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Modeling the Role of Conflict and Conciliation in Bargaining

Bibliographic Data

ID6284084
AuthorsEdward Saraydar (Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, corresponding author)
Year1984
Volume28
Issue3
Pages420-450
Publication date1984-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002784028003003
OpenAlexW2143956941
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited13

So as to provide a more general framework for an analysis of those factors that can influence the outcome of bargaining under a situation of uncertainty, this article develops an adaptive-expectations multisized-concession paradigm of bargaining. The firmness with which bargainers hold to their positions is a function of the expected utility of the potential payoffs associated with alternative moves, and the size of alternative concession prospects is considered implicitly in relationship to the differential effect on subjective probability distributions. The construct permits the development of the role of bargaining as a communicative device, designed to transmit and receive information, create and dispel uncertainty. Bluff and notbluff are discussed as tactics of conflict and conciliation, within the context of a relationship between the manifest bargaining stance of bargainers and their actual commitment to their current demand. The “loss of face” factor involved in concession moves is explored, as well as the role of time and timing as bargaining tactics. Finally, quid pro quo is discussed as a tactic of conciliation, together with the constituents of what might be termed an optimum bargaining behavior

Arbitration · Bargaining power · Bargaining problem · Conciliation · Construct (python library · Context (archaeology · Differential (mechanical device · Economics · Function (biology · Market economy · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Political science · Status quo · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

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    Open Access•Nancy A Burrell, Nancy Burrell et al.•Human Communication Research•1990

  • A behavioral theory of labor negotiations

    Richard E Walton•A behavioral theory of labor…•1991

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    John F Nash•Econometrica•1950

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    Open Access•Otomar J Bartos•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1977

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    Open Access•Marek P Hessel, Marek Hessel•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1981

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  • Strategy and Tactics in Labor Negotiations

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Unique citing works2
Citations per year0,06
Citation span1990 - 2021 (32)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 2

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