business · Collective bargaining · Compulsory arbitration · Conflict resolution · Dispute resolution · Economics · Empirical evidence · Incentive · Industrial organization · Labour economics · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Political science · Power (physics · Process (computing · Computer Science · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Merger and Competition Analysis · Sports Analytics and Performance

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