Flexibility and Firmness in Crisis Bargaining
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071555 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Vesna Danilovic (0000-0001-8865-9675, Department of Political Science, University at Buffalo–SUNY, Buffalo, NY, USA, corresponding author), Joe Clare (0000-0003-2245-9376, Louisiana State University) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 65 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 1039-1066 |
| Publication date | 2021-02-17 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002721994174 |
| OpenAlex | W3133075381 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 43 |
Our study compares the efficacy of mixed bargaining strategies to strict coercion or accommodation. While mixed strategies can be approached from different conceptual angles, we focus on flexible and/or firm postures as signaling properties of bargaining. In our theory and empirical analysis, we show that the combination of firmness with flexibility on both sides, without necessarily scripted rules as in tit-for-tat, leads to peaceful resolution without unilateral concessions. Its opposite, resolute firmness is unlikely to make the opponent yield, as assumed in influential literature of the traditional canon. If anything, war is most likely when both sides opt for it. We provide the theoretical rationale for these expectations, which are validated in our empirical analysis of the ICB crisis dataset for the 1918 to 2015 period. Our study also points to the bargaining process as a potential causal mechanism between democracy and peace, and therefore has relevant implications for several research strands
Accommodation · Ambivalence · Coercion (linguistics · Democracy · Economics · Epistemology · Flexibility (engineering · Incentive · Management · Mechanism (biology · Microeconomics · Political science · Positive economics · Yield (engineering · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology
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| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,33 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |