Daniel F Spulber
Biographic Data
| ID | 1107568 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel F Spulber |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel F |
| FAMILY NAME | Spulber |
| SIGNATURE | SPULBER D F |
| AFFILIATIONS | Northwestern University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2697-6522 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 24 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1989 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Measuring the Private and Social Returns to R&D: Unintended Spillovers versus Technology Markets
The canonical approach to measuring private and social returns to R&D assumes diffusion through spillovers. We develop a general framework that allows R&D to diffuse through both spillovers and voluntary technology transfers. To operationalize the framework, we create a data set of interactions in the market for technology between publicly held US firms. We use changes in tax incentives for R&D to identify causal effects. Taking market channels i…
Standard Setting Organisations and Standard Essential Patents: Voting and Markets
The analysis provides conditions under which standard setting organisations (SSOs) choose efficient technology standards. I introduce a two-stage game with both voting and market competition. In equilibrium, standards and market outcomes are efficient even with market power from scarce capacity and standard essential patents (SEPs). I show that a drastic innovation with SEPs generates greater social welfare than a less efficient standard without …
How Do Competitive Pressures Affect Incentives to Innovate When There Is a Market for Inventions
Competition and intellectual property (IP) protections are complements in stimulating innovation. When IP is appropriable, a market for inventions forms and competitive pressures increase incentives to innovate. Competition among producers, the demand side of the market for inventions, and competition among inventors, the supply side of the market for inventions, create incentives to innovate. When IP is not fully appropriable, markets for invent…
Market Microstructure and Incentives to Invest
Market organization significantly affects total output and incentives for firms to invest. I compare three types of market organization. In a market with search and random matching, total output is excessive and there are incentives for inefficient underinvestment. In a market with a monopoly dealer, total output is insufficient and underinvestment also occurs. Competition between the search market and the dealer market improves incentives to inv…
Market Microstructure and Intermediation
This paper emphasizes the important role played by intermediaries in the economy, including wholesalers, retailers, and financial firms. The paper defines an intermediary as an economic agent that purchases from suppliers for resale to buyers or that helps buyers and sellers meet and transact. Intermediaries coordinate transactions and provide the institutions of exchange that constitute market microstructure. Intermediaries set prices, manage in…
Regulations and Markets
Journal Article Regulations and Markets Get access Regulations and Markets. By DANIEL F. SPULBER. (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1989. Pp. xviii + 690. £40.50 hardback. ISBN o 262 192756.) Dieter Helm Dieter Helm Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 100, Issue 399, 1 March 1990, Pages 265–266, https://doi.org/10.2307/2233620 Published: 01 March 1…
Antitrust Enforcement Under Asymmetric Information
Journal Article Antitrust Enforcement Under Asymmetric Information Get access David Besanko, David Besanko Indiana University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Daniel F. Spulber Daniel F. Spulber University of Southern California Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 99, Issue 396, 1 June 1989, Pages 408–425, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234033 Publ…
Market Microstructure and Intermediation
This paper emphasizes the important role played by intermediaries in the economy, including wholesalers, retailers, and financial firms. The paper defines an intermediary as an economic agent that purchases from suppliers for resale to buyers or that helps buyers and sellers meet and transact. Intermediaries coordinate transactions and provide the institutions of exchange that constitute market microstructure. Intermediaries set prices, manage in…
How Do Competitive Pressures Affect Incentives to Innovate When There Is a Market for Inventions
Competition and intellectual property (IP) protections are complements in stimulating innovation. When IP is appropriable, a market for inventions forms and competitive pressures increase incentives to innovate. Competition among producers, the demand side of the market for inventions, and competition among inventors, the supply side of the market for inventions, create incentives to innovate. When IP is not fully appropriable, markets for invent…
Antitrust Enforcement Under Asymmetric Information
Journal Article Antitrust Enforcement Under Asymmetric Information Get access David Besanko, David Besanko Indiana University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Daniel F. Spulber Daniel F. Spulber University of Southern California Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 99, Issue 396, 1 June 1989, Pages 408–425, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234033 Publ…
Standard Setting Organisations and Standard Essential Patents: Voting and Markets
The analysis provides conditions under which standard setting organisations (SSOs) choose efficient technology standards. I introduce a two-stage game with both voting and market competition. In equilibrium, standards and market outcomes are efficient even with market power from scarce capacity and standard essential patents (SEPs). I show that a drastic innovation with SEPs generates greater social welfare than a less efficient standard without …
Market Microstructure and Incentives to Invest
Market organization significantly affects total output and incentives for firms to invest. I compare three types of market organization. In a market with search and random matching, total output is excessive and there are incentives for inefficient underinvestment. In a market with a monopoly dealer, total output is insufficient and underinvestment also occurs. Competition between the search market and the dealer market improves incentives to inv…
Antitrust Enforcement Under Asymmetric Information
Journal Article Antitrust Enforcement Under Asymmetric Information Get access David Besanko, David Besanko Indiana University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Daniel F. Spulber Daniel F. Spulber University of Southern California Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 99, Issue 396, 1 June 1989, Pages 408–425, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234033 Publ…
Regulations and Markets
Journal Article Regulations and Markets Get access Regulations and Markets. By DANIEL F. SPULBER. (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1989. Pp. xviii + 690. £40.50 hardback. ISBN o 262 192756.) Dieter Helm Dieter Helm Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 100, Issue 399, 1 March 1990, Pages 265–266, https://doi.org/10.2307/2233620 Published: 01 March 1…
Market Microstructure and Intermediation
This paper emphasizes the important role played by intermediaries in the economy, including wholesalers, retailers, and financial firms. The paper defines an intermediary as an economic agent that purchases from suppliers for resale to buyers or that helps buyers and sellers meet and transact. Intermediaries coordinate transactions and provide the institutions of exchange that constitute market microstructure. Intermediaries set prices, manage in…
Market Microstructure and Incentives to Invest
Market organization significantly affects total output and incentives for firms to invest. I compare three types of market organization. In a market with search and random matching, total output is excessive and there are incentives for inefficient underinvestment. In a market with a monopoly dealer, total output is insufficient and underinvestment also occurs. Competition between the search market and the dealer market improves incentives to inv…
How Do Competitive Pressures Affect Incentives to Innovate When There Is a Market for Inventions
Competition and intellectual property (IP) protections are complements in stimulating innovation. When IP is appropriable, a market for inventions forms and competitive pressures increase incentives to innovate. Competition among producers, the demand side of the market for inventions, and competition among inventors, the supply side of the market for inventions, create incentives to innovate. When IP is not fully appropriable, markets for invent…
Standard Setting Organisations and Standard Essential Patents: Voting and Markets
The analysis provides conditions under which standard setting organisations (SSOs) choose efficient technology standards. I introduce a two-stage game with both voting and market competition. In equilibrium, standards and market outcomes are efficient even with market power from scarce capacity and standard essential patents (SEPs). I show that a drastic innovation with SEPs generates greater social welfare than a less efficient standard without …
Measuring the Private and Social Returns to R&D: Unintended Spillovers versus Technology Markets
The canonical approach to measuring private and social returns to R&D assumes diffusion through spillovers. We develop a general framework that allows R&D to diffuse through both spillovers and voluntary technology transfers. To operationalize the framework, we create a data set of interactions in the market for technology between publicly held US firms. We use changes in tax incentives for R&D to identify causal effects. Taking market channels i…
Economics (6 works) · Business (4 works) · Industrial organization (4 works) · Market economy (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Competition (biology (3 works) · Incentive (3 works) · Innovation Policy and RD (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works)