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Edward Saraydar

Biographic Data

ID1118102
NAMEEdward Saraydar
GIVEN NAMESEdward
FAMILY NAMESaraydar
SIGNATURESARAYDAR E
AFFILIATIONSDepartment of Economics, University of Western Ontario
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS9
TOTAL CITATIONS9
AUTHOR COUNT9
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1964
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR1984
H-INDEX2
  • Modeling the Role of Conflict and Conciliation in Bargaining

    Open Access•Edward Saraydar•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1984•Cited by: 2•References: 11

    So as to provide a more general framework for an analysis of those factors that can influence the outcome of bargaining under a situation of uncertainty, this article develops an adaptive-expectations multisized-concession paradigm of bargaining. The firmness with which bargainers hold to their positions is a function of the expected utility of the potential payoffs associated with alternative moves, and the size of alternative concession prospec…

  • Transaction Costs and the Solution to Captain MacWhirr's Problem

    Edward Saraydar•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1983

    I think that he got out of it very well for such a stupid man. [Joseph Conrad, Typhoon]

  • The Cost of World War II to the Soviet People

    Open Access•Edward Saraydar•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic History•1980•Cited by: 2•References: 3

    In a recent paper in this Journal, James Millar and Susan Linz seek “to determine the reasonableness of the Soviet claim that World War II cost the Soviet economy two Five-Year Plans.” They argue that Soviet direct estimates of non-human war cost (capital loss plus direct war outlays plus wartime loss of national income), made by a postwar Extraordinary Commission, imply a cost per employed member of the 1940 population of 7.4 years' earnings. Th…

  • Labour Markets in Canada

    Edward Saraydar, J Tait Montague et al.•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1972

  • A certainty-equivalent model of bargaining

    Open Access•Edward Saraydar•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1971•Cited by: 2•References: 11

    In economic theory, there have been in essence two broad approaches to the question of how agreement is reached when each participant in the market has at least some control over the terms of exchange. The first, which places major emphasis on the economic determinants of the outcome, is best exemplified by Zeuthen's theory of bargaining (1930, ch. 4; 1957, ch. 57), which assumes away purely personal elements, the skill of the negotiators, misund…

  • Wage Negotiation and Bargaining Power

    Open Access•Edward Saraydar•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1970

  • Wage Negotiation and Bargaining Power

    Edward Saraydar•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1970

  • The Economics of Bargaining

    Edward Saraydar, John G Cro et al.•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1970

  • A Note on the Profitability of Ante Bellum Slavery

    Edward Saraydar•ARTICLE•Southern Economic Journal•1964•Cited by: 3

    opportunities, or was slavery-as many have contended-on the verge of 'toppling of its own weight' because of insufficient returns? (ii) Was slavery viable; that is, did the system include an efficient market for generating and allocating slave labor? (iii) Was the institution of slavery inimical to southern economic growth because of such factors as slave inefficiency in industry, excessive use of credit, and the rigidifying of capital in slave h…

  • A Note on the Profitability of Ante Bellum Slavery

    Edward Saraydar•ARTICLE•Southern Economic Journal•1964•Cited by: 3

    opportunities, or was slavery-as many have contended-on the verge of 'toppling of its own weight' because of insufficient returns? (ii) Was slavery viable; that is, did the system include an efficient market for generating and allocating slave labor? (iii) Was the institution of slavery inimical to southern economic growth because of such factors as slave inefficiency in industry, excessive use of credit, and the rigidifying of capital in slave h…

  • Modeling the Role of Conflict and Conciliation in Bargaining

    Open Access•Edward Saraydar•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1984•Cited by: 2•References: 11

    So as to provide a more general framework for an analysis of those factors that can influence the outcome of bargaining under a situation of uncertainty, this article develops an adaptive-expectations multisized-concession paradigm of bargaining. The firmness with which bargainers hold to their positions is a function of the expected utility of the potential payoffs associated with alternative moves, and the size of alternative concession prospec…

  • The Cost of World War II to the Soviet People

    Open Access•Edward Saraydar•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic History•1980•Cited by: 2•References: 3

    In a recent paper in this Journal, James Millar and Susan Linz seek “to determine the reasonableness of the Soviet claim that World War II cost the Soviet economy two Five-Year Plans.” They argue that Soviet direct estimates of non-human war cost (capital loss plus direct war outlays plus wartime loss of national income), made by a postwar Extraordinary Commission, imply a cost per employed member of the 1940 population of 7.4 years' earnings. Th…

  • A certainty-equivalent model of bargaining

    Open Access•Edward Saraydar•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1971•Cited by: 2•References: 11

    In economic theory, there have been in essence two broad approaches to the question of how agreement is reached when each participant in the market has at least some control over the terms of exchange. The first, which places major emphasis on the economic determinants of the outcome, is best exemplified by Zeuthen's theory of bargaining (1930, ch. 4; 1957, ch. 57), which assumes away purely personal elements, the skill of the negotiators, misund…

  • A Note on the Profitability of Ante Bellum Slavery

    Edward Saraydar•ARTICLE•Southern Economic Journal•1964•Cited by: 3

    opportunities, or was slavery-as many have contended-on the verge of 'toppling of its own weight' because of insufficient returns? (ii) Was slavery viable; that is, did the system include an efficient market for generating and allocating slave labor? (iii) Was the institution of slavery inimical to southern economic growth because of such factors as slave inefficiency in industry, excessive use of credit, and the rigidifying of capital in slave h…

  • Wage Negotiation and Bargaining Power

    Open Access•Edward Saraydar•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1970

  • Wage Negotiation and Bargaining Power

    Edward Saraydar•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1970

  • The Economics of Bargaining

    Edward Saraydar, John G Cro et al.•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1970

  • A certainty-equivalent model of bargaining

    Open Access•Edward Saraydar•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1971•Cited by: 2•References: 11

    In economic theory, there have been in essence two broad approaches to the question of how agreement is reached when each participant in the market has at least some control over the terms of exchange. The first, which places major emphasis on the economic determinants of the outcome, is best exemplified by Zeuthen's theory of bargaining (1930, ch. 4; 1957, ch. 57), which assumes away purely personal elements, the skill of the negotiators, misund…

  • Labour Markets in Canada

    Edward Saraydar, J Tait Montague et al.•ARTICLE•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1972

  • The Cost of World War II to the Soviet People

    Open Access•Edward Saraydar•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic History•1980•Cited by: 2•References: 3

    In a recent paper in this Journal, James Millar and Susan Linz seek “to determine the reasonableness of the Soviet claim that World War II cost the Soviet economy two Five-Year Plans.” They argue that Soviet direct estimates of non-human war cost (capital loss plus direct war outlays plus wartime loss of national income), made by a postwar Extraordinary Commission, imply a cost per employed member of the 1940 population of 7.4 years' earnings. Th…

  • Transaction Costs and the Solution to Captain MacWhirr's Problem

    Edward Saraydar•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1983

    I think that he got out of it very well for such a stupid man. [Joseph Conrad, Typhoon]

  • Modeling the Role of Conflict and Conciliation in Bargaining

    Open Access•Edward Saraydar•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1984•Cited by: 2•References: 11

    So as to provide a more general framework for an analysis of those factors that can influence the outcome of bargaining under a situation of uncertainty, this article develops an adaptive-expectations multisized-concession paradigm of bargaining. The firmness with which bargainers hold to their positions is a function of the expected utility of the potential payoffs associated with alternative moves, and the size of alternative concession prospec…

Economics (9 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Bargaining power (3 works) · Labor Movements and Unions (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Negotiation (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Finance (2 works)

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