Boris Babic
Biographic Data
| ID | 1103192 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Boris Babic |
| GIVEN NAMES | Boris |
| FAMILY NAME | Babic |
| SIGNATURE | BABIC B |
| AFFILIATIONS | INSEAD |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2800-1307 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Justifiability and AI: Putting explainability in its place
As artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) systems become increasingly pervasive in society, their opacity—i.e., the difficulty, and sometimes impossibility, of understanding why they make the decisions they make—has become a serious problem. This is especially true in sensitive decision-making contexts, such as criminal justice, health care, and finance, or in choices requiring allocation of scarce resources. One attempt to “open up…
Algorithmic fairness and resentment
Normativity, Epistemic Rationality, and Noisy Statistical Evidence
Many philosophers have argued that statistical evidence regarding group characteristics (particularly stereotypical ones) can create normative conflicts between the requirements of epistemic rationality and our moral obligations to each other. In a recent article, Johnson-King and Babic argue that such conflicts can usually be avoided: what ordinary morality requires, they argue, epistemic rationality permits. In this article, we show that as dat…
Approximate Coherentism and Luck
Approximate coherentism suggests that imperfectly rational agents should hold approximately coherent credences. This norm is intended as a generalization of ordinary coherence. I argue that it may be unable to play this role by considering its application under learning experiences. While it is unclear how imperfect agents should revise their beliefs, I suggest a plausible route is through Bayesian updating. However, Bayesian updating can take an…
A Theory of Epistemic Risk
I propose a general alethic theory of epistemic risk according to which the riskiness of an agent’s credence function encodes her relative sensitivity to different types of graded error. After motivating and mathematically developing this approach, I show that the epistemic risk function is a scaled reflection of expected inaccuracy (a quantity also known as generalized information entropy). This duality between risk and information enables us to…
Byzantine and post-byzantine sources on medieval Bosnia, its area and position
This article discusses the historical and geographical characteristics of medieval Bosnia, its area and position presented in the perception of Byzantine and post-Byzantine sources. It is characteristic that all these sources, regardless of whether they originated in the 10th, 12th, or 15th century or in the centuries after the collapse of the Byzantine Empire offered testimony of the territory of Bosnia. The presentations are sometimes a bit dis…
A Theory of Epistemic Risk
I propose a general alethic theory of epistemic risk according to which the riskiness of an agent’s credence function encodes her relative sensitivity to different types of graded error. After motivating and mathematically developing this approach, I show that the epistemic risk function is a scaled reflection of expected inaccuracy (a quantity also known as generalized information entropy). This duality between risk and information enables us to…
Byzantine and post-byzantine sources on medieval Bosnia, its area and position
This article discusses the historical and geographical characteristics of medieval Bosnia, its area and position presented in the perception of Byzantine and post-Byzantine sources. It is characteristic that all these sources, regardless of whether they originated in the 10th, 12th, or 15th century or in the centuries after the collapse of the Byzantine Empire offered testimony of the territory of Bosnia. The presentations are sometimes a bit dis…
A Theory of Epistemic Risk
I propose a general alethic theory of epistemic risk according to which the riskiness of an agent’s credence function encodes her relative sensitivity to different types of graded error. After motivating and mathematically developing this approach, I show that the epistemic risk function is a scaled reflection of expected inaccuracy (a quantity also known as generalized information entropy). This duality between risk and information enables us to…
Approximate Coherentism and Luck
Approximate coherentism suggests that imperfectly rational agents should hold approximately coherent credences. This norm is intended as a generalization of ordinary coherence. I argue that it may be unable to play this role by considering its application under learning experiences. While it is unclear how imperfect agents should revise their beliefs, I suggest a plausible route is through Bayesian updating. However, Bayesian updating can take an…
Normativity, Epistemic Rationality, and Noisy Statistical Evidence
Many philosophers have argued that statistical evidence regarding group characteristics (particularly stereotypical ones) can create normative conflicts between the requirements of epistemic rationality and our moral obligations to each other. In a recent article, Johnson-King and Babic argue that such conflicts can usually be avoided: what ordinary morality requires, they argue, epistemic rationality permits. In this article, we show that as dat…
Algorithmic fairness and resentment
Justifiability and AI: Putting explainability in its place
As artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) systems become increasingly pervasive in society, their opacity—i.e., the difficulty, and sometimes impossibility, of understanding why they make the decisions they make—has become a serious problem. This is especially true in sensitive decision-making contexts, such as criminal justice, health care, and finance, or in choices requiring allocation of scarce resources. One attempt to “open up…
Computer Science (4 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Bayesian probability (2 works) · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works)