Tiberiu Dragu
Biographic Data
| ID | 1122629 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Tiberiu Dragu |
| GIVEN NAMES | Tiberiu |
| FAMILY NAME | Dragu |
| SIGNATURE | DRAGU T |
| AFFILIATIONS | New York University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8269-0724 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 229 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 16 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 9 |
When salience undermines representation: Democratic Dilemmas in Security and Counterterrorism Policy
Congruence between the policies implemented by elected representatives and voters’ policy preferences is fundamental to representation and democratic accountability. Can we anticipate a closer alignment between voters’ policy preferences and the policies explicitly adopted by elected representatives on the more electorally significant issues? We address this question using a simple game theoretic model, where we demonstrate that greater salience …
Counterterrorism Policy in an Uncertain World
Terrorism prevention is a priority for most democratic polities; however, governments are often unable to precisely assess the threat posed by various terrorist groups. How does a government’s uncertainty about terrorists’ capacity affect the probability of a terror attack occurring? We develop a game-theoretic model to show that the probability of a successful terrorist attack increases when the government expects to face a terror group with low…
Digital Authoritarianism and the Future of Human Rights
How will advances in digital technology affect the future of human rights and authoritarian rule? Media figures, public intellectuals, and scholars have debated this relationship for decades, with some arguing that new technologies facilitate mobilization against the state and others countering that the same technologies allow authoritarians to strengthen their grip on power. We address this issue by analyzing the first game-theoretic model that …
Self-Enforcing Legal Limits: Bureaucratic Constraints on Repression under Emergency Powers
Governments of all stripes have attempted to transgress ordinary legal limits and infringe upon rights and liberties under the cover of emergency powers. Are repressive policies adopted under emergency law less likely to comply with extant legal limits, as compared to repressive policies adopted under normal law? What are the mechanisms by which the potential abuse of emergency powers can be constrained? To answer these questions, we develop a ga…
Coalition Governance with Incomplete Information
How can coalition cabinets make policy decisions if the policy preferences of the coalition partners are private information? We use a mechanism design approach to study the important process of coalition governance in this setting. We show that, among all possible mechanisms that could structure decision making within a coalition government, the mechanism that leads to the "best" policy compromise among coalition partners when members' preferenc…
Preventive Repression: Two Types of Moral Hazard
Authoritarian leaders maintain their grip on power primarily through preventive repression, routinely exercised by specialized security agencies with the aim of preventing any opponents from organizing and threatening their power. We develop a formal model to analyze the moral hazard problems inherent in the principal-agent relationship between rulers and their security agents in charge of preventive repression. The model distinguishes two types …
Collective Action and Constraints on Repression at the Endgame
How can human rights abuses be prevented or reduced? Using a simple game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that repression can become a coordination game when the potential for abuses is greatest: when dissent against a regime has grown sufficiently powerful. In such scenarios, repression depends on how the leader’s agents coordinate on implementing a repression order. If and to the extent agents believe other agents will not comply with an order t…
Veto players, policy change, and institutional design
What institutional arrangements allow veto players to secure maximal welfare when all agree on both the need for and the direction of policy change? To answer this question, we conduct a mechanism design analysis. We focus on a system with two veto players, each with incomplete information about the other’s policy preferences. We show that the unique welfare-maximizing mechanism is the mechanism that implements the preferred policy of the player …
The Moral Hazard of Terrorism Prevention
How does a policy of reacting to terrorist attacks with restrictions on free speech protections affect the likelihood of terrorism in the first place? In this article, I develop a dynamic model of an interaction between a security agency and a terrorist organization to study the dynamic consequences of adopting policies that curtail free speech protections and other rights when terror strikes. The article shows that in a world in which democratic…
On repression and its effectiveness
Do electoral incentives to stop a terrorist attack before the next election induce democratic governments to undertake ineffective counterterrorism policies? This article shows that shortsighted electoral motivations are not a sufficient explanation for why governments engage in counterproductive repression when responding to electoral pressures to safeguard security. It develops a game-theoretic model to show that limitations on observability of…
An Agenda-Setting Theory of Electoral Competition
The strategy of parties regarding which issues to emphasize during electoral campaigns is an important aspect of electoral competition. In this article, we advance research on electoral competition by developing a multidimensional model of electoral competition in which parties compete for electoral support by raising the electoral salience of position issues. We show that parties have incentives to advertise an issue on which the opponent has a …
On Judicial Review in a Separation of Powers System
The institution of judicial review is an important mechanism of holding the government legally accountable, nevertheless questions remain about its proper role in a separation of powers system. This article analyzes the effect of judicial review on the policy-making process from an expertise perspective. It shows that the exercise of non-expert judicial review can induce more informed policies and that non-expert courts have incentives to exercis…
Designing Checks and Balances
Essential to the Madisonian conception of checks and balances is the division of policy-making authority among multiple actors such that each can veto proposed changes in policy. We use a mechanism design approach to analyze checks and balances institutions. We show that checks and balances institutions in which the most preferred policy of the more moderate player is the unique equilibrium outcome are the only checks and balances institutions th…
The Rule of Law in the Fight against Terrorism
What is the role of legal limits on executive power, if any, when citizens demand more security from terrorism, and allowing executive officials legal flexibility of action appears necessary to achieve it? We develop a game‐theoretic model to show that when the executive faces increased electoral incentives to provide security and has legal flexibility to choose any policy it finds optimal, security from terrorism can actually decrease. In contra…
The Administrative Foundation of the Rule of Law
This article builds upon the observation that political rulers have to rely upon administra-tors to implement their policy decisions to uncover two mechanisms by which legal limits, understood in terms of fundamental human rights, can be self-enforcing. We show how the effectiveness of such legal limits depends on administrators ’ expectation that rights violations might be costly in the future, when the current ruler’s grip on power ends. We als…
Is There a Trade-off between Security and Liberty? Executive Bias, Privacy Protections, and Terrorism Prevention
I develop a game-theoretic model of an interaction between an antiterrorist agency and a terrorist organization to analyze how the probability of a terrorist attack varies when the level of privacy protections changes. I derive two implications. First, privacy and security from terrorism need not be in conflict: when accounting for strategic interactions, reducing privacy protections does not necessarily increase security from terrorism. Second, …
Preventive Repression: Two Types of Moral Hazard
Authoritarian leaders maintain their grip on power primarily through preventive repression, routinely exercised by specialized security agencies with the aim of preventing any opponents from organizing and threatening their power. We develop a formal model to analyze the moral hazard problems inherent in the principal-agent relationship between rulers and their security agents in charge of preventive repression. The model distinguishes two types …
Digital Authoritarianism and the Future of Human Rights
How will advances in digital technology affect the future of human rights and authoritarian rule? Media figures, public intellectuals, and scholars have debated this relationship for decades, with some arguing that new technologies facilitate mobilization against the state and others countering that the same technologies allow authoritarians to strengthen their grip on power. We address this issue by analyzing the first game-theoretic model that …
Is There a Trade-off between Security and Liberty? Executive Bias, Privacy Protections, and Terrorism Prevention
I develop a game-theoretic model of an interaction between an antiterrorist agency and a terrorist organization to analyze how the probability of a terrorist attack varies when the level of privacy protections changes. I derive two implications. First, privacy and security from terrorism need not be in conflict: when accounting for strategic interactions, reducing privacy protections does not necessarily increase security from terrorism. Second, …
The Rule of Law in the Fight against Terrorism
What is the role of legal limits on executive power, if any, when citizens demand more security from terrorism, and allowing executive officials legal flexibility of action appears necessary to achieve it? We develop a game‐theoretic model to show that when the executive faces increased electoral incentives to provide security and has legal flexibility to choose any policy it finds optimal, security from terrorism can actually decrease. In contra…
The Administrative Foundation of the Rule of Law
This article builds upon the observation that political rulers have to rely upon administra-tors to implement their policy decisions to uncover two mechanisms by which legal limits, understood in terms of fundamental human rights, can be self-enforcing. We show how the effectiveness of such legal limits depends on administrators ’ expectation that rights violations might be costly in the future, when the current ruler’s grip on power ends. We als…
Collective Action and Constraints on Repression at the Endgame
How can human rights abuses be prevented or reduced? Using a simple game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that repression can become a coordination game when the potential for abuses is greatest: when dissent against a regime has grown sufficiently powerful. In such scenarios, repression depends on how the leader’s agents coordinate on implementing a repression order. If and to the extent agents believe other agents will not comply with an order t…
