Standard Setting Organisations and Standard Essential Patents

Voting and Markets

Bibliographic Data

ID9712189
AuthorsDaniel F Spulber (0000-0003-2697-6522, Northwestern University, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume129
Issue619
Pages1477-1509
Publication date2019-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12606
OpenAlexW2566462477
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited46

The analysis provides conditions under which standard setting organisations (SSOs) choose efficient technology standards. I introduce a two-stage game with both voting and market competition. In equilibrium, standards and market outcomes are efficient even with market power from scarce capacity and standard essential patents (SEPs). I show that a drastic innovation with SEPs generates greater social welfare than a less efficient standard without SEPs. A key finding is that voting power and market power have counterbalancing effects. The discussion helps explain empirical observation of differences in SSO voting rules, intellectual property (IP) rules, membership and alliances

Business · Competition (biology · Economics · Industrial organization · Intellectual property · Majority rule · Market economy · Market power · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Social Welfare · Voting · Welfare · Innovation and Knowledge Management · Innovation Policy and RD · Intellectual Property and Patents · Law

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