Politics for Profit
Business, Elections, and Policymaking in Russia
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19923094 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David Szakonyi (0000-0002-3796-0297, George Washington University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Publication date | 2020-07-09 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Politics for Profit (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1017/9781108869089 |
| OpenAlex | W4229584339 |
| ISBN | 9781108869089 |
| Open Library | OL34754131M |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 28 |
Businesspeople run for and win elected office around the world, with roughly one-third of members of parliament and numerous heads of states coming directly from the private sector. Yet we know little about why these politicians choose to leave the private sector and what they actually do while in government. In Politics for Profit, David Szakonyi brings to bear sweeping quantitative and qualitative evidence from Putin-era Russia to shed light on why businesspeople contest elections and what the consequences are for their firms and for society when they win. The book develops an original theory of businessperson candidacy as a type of corporate political activity undertaken in response to both economic competition and weak political parties. Szakonyi's evidence then shows that businesspeople help their firms reap huge gains in revenue and profitability while prioritizing investments in public infrastructure over human capital. The book finally evaluates policies for combatting political corruption
CONTEST · Economics · Government (linguistics) · Market economy · Parliament · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Private sector · Profitability index · Rent-seeking · Revenue · Corruption and Economic Development · Finance · Law · Public Administration
Syndrome of populism and the evolution of post-Soviet regimes
Do political connections make businesspeople richer? Evidence from Russia, 2003–2010
The Oligarch Vanishes
The civic crime of corruption
Business and development
Centre–Regional Relations in Russia and the War Against Ukraine
How Insurgency Begins
No Success Without Approval
Addressing Risk by Doing Good
Family Ties as Corporate Power
Vse (Everyone) Online?”
Why parties can benefit from promoting occupational diversity in legislatures
Mutual restraint in nondemocratic legislatures
Exiting Russia
We don’t abandon our own people
Paying to party
Businessperson Deputies and Party Cohesion
Reluctant cooptation
Preferential Trade Agreements and Leaders’ Business Experience
Autocrats and Their Business Allies
Formal contracting and state–business relations in Russia. A case study from Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug
Strategic Uncertainty and Elite Defections in Electoral Autocracies
Politicians’ Private Sector Jobs and Parliamentary Behavior
Indecent Disclosures
Antipolitical class bias in corruption sentencing
Candidate Filtering
Invisible Participation
Corruption and Co-Optation in Autocracy
| Citations per year | 4.67 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Highly cited | No |