An Agenda-Setting Theory of Electoral Competition
The strategy of parties regarding which issues to emphasize during electoral campaigns is an important aspect of electoral competition. In this article, we advance research on electoral competition by developing a multidimensional model of electoral competition in which parties compete for electoral support by raising the electoral salience of position issues. We show that parties have incentives to advertise an issue on which the opponent has a …
The Moral Hazard of Terrorism Prevention
How does a policy of reacting to terrorist attacks with restrictions on free speech protections affect the likelihood of terrorism in the first place? In this article, I develop a dynamic model of an interaction between a security agency and a terrorist organization to study the dynamic consequences of adopting policies that curtail free speech protections and other rights when terror strikes. The article shows that in a world in which democratic…
On repression and its effectiveness
Do electoral incentives to stop a terrorist attack before the next election induce democratic governments to undertake ineffective counterterrorism policies? This article shows that shortsighted electoral motivations are not a sufficient explanation for why governments engage in counterproductive repression when responding to electoral pressures to safeguard security. It develops a game-theoretic model to show that limitations on observability of…
Counterterrorism Policy in an Uncertain World
Terrorism prevention is a priority for most democratic polities; however, governments are often unable to precisely assess the threat posed by various terrorist groups. How does a government’s uncertainty about terrorists’ capacity affect the probability of a terror attack occurring? We develop a game-theoretic model to show that the probability of a successful terrorist attack increases when the government expects to face a terror group with low…
Designing Checks and Balances
Essential to the Madisonian conception of checks and balances is the division of policy-making authority among multiple actors such that each can veto proposed changes in policy. We use a mechanism design approach to analyze checks and balances institutions. We show that checks and balances institutions in which the most preferred policy of the more moderate player is the unique equilibrium outcome are the only checks and balances institutions th…
Coalition Governance with Incomplete Information
How can coalition cabinets make policy decisions if the policy preferences of the coalition partners are private information? We use a mechanism design approach to study the important process of coalition governance in this setting. We show that, among all possible mechanisms that could structure decision making within a coalition government, the mechanism that leads to the "best" policy compromise among coalition partners when members' preferenc…
Self-Enforcing Legal Limits: Bureaucratic Constraints on Repression under Emergency Powers
Governments of all stripes have attempted to transgress ordinary legal limits and infringe upon rights and liberties under the cover of emergency powers. Are repressive policies adopted under emergency law less likely to comply with extant legal limits, as compared to repressive policies adopted under normal law? What are the mechanisms by which the potential abuse of emergency powers can be constrained? To answer these questions, we develop a ga…
Is There a Trade-off between Security and Liberty? Executive Bias, Privacy Protections, and Terrorism Prevention
I develop a game-theoretic model of an interaction between an antiterrorist agency and a terrorist organization to analyze how the probability of a terrorist attack varies when the level of privacy protections changes. I derive two implications. First, privacy and security from terrorism need not be in conflict: when accounting for strategic interactions, reducing privacy protections does not necessarily increase security from terrorism. Second, …
The Administrative Foundation of the Rule of Law
This article builds upon the observation that political rulers have to rely upon administra-tors to implement their policy decisions to uncover two mechanisms by which legal limits, understood in terms of fundamental human rights, can be self-enforcing. We show how the effectiveness of such legal limits depends on administrators ’ expectation that rights violations might be costly in the future, when the current ruler’s grip on power ends. We als…
Designing Checks and Balances
Essential to the Madisonian conception of checks and balances is the division of policy-making authority among multiple actors such that each can veto proposed changes in policy. We use a mechanism design approach to analyze checks and balances institutions. We show that checks and balances institutions in which the most preferred policy of the more moderate player is the unique equilibrium outcome are the only checks and balances institutions th…
The Rule of Law in the Fight against Terrorism
What is the role of legal limits on executive power, if any, when citizens demand more security from terrorism, and allowing executive officials legal flexibility of action appears necessary to achieve it? We develop a game‐theoretic model to show that when the executive faces increased electoral incentives to provide security and has legal flexibility to choose any policy it finds optimal, security from terrorism can actually decrease. In contra…
On Judicial Review in a Separation of Powers System
