David Szakonyi
Biographic Data
| ID | 1122534 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David Szakonyi |
| GIVEN NAMES | David |
| FAMILY NAME | Szakonyi |
| SIGNATURE | SZAKONYI D |
| AFFILIATIONS | George Washington University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3796-0297 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 19 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 341 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 19 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
Opposition rule under autocracy
How does the opposition govern under autocracy? Most authoritarian regimes tolerate some degree of internal opposition, allowing it to contest and even take power. Yet we know little about how such power‐sharing dynamics affect governance. In this paper, I exploit a unique instance where an opposition won control of political institutions in a prominent electoral autocracy: the 2017 Moscow municipal elections. Using a difference‐in‐differences de…
Corruption and Co-Optation in Autocracy
Do corrupt officials govern differently in elected office? This article develops a theoretical framework and analyzes new data from financial disclosures to estimate the governing costs of corruption. First, I uncover substantial hidden wealth held by roughly one quarter of the legislators in the Russian Duma; these "kompromat deputies" are vulnerable to damaging information being used against them by the regime. Analyzing their behavior in offic…
Russia Resurrected
Russia’s horrific war in Ukraine has left scores of analysts wondering how we got here. Published just prior to the invasion, Kathryn Stoner’s Russia Resurrected deftly shows that this assertiveness has long been a trademark of Putin's regime. Her central thesis is a simple one: over the past two decades, Russia has become resurgent, not just economically and politically, but through the pursuit of an aggressive foreign policy designed to return …
Indecent Disclosures
Does the passage of anticorruption reforms affect the types of people that want to serve in government? This article evaluates the effects of a common tool to fight corruption—financial disclosures—using data on 25,642 elections in Putin‐era Russia. I argue that financial disclosures function like a personal audit, generating information for journalists and prosecutors to investigate illicit gains earned inside and outside of government. Exploiti…
Candidate Filtering
Incumbents have many tools to tip elections in their favor, yet little is known about how they choose between strategies. By comparing various tactics, this article argues that electoral malpractice centered on manipulating institutions offers the greatest effectiveness while shielding incumbents from public anger and criminal prosecution. To demonstrate this, the study focuses on a widespread institutional tactic: preventing candidates from acce…
Electoral Manipulation and Regime Support
Does electoral fraud stabilize authoritarian rule or undermine it? The answer to this question rests in part on how voters evaluate regime candidates who engage in fraud. Using a survey experiment conducted after the 2016 elections in Russia, the authors find that voters withdraw their support from ruling party candidates who commit electoral fraud. This effect is especially large among strong supporters of the regime. Core regime supporters are …
Politics for Profit
Businesspeople run for and win elected office around the world, with roughly one-third of members of parliament and numerous heads of states coming directly from the private sector. Yet we know little about why these politicians choose to leave the private sector and what they actually do while in government. In Politics for Profit, David Szakonyi brings to bear sweeping quantitative and qualitative evidence from Putin-era Russia to shed light on…
Politics for Profit
Princelings in the Private Sector
What is the value of a family tie? Nepotism is a common feature of democratic and non-democratic systems, but our understanding of how and why family members of government officials receive preferential treatment is limited. Using administrative data on the universe of Moscow citizens to identify family links, I adopt a difference-in-differences design to estimate the labor market returns of having a relative enter the Russian government from 199…
Billionaires and Stealth Politics
As the 2020 presidential campaign heats up, the issue of billionaires ascendant within American politics will once again take center stage. The country could see another billionaire candidate challenge the incumbent billionaire president, whose many informal advisers and cabinet members run in similar circles. Several ultrarich elites will inevitably break new records with their individual campaign contributions. A voter could be forgiven for thi…
Vote Brokers, Clientelist Appeals, and Voter Turnout
Modern clientelist exchange is typically carried out by intermediaries—party activists, employers, local strongmen, traditional leaders, and the like. Politicians use such brokers to mobilize voters, yet little about their relative effectiveness is known. The authors argue that broker effectiveness depends on their leverage over clients and their ability to monitor voters. They apply their theoretical framework to compare two of the most common b…
Hitting Them With Carrots
Hitting Them With Carrots
Scholars have identified many ways that politicians use carrots, such as vote buying, to mobilize voters, but have paid far less attention to how they use sticks, such as voter intimidation. This article develops a simple argument which suggests that voter intimidation should be especially likely where vote buying is expensive and employers have greater leverage over employees. Using survey experiments and crowd-sourced electoral violation report…
Elite Defection under Autocracy
Elite cohesion is a fundamental pillar of authoritarian stability. High-level defections can signal weakness, embolden the opposition, and sometimes, lead to regime collapse. Using a dataset of 4,291 ruling party candidates in Russia, this paper develops and tests hypotheses about the integrity of elite coalitions under autocracy. Our theory predicts that ruling elites defect when there is greater uncertainty about the regime's willingness to pro…
Solar power for street vendors? Problems with centralized charging stations in urban markets
Online Social Media and Political Awareness in Authoritarian Regimes
Do online social media undermine authoritarianism? The conditions under which online social networks can increase public awareness of electoral fraud in non-democracies are examined in this article and it is argued that a given online social network will only increase political awareness if it is first politicized by elites. Survey data from the 2011 Russian parliamentary elections show that usage of Twitter and Facebook, which were politicized b…
Who Benefits From Economic Reform? Firms and Distributive Politics
While the distributional consequences of economic reform have captivated political scientists, few studies have investigated the ability of different firms to reap gains from policy change. Reforms indeed create winners and losers, but there is scant evidence on specifically which firms benefit and which firms lose out. We propose that the benefits from liberalizing reform accrue mostly to firms that are not vulnerable to extortion by the state a…
Political Machines at Work Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace
The authors explore how modern autocrats win elections by inducing employers to mobilize their employees to vote for the regime and thereby subvert the electoral process. using two original surveys of employers and workers conducted around the 2011 parliamentary elections in russia, they find that just under one-quarter of employers engaged in some form of political mobilization. they then develop a simple framework for identifying which firms en…
Veto Players and the Value of Political Control
We examine how veto players and the government’s valuation of political control of economic activity affect the likelihood of privatization. When the government ascribes a high value to political control, veto players impede privatization because they would have to be compensated for their losses. When the value of political control is low, the government prefers to privatize enterprises that become difficult to control with multiple veto players…
Online Social Media and Political Awareness in Authoritarian Regimes
Do online social media undermine authoritarianism? The conditions under which online social networks can increase public awareness of electoral fraud in non-democracies are examined in this article and it is argued that a given online social network will only increase political awareness if it is first politicized by elites. Survey data from the 2011 Russian parliamentary elections show that usage of Twitter and Facebook, which were politicized b…
Political Machines at Work Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace
The authors explore how modern autocrats win elections by inducing employers to mobilize their employees to vote for the regime and thereby subvert the electoral process. using two original surveys of employers and workers conducted around the 2011 parliamentary elections in russia, they find that just under one-quarter of employers engaged in some form of political mobilization. they then develop a simple framework for identifying which firms en…
Hitting Them With Carrots
Scholars have identified many ways that politicians use carrots, such as vote buying, to mobilize voters, but have paid far less attention to how they use sticks, such as voter intimidation. This article develops a simple argument which suggests that voter intimidation should be especially likely where vote buying is expensive and employers have greater leverage over employees. Using survey experiments and crowd-sourced electoral violation report…
Elite Defection under Autocracy
Elite cohesion is a fundamental pillar of authoritarian stability. High-level defections can signal weakness, embolden the opposition, and sometimes, lead to regime collapse. Using a dataset of 4,291 ruling party candidates in Russia, this paper develops and tests hypotheses about the integrity of elite coalitions under autocracy. Our theory predicts that ruling elites defect when there is greater uncertainty about the regime's willingness to pro…
Vote Brokers, Clientelist Appeals, and Voter Turnout
Modern clientelist exchange is typically carried out by intermediaries—party activists, employers, local strongmen, traditional leaders, and the like. Politicians use such brokers to mobilize voters, yet little about their relative effectiveness is known. The authors argue that broker effectiveness depends on their leverage over clients and their ability to monitor voters. They apply their theoretical framework to compare two of the most common b…
Electoral Manipulation and Regime Support
Does electoral fraud stabilize authoritarian rule or undermine it? The answer to this question rests in part on how voters evaluate regime candidates who engage in fraud. Using a survey experiment conducted after the 2016 elections in Russia, the authors find that voters withdraw their support from ruling party candidates who commit electoral fraud. This effect is especially large among strong supporters of the regime. Core regime supporters are …
Candidate Filtering
Incumbents have many tools to tip elections in their favor, yet little is known about how they choose between strategies. By comparing various tactics, this article argues that electoral malpractice centered on manipulating institutions offers the greatest effectiveness while shielding incumbents from public anger and criminal prosecution. To demonstrate this, the study focuses on a widespread institutional tactic: preventing candidates from acce…
Corruption and Co-Optation in Autocracy
Do corrupt officials govern differently in elected office? This article develops a theoretical framework and analyzes new data from financial disclosures to estimate the governing costs of corruption. First, I uncover substantial hidden wealth held by roughly one quarter of the legislators in the Russian Duma; these "kompromat deputies" are vulnerable to damaging information being used against them by the regime. Analyzing their behavior in offic…
Indecent Disclosures
Does the passage of anticorruption reforms affect the types of people that want to serve in government? This article evaluates the effects of a common tool to fight corruption—financial disclosures—using data on 25,642 elections in Putin‐era Russia. I argue that financial disclosures function like a personal audit, generating information for journalists and prosecutors to investigate illicit gains earned inside and outside of government. Exploiti…
Veto Players and the Value of Political Control
We examine how veto players and the government’s valuation of political control of economic activity affect the likelihood of privatization. When the government ascribes a high value to political control, veto players impede privatization because they would have to be compensated for their losses. When the value of political control is low, the government prefers to privatize enterprises that become difficult to control with multiple veto players…
Princelings in the Private Sector
What is the value of a family tie? Nepotism is a common feature of democratic and non-democratic systems, but our understanding of how and why family members of government officials receive preferential treatment is limited. Using administrative data on the universe of Moscow citizens to identify family links, I adopt a difference-in-differences design to estimate the labor market returns of having a relative enter the Russian government from 199…
Billionaires and Stealth Politics
As the 2020 presidential campaign heats up, the issue of billionaires ascendant within American politics will once again take center stage. The country could see another billionaire candidate challenge the incumbent billionaire president, whose many informal advisers and cabinet members run in similar circles. Several ultrarich elites will inevitably break new records with their individual campaign contributions. A voter could be forgiven for thi…
Who Benefits From Economic Reform? Firms and Distributive Politics
While the distributional consequences of economic reform have captivated political scientists, few studies have investigated the ability of different firms to reap gains from policy change. Reforms indeed create winners and losers, but there is scant evidence on specifically which firms benefit and which firms lose out. We propose that the benefits from liberalizing reform accrue mostly to firms that are not vulnerable to extortion by the state a…
Who Benefits From Economic Reform? Firms and Distributive Politics
While the distributional consequences of economic reform have captivated political scientists, few studies have investigated the ability of different firms to reap gains from policy change. Reforms indeed create winners and losers, but there is scant evidence on specifically which firms benefit and which firms lose out. We propose that the benefits from liberalizing reform accrue mostly to firms that are not vulnerable to extortion by the state a…
Political Machines at Work Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace
The authors explore how modern autocrats win elections by inducing employers to mobilize their employees to vote for the regime and thereby subvert the electoral process. using two original surveys of employers and workers conducted around the 2011 parliamentary elections in russia, they find that just under one-quarter of employers engaged in some form of political mobilization. they then develop a simple framework for identifying which firms en…
Veto Players and the Value of Political Control
We examine how veto players and the government’s valuation of political control of economic activity affect the likelihood of privatization. When the government ascribes a high value to political control, veto players impede privatization because they would have to be compensated for their losses. When the value of political control is low, the government prefers to privatize enterprises that become difficult to control with multiple veto players…
Online Social Media and Political Awareness in Authoritarian Regimes
Do online social media undermine authoritarianism? The conditions under which online social networks can increase public awareness of electoral fraud in non-democracies are examined in this article and it is argued that a given online social network will only increase political awareness if it is first politicized by elites. Survey data from the 2011 Russian parliamentary elections show that usage of Twitter and Facebook, which were politicized b…
Solar power for street vendors? Problems with centralized charging stations in urban markets
Princelings in the Private Sector
What is the value of a family tie? Nepotism is a common feature of democratic and non-democratic systems, but our understanding of how and why family members of government officials receive preferential treatment is limited. Using administrative data on the universe of Moscow citizens to identify family links, I adopt a difference-in-differences design to estimate the labor market returns of having a relative enter the Russian government from 199…
Billionaires and Stealth Politics
As the 2020 presidential campaign heats up, the issue of billionaires ascendant within American politics will once again take center stage. The country could see another billionaire candidate challenge the incumbent billionaire president, whose many informal advisers and cabinet members run in similar circles. Several ultrarich elites will inevitably break new records with their individual campaign contributions. A voter could be forgiven for thi…
Vote Brokers, Clientelist Appeals, and Voter Turnout
Modern clientelist exchange is typically carried out by intermediaries—party activists, employers, local strongmen, traditional leaders, and the like. Politicians use such brokers to mobilize voters, yet little about their relative effectiveness is known. The authors argue that broker effectiveness depends on their leverage over clients and their ability to monitor voters. They apply their theoretical framework to compare two of the most common b…
Hitting Them With Carrots
Hitting Them With Carrots
Scholars have identified many ways that politicians use carrots, such as vote buying, to mobilize voters, but have paid far less attention to how they use sticks, such as voter intimidation. This article develops a simple argument which suggests that voter intimidation should be especially likely where vote buying is expensive and employers have greater leverage over employees. Using survey experiments and crowd-sourced electoral violation report…
Elite Defection under Autocracy
Elite cohesion is a fundamental pillar of authoritarian stability. High-level defections can signal weakness, embolden the opposition, and sometimes, lead to regime collapse. Using a dataset of 4,291 ruling party candidates in Russia, this paper develops and tests hypotheses about the integrity of elite coalitions under autocracy. Our theory predicts that ruling elites defect when there is greater uncertainty about the regime's willingness to pro…
Politics for Profit
Businesspeople run for and win elected office around the world, with roughly one-third of members of parliament and numerous heads of states coming directly from the private sector. Yet we know little about why these politicians choose to leave the private sector and what they actually do while in government. In Politics for Profit, David Szakonyi brings to bear sweeping quantitative and qualitative evidence from Putin-era Russia to shed light on…
Politics for Profit
Electoral Manipulation and Regime Support
Does electoral fraud stabilize authoritarian rule or undermine it? The answer to this question rests in part on how voters evaluate regime candidates who engage in fraud. Using a survey experiment conducted after the 2016 elections in Russia, the authors find that voters withdraw their support from ruling party candidates who commit electoral fraud. This effect is especially large among strong supporters of the regime. Core regime supporters are …
Candidate Filtering
Incumbents have many tools to tip elections in their favor, yet little is known about how they choose between strategies. By comparing various tactics, this article argues that electoral malpractice centered on manipulating institutions offers the greatest effectiveness while shielding incumbents from public anger and criminal prosecution. To demonstrate this, the study focuses on a widespread institutional tactic: preventing candidates from acce…
Russia Resurrected
Russia’s horrific war in Ukraine has left scores of analysts wondering how we got here. Published just prior to the invasion, Kathryn Stoner’s Russia Resurrected deftly shows that this assertiveness has long been a trademark of Putin's regime. Her central thesis is a simple one: over the past two decades, Russia has become resurgent, not just economically and politically, but through the pursuit of an aggressive foreign policy designed to return …
Indecent Disclosures
Does the passage of anticorruption reforms affect the types of people that want to serve in government? This article evaluates the effects of a common tool to fight corruption—financial disclosures—using data on 25,642 elections in Putin‐era Russia. I argue that financial disclosures function like a personal audit, generating information for journalists and prosecutors to investigate illicit gains earned inside and outside of government. Exploiti…
Opposition rule under autocracy
How does the opposition govern under autocracy? Most authoritarian regimes tolerate some degree of internal opposition, allowing it to contest and even take power. Yet we know little about how such power‐sharing dynamics affect governance. In this paper, I exploit a unique instance where an opposition won control of political institutions in a prominent electoral autocracy: the 2017 Moscow municipal elections. Using a difference‐in‐differences de…
Corruption and Co-Optation in Autocracy
Do corrupt officials govern differently in elected office? This article develops a theoretical framework and analyzes new data from financial disclosures to estimate the governing costs of corruption. First, I uncover substantial hidden wealth held by roughly one quarter of the legislators in the Russian Duma; these "kompromat deputies" are vulnerable to damaging information being used against them by the regime. Analyzing their behavior in offic…
Political science (16 works) · Politics (15 works) · Economics (14 works) · Law (14 works) · Law (14 works) · Political economy (12 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (7 works) · Democracy (7 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (6 works) · Business (5 works)