Dagobert L Brito
Biographic Data
| ID | 1105645 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dagobert L Brito |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dagobert L |
| FAMILY NAME | Brito |
| SIGNATURE | BRITO D L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Rice University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 145 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1973 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Proliferation and the Probability of War: A Cardinality Theorem
To determine formally the effects of nuclear proliferation on the probability of a deliberate nuclear war requires more than just qualitative assertions about the change in the probability that an individual nation will initiate a deliberate nuclear war as the number of nuclear powers increases. For a model to predict that an increase in the number of nuclear powers will increase or decrease the probability of a deliberate nuclear war, it is nece…
Consumer Rationality and Credit Cards
Borrowing on credit cards at high interest rates might appear irrational. However, even low transactions costs can make credit cards attractive relative to bank loans. Credit cards also provide liquidity services by allowing consumers to avoid some of the opportunity costs of holding money. The effect of alternative interest rates on the demand for card debits can explain why credit card interest rates only partially reflect changes in the cost o…
The Economic and Political Incentives to Acquire Nuclear Weapons
An economic model of guerrilla warfare∗
This paper draws on the guerrilla warfare literature so as to synthesize and to describe the dynamics of the initial stages of a guerrilla war against an established government. It combines two classical economic models, the Solow growth model and the Ricardian model of economic rents, with two classic studies of guerrilla warfare by T. E. Lawrence and by Mao Tse‐tung. The transitional stages of the guerrilla warfare are modeled as conflict over …
The potential contribution of psychology to nuclear war issues
The potential contribution of psychology to nuclear war issues
A predator-prey model of guerrilla warfare
Arms races and instability
(1986). Arms races and instability. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 9, Dilemmas of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 113-131
Mayer's Alternative to the I-B Model
MV ayer's article is a useful further development and extension of our model of arms races and war initiation. He uses our general framework but varies either the conditions for deterrence or attack (linear alternatives) or the nature of the model (nonlinear alternatives) and finds in certain cases different conclusions with regard to the relationship between arms races and the initiation of war than in our model. The results of a theoretical mod…
Wolfson on Economic Warfare
Conflict, War, and Redistribution
This article analyzes the circumstances under which conflict leads to the outbreak of war using a formal model which incorporates both the redistribution of resources as an alternative to war and imperfect information. Countries act as rational agents concerned with both consumption and the public bad of a war. In the first period both countries can either consume or build arms, whereas in the second period there can be either the threat or the u…
Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War
The possible relationships of an arms race to the outbreak of war are treated in the framework of a dynamic model of a missile war that could be used by defense planners to simulate the outbreak of war between two nuclear nations. It is shown that, depending on the initial and final configuration of weapons on both sides, an arms race could lead not only to war but to peace. Conversely, a disarming race could lead not only to peace but to war. Th…
Strategic arms limitation treaties and innovations in weapons technology
Nuclear proliferation and the probability of nuclear war
Skilled labor and nineteenth century Anglo-American managerial behavior
Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War
The possible relationships of an arms race to the outbreak of war are treated in the framework of a dynamic model of a missile war that could be used by defense planners to simulate the outbreak of war between two nuclear nations. It is shown that, depending on the initial and final configuration of weapons on both sides, an arms race could lead not only to war but to peace. Conversely, a disarming race could lead not only to peace but to war. Th…
Conflict, War, and Redistribution
This article analyzes the circumstances under which conflict leads to the outbreak of war using a formal model which incorporates both the redistribution of resources as an alternative to war and imperfect information. Countries act as rational agents concerned with both consumption and the public bad of a war. In the first period both countries can either consume or build arms, whereas in the second period there can be either the threat or the u…
Nuclear proliferation and the probability of nuclear war
Skilled labor and nineteenth century Anglo-American managerial behavior
Consumer Rationality and Credit Cards
Borrowing on credit cards at high interest rates might appear irrational. However, even low transactions costs can make credit cards attractive relative to bank loans. Credit cards also provide liquidity services by allowing consumers to avoid some of the opportunity costs of holding money. The effect of alternative interest rates on the demand for card debits can explain why credit card interest rates only partially reflect changes in the cost o…
Proliferation and the Probability of War: A Cardinality Theorem