The institution of judicial review is an important mechanism of holding the government legally accountable, nevertheless questions remain about its proper role in a separation of powers system. This article analyzes the effect of judicial review on the policy-making process from an expertise perspective. It shows that the exercise of non-expert judicial review can induce more informed policies and that non-expert courts have incentives to exercis…
An Agenda-Setting Theory of Electoral Competition
The strategy of parties regarding which issues to emphasize during electoral campaigns is an important aspect of electoral competition. In this article, we advance research on electoral competition by developing a multidimensional model of electoral competition in which parties compete for electoral support by raising the electoral salience of position issues. We show that parties have incentives to advertise an issue on which the opponent has a …
Veto players, policy change, and institutional design
What institutional arrangements allow veto players to secure maximal welfare when all agree on both the need for and the direction of policy change? To answer this question, we conduct a mechanism design analysis. We focus on a system with two veto players, each with incomplete information about the other’s policy preferences. We show that the unique welfare-maximizing mechanism is the mechanism that implements the preferred policy of the player …
The Moral Hazard of Terrorism Prevention
How does a policy of reacting to terrorist attacks with restrictions on free speech protections affect the likelihood of terrorism in the first place? In this article, I develop a dynamic model of an interaction between a security agency and a terrorist organization to study the dynamic consequences of adopting policies that curtail free speech protections and other rights when terror strikes. The article shows that in a world in which democratic…
On repression and its effectiveness
Do electoral incentives to stop a terrorist attack before the next election induce democratic governments to undertake ineffective counterterrorism policies? This article shows that shortsighted electoral motivations are not a sufficient explanation for why governments engage in counterproductive repression when responding to electoral pressures to safeguard security. It develops a game-theoretic model to show that limitations on observability of…
Collective Action and Constraints on Repression at the Endgame
How can human rights abuses be prevented or reduced? Using a simple game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that repression can become a coordination game when the potential for abuses is greatest: when dissent against a regime has grown sufficiently powerful. In such scenarios, repression depends on how the leader’s agents coordinate on implementing a repression order. If and to the extent agents believe other agents will not comply with an order t…
Coalition Governance with Incomplete Information
How can coalition cabinets make policy decisions if the policy preferences of the coalition partners are private information? We use a mechanism design approach to study the important process of coalition governance in this setting. We show that, among all possible mechanisms that could structure decision making within a coalition government, the mechanism that leads to the "best" policy compromise among coalition partners when members' preferenc…
Preventive Repression: Two Types of Moral Hazard
Authoritarian leaders maintain their grip on power primarily through preventive repression, routinely exercised by specialized security agencies with the aim of preventing any opponents from organizing and threatening their power. We develop a formal model to analyze the moral hazard problems inherent in the principal-agent relationship between rulers and their security agents in charge of preventive repression. The model distinguishes two types …
Self-Enforcing Legal Limits: Bureaucratic Constraints on Repression under Emergency Powers
Governments of all stripes have attempted to transgress ordinary legal limits and infringe upon rights and liberties under the cover of emergency powers. Are repressive policies adopted under emergency law less likely to comply with extant legal limits, as compared to repressive policies adopted under normal law? What are the mechanisms by which the potential abuse of emergency powers can be constrained? To answer these questions, we develop a ga…
Counterterrorism Policy in an Uncertain World
Terrorism prevention is a priority for most democratic polities; however, governments are often unable to precisely assess the threat posed by various terrorist groups. How does a government’s uncertainty about terrorists’ capacity affect the probability of a terror attack occurring? We develop a game-theoretic model to show that the probability of a successful terrorist attack increases when the government expects to face a terror group with low…
Digital Authoritarianism and the Future of Human Rights
How will advances in digital technology affect the future of human rights and authoritarian rule? Media figures, public intellectuals, and scholars have debated this relationship for decades, with some arguing that new technologies facilitate mobilization against the state and others countering that the same technologies allow authoritarians to strengthen their grip on power. We address this issue by analyzing the first game-theoretic model that …
When salience undermines representation: Democratic Dilemmas in Security and Counterterrorism Policy
Congruence between the policies implemented by elected representatives and voters’ policy preferences is fundamental to representation and democratic accountability. Can we anticipate a closer alignