Jan-Willem Romeijn
Biographic Data
| ID | 1108061 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jan-Willem Romeijn |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jan-Willem |
| FAMILY NAME | Romeijn |
| SIGNATURE | ROMEIJN J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Groningen |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5711-7021 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 19 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Ill-informed Consensus or Truthful Disagreement? How Argumentation Styles and Preference Perceptions Affect Deliberation Outcomes in Groups with Conflicting Stakes
In groups where members deliberate with limited information, consensus can emerge where, under complete information, fundamental disagreement would prevail. Using an agent-based model, we explore the factors contributing to group consensus by comparing argumentation styles in two types of groups: agents in groups of advocates communicate arguments for options perceived as personally beneficial. Agents in groups of diplomats do the same but avoid …
Simplicity in Bayesian nested-model comparisons: Popper’s disagreement with Wrinch and Jeffreys revisited
Bayesian nested-model comparisons involve an assessment of the probabilities for a relatively simple model and a more general encompassing model. Since the simpler model can be viewed as a subset of the more complex model it is nested in, Popper has argued that the axioms of probability are violated when the simpler model is nonetheless assigned a higher prior probability. While Popper raised this objection in the context of assigning prior proba…
Philosophy of science and the formalization of psychological theory
One of the original aims of this journal was to promote theory in psychology. Nowadays more and more psychological researchers are calling for more theory development, and articles on the “theory crisis” have also found their way into mainstream journals. In this article, we provide a further perspective to this theory debate. Over the past century, philosophy of science has staged extensive discussions on the mathematization of nature and on the…
An Interpretation of Weights in Linear Opinion Pooling
This paper explores the fact that linear opinion pooling can be represented as a Bayesian update on the opinions of others. It uses this fact to propose a new interpretation of the pooling weights. Relative to certain modelling assumptions the weights can be equated with the so-called truth-conduciveness known from the context of Condorcet's jury theorem. This suggests a novel way to elicit the weights
Epsa15 Selected Papers: The 5th conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association in Düsseldorf
All agreed: Aumann meets DeGroot
We represent consensus formation processes based on iterated opinion pooling (DeGroot in J Am Stat Assoc 69:118–121, 1974; Lehrer and Wagner in Rational consensus in science and society: a philosophical and mathematical study. Springer, Berlin, 1981) as a dynamic approach to common knowledge of posteriors (Aumann in Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976; Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis in J Econ Theory 28:192–200, 1982). We thus provide a concrete and plau…
Inherent Complexity: A Problem for Statistical Model Evaluation
This article investigates a problem for statistical model evaluation, in particular for curve fitting: by employing a different family of curves we can fit any scatter plot almost perfectly at apparently minor cost in terms of model complexity. The problem is resolved by an appeal to prior probabilities. This leads to some general lessons about how to approach model evaluation
Logic of Statistical Inference
One of Ian Hacking's earliest publications, this book showcases his early ideas on the central concepts and questions surrounding statistical reasoning. He explores the basic principles of statistical reasoning and tests them, both at a philosophical level and in terms of their practical consequences for statisticians. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Jan-Willem Rom…
New theory about old evidence: A framework for open-minded Bayesianism
We present a conservative extension of a Bayesian account of confirmation that can deal with the problem of old evidence and new theories. So-called open-minded Bayesianism challenges the assumption—implicit in standard Bayesianism—that the correct empirical hypothesis is among the ones currently under consideration. It requires the inclusion of a catch-all hypothesis, which is characterized by means of sets of probability assignments. Upon the i…
Commentary: “Consistent Superiority of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors Over Placebo in Reducing Depressed Mood in Patients with Major Depression”
In the past decades, almost all research in psychiatry and clinical psychology has been directed at the level of disorders, such as major depressive disorder (MDD) or schizophrenia. As has been argued by many scholars in recent work, this organization of the psychiatric research program has yielded limited insights, which justifies the investigation of psychopathology at a more fine-grained level: the level of symptoms (1, 2). In the present lett…
Good Listeners, Wise Crowds, and Parasitic Experts
This article comments on the article of Thorn and Schurz in this volume and focuses on, what we call, the problem of parasitic experts. We discuss that both meta- induction and crowd wisdom can be understood as pertaining to absolute reliability rather than comparative optimality, and we suggest that the involvement of reliability will provide a handle on this problem
Evaluating expectations about negative emotional states of aggressive boys using Bayesian model selection
Researchers often have expectations about the research outcomes in regard to inequality constraints between, e.g., group means. Consider the example of researchers who investigated the effects of inducing a negative emotional state in aggressive boys. It was expected that highly aggressive boys would, on average, score higher on aggressive responses toward other peers than moderately aggressive boys, who would in turn score higher than nonaggress…
Learning juror competence: A generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem
This article presents a generalization of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. All results to date assume a fixed value for the competence of jurors, or alternatively, a fixed probability distribution over the possible competences of jurors. In this article, we develop the idea that we can learn the competence of the jurors by the jury vote. We assume a uniform prior probability assignment over the competence parameter, and we adapt this assignment in the…
Theory Change and Bayesian Statistical Inference
This paper addresses the problem that Bayesian statistical inference cannot accommodate theory change, and proposes a framework for dealing with such changes. It first presents a scheme for generating predictions from observations by means of hypotheses. An example shows how the hypotheses represent the theoretical structure underlying the scheme. This is followed by an example of a change of hypotheses. The paper then presents a general framewor…
New theory about old evidence: A framework for open-minded Bayesianism
We present a conservative extension of a Bayesian account of confirmation that can deal with the problem of old evidence and new theories. So-called open-minded Bayesianism challenges the assumption—implicit in standard Bayesianism—that the correct empirical hypothesis is among the ones currently under consideration. It requires the inclusion of a catch-all hypothesis, which is characterized by means of sets of probability assignments. Upon the i…
Evaluating expectations about negative emotional states of aggressive boys using Bayesian model selection
Researchers often have expectations about the research outcomes in regard to inequality constraints between, e.g., group means. Consider the example of researchers who investigated the effects of inducing a negative emotional state in aggressive boys. It was expected that highly aggressive boys would, on average, score higher on aggressive responses toward other peers than moderately aggressive boys, who would in turn score higher than nonaggress…
Learning juror competence: A generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem
This article presents a generalization of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. All results to date assume a fixed value for the competence of jurors, or alternatively, a fixed probability distribution over the possible competences of jurors. In this article, we develop the idea that we can learn the competence of the jurors by the jury vote. We assume a uniform prior probability assignment over the competence parameter, and we adapt this assignment in the…
Inherent Complexity: A Problem for Statistical Model Evaluation
This article investigates a problem for statistical model evaluation, in particular for curve fitting: by employing a different family of curves we can fit any scatter plot almost perfectly at apparently minor cost in terms of model complexity. The problem is resolved by an appeal to prior probabilities. This leads to some general lessons about how to approach model evaluation
Theory Change and Bayesian Statistical Inference
This paper addresses the problem that Bayesian statistical inference cannot accommodate theory change, and proposes a framework for dealing with such changes. It first presents a scheme for generating predictions from observations by means of hypotheses. An example shows how the hypotheses represent the theoretical structure underlying the scheme. This is followed by an example of a change of hypotheses. The paper then presents a general framewor…
Theory Change and Bayesian Statistical Inference
This paper addresses the problem that Bayesian statistical inference cannot accommodate theory change, and proposes a framework for dealing with such changes. It first presents a scheme for generating predictions from observations by means of hypotheses. An example shows how the hypotheses represent the theoretical structure underlying the scheme. This is followed by an example of a change of hypotheses. The paper then presents a general framewor…
Learning juror competence: A generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem
This article presents a generalization of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. All results to date assume a fixed value for the competence of jurors, or alternatively, a fixed probability distribution over the possible competences of jurors. In this article, we develop the idea that we can learn the competence of the jurors by the jury vote. We assume a uniform prior probability assignment over the competence parameter, and we adapt this assignment in the…
Evaluating expectations about negative emotional states of aggressive boys using Bayesian model selection
Researchers often have expectations about the research outcomes in regard to inequality constraints between, e.g., group means. Consider the example of researchers who investigated the effects of inducing a negative emotional state in aggressive boys. It was expected that highly aggressive boys would, on average, score higher on aggressive responses toward other peers than moderately aggressive boys, who would in turn score higher than nonaggress…
Good Listeners, Wise Crowds, and Parasitic Experts
This article comments on the article of Thorn and Schurz in this volume and focuses on, what we call, the problem of parasitic experts. We discuss that both meta- induction and crowd wisdom can be understood as pertaining to absolute reliability rather than comparative optimality, and we suggest that the involvement of reliability will provide a handle on this problem
Commentary: “Consistent Superiority of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors Over Placebo in Reducing Depressed Mood in Patients with Major Depression”
In the past decades, almost all research in psychiatry and clinical psychology has been directed at the level of disorders, such as major depressive disorder (MDD) or schizophrenia. As has been argued by many scholars in recent work, this organization of the psychiatric research program has yielded limited insights, which justifies the investigation of psychopathology at a more fine-grained level: the level of symptoms (1, 2). In the present lett…
Logic of Statistical Inference
One of Ian Hacking's earliest publications, this book showcases his early ideas on the central concepts and questions surrounding statistical reasoning. He explores the basic principles of statistical reasoning and tests them, both at a philosophical level and in terms of their practical consequences for statisticians. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Jan-Willem Rom…
New theory about old evidence: A framework for open-minded Bayesianism
We present a conservative extension of a Bayesian account of confirmation that can deal with the problem of old evidence and new theories. So-called open-minded Bayesianism challenges the assumption—implicit in standard Bayesianism—that the correct empirical hypothesis is among the ones currently under consideration. It requires the inclusion of a catch-all hypothesis, which is characterized by means of sets of probability assignments. Upon the i…
Epsa15 Selected Papers: The 5th conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association in Düsseldorf
All agreed: Aumann meets DeGroot
We represent consensus formation processes based on iterated opinion pooling (DeGroot in J Am Stat Assoc 69:118–121, 1974; Lehrer and Wagner in Rational consensus in science and society: a philosophical and mathematical study. Springer, Berlin, 1981) as a dynamic approach to common knowledge of posteriors (Aumann in Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976; Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis in J Econ Theory 28:192–200, 1982). We thus provide a concrete and plau…
Inherent Complexity: A Problem for Statistical Model Evaluation
This article investigates a problem for statistical model evaluation, in particular for curve fitting: by employing a different family of curves we can fit any scatter plot almost perfectly at apparently minor cost in terms of model complexity. The problem is resolved by an appeal to prior probabilities. This leads to some general lessons about how to approach model evaluation
Philosophy of science and the formalization of psychological theory
One of the original aims of this journal was to promote theory in psychology. Nowadays more and more psychological researchers are calling for more theory development, and articles on the “theory crisis” have also found their way into mainstream journals. In this article, we provide a further perspective to this theory debate. Over the past century, philosophy of science has staged extensive discussions on the mathematization of nature and on the…
An Interpretation of Weights in Linear Opinion Pooling
This paper explores the fact that linear opinion pooling can be represented as a Bayesian update on the opinions of others. It uses this fact to propose a new interpretation of the pooling weights. Relative to certain modelling assumptions the weights can be equated with the so-called truth-conduciveness known from the context of Condorcet's jury theorem. This suggests a novel way to elicit the weights
Simplicity in Bayesian nested-model comparisons: Popper’s disagreement with Wrinch and Jeffreys revisited
Bayesian nested-model comparisons involve an assessment of the probabilities for a relatively simple model and a more general encompassing model. Since the simpler model can be viewed as a subset of the more complex model it is nested in, Popper has argued that the axioms of probability are violated when the simpler model is nonetheless assigned a higher prior probability. While Popper raised this objection in the context of assigning prior proba…
Ill-informed Consensus or Truthful Disagreement? How Argumentation Styles and Preference Perceptions Affect Deliberation Outcomes in Groups with Conflicting Stakes
In groups where members deliberate with limited information, consensus can emerge where, under complete information, fundamental disagreement would prevail. Using an agent-based model, we explore the factors contributing to group consensus by comparing argumentation styles in two types of groups: agents in groups of advocates communicate arguments for options perceived as personally beneficial. Agents in groups of diplomats do the same but avoid …
Computer Science (8 works) · Mathematics (8 works) · Bayesian probability (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Artificial Intelligence (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (4 works) · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference (4 works) · Econometrics (4 works) · Law (4 works)