To determine formally the effects of nuclear proliferation on the probability of a deliberate nuclear war requires more than just qualitative assertions about the change in the probability that an individual nation will initiate a deliberate nuclear war as the number of nuclear powers increases. For a model to predict that an increase in the number of nuclear powers will increase or decrease the probability of a deliberate nuclear war, it is nece…
An economic model of guerrilla warfare∗
This paper draws on the guerrilla warfare literature so as to synthesize and to describe the dynamics of the initial stages of a guerrilla war against an established government. It combines two classical economic models, the Solow growth model and the Ricardian model of economic rents, with two classic studies of guerrilla warfare by T. E. Lawrence and by Mao Tse‐tung. The transitional stages of the guerrilla warfare are modeled as conflict over …
Strategic arms limitation treaties and innovations in weapons technology
The Economic and Political Incentives to Acquire Nuclear Weapons
A predator-prey model of guerrilla warfare
Arms races and instability
(1986). Arms races and instability. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 9, Dilemmas of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 113-131
Mayer's Alternative to the I-B Model
MV ayer's article is a useful further development and extension of our model of arms races and war initiation. He uses our general framework but varies either the conditions for deterrence or attack (linear alternatives) or the nature of the model (nonlinear alternatives) and finds in certain cases different conclusions with regard to the relationship between arms races and the initiation of war than in our model. The results of a theoretical mod…
Wolfson on Economic Warfare
Skilled labor and nineteenth century Anglo-American managerial behavior
Strategic arms limitation treaties and innovations in weapons technology
Nuclear proliferation and the probability of nuclear war
Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War
The possible relationships of an arms race to the outbreak of war are treated in the framework of a dynamic model of a missile war that could be used by defense planners to simulate the outbreak of war between two nuclear nations. It is shown that, depending on the initial and final configuration of weapons on both sides, an arms race could lead not only to war but to peace. Conversely, a disarming race could lead not only to peace but to war. Th…
Wolfson on Economic Warfare
Conflict, War, and Redistribution
This article analyzes the circumstances under which conflict leads to the outbreak of war using a formal model which incorporates both the redistribution of resources as an alternative to war and imperfect information. Countries act as rational agents concerned with both consumption and the public bad of a war. In the first period both countries can either consume or build arms, whereas in the second period there can be either the threat or the u…
Arms races and instability
(1986). Arms races and instability. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 9, Dilemmas of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 113-131
Mayer's Alternative to the I-B Model
MV ayer's article is a useful further development and extension of our model of arms races and war initiation. He uses our general framework but varies either the conditions for deterrence or attack (linear alternatives) or the nature of the model (nonlinear alternatives) and finds in certain cases different conclusions with regard to the relationship between arms races and the initiation of war than in our model. The results of a theoretical mod…
The potential contribution of psychology to nuclear war issues
The potential contribution of psychology to nuclear war issues
A predator-prey model of guerrilla warfare
An economic model of guerrilla warfare∗
This paper draws on the guerrilla warfare literature so as to synthesize and to describe the dynamics of the initial stages of a guerrilla war against an established government. It combines two classical economic models, the Solow growth model and the Ricardian model of economic rents, with two classic studies of guerrilla warfare by T. E. Lawrence and by Mao Tse‐tung. The transitional stages of the guerrilla warfare are modeled as conflict over …
The Economic and Political Incentives to Acquire Nuclear Weapons
Consumer Rationality and Credit Cards
Borrowing on credit cards at high interest rates might appear irrational. However, even low transactions costs can make credit cards attractive relative to bank loans. Credit cards also provide liquidity services by allowing consumers to avoid some of the opportunity costs of holding money. The effect of alternative interest rates on the demand for card debits can explain why credit card interest rates only partially reflect changes in the cost o…
Proliferation and the Probability of War: A Cardinality Theorem
To determine formally the effects of nuclear proliferation on the probability of a deliberate nuclear war requires more than just qualitative assertions about the change in the probability that an individual nation will initiate a deliberate nuclear war as the number of nuclear powers increases. For a model to predict that an increase in the number of nuclear powers will increase or decrease the probability of a deliberate nuclear war, it is nece…
Economics (11 works) · Political science (10 works) · Political economy (9 works) · Law (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies (6 works) · Nuclear Issues and Defense (6 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (4 works) · Nuclear weapon (4 works) · Politics (4 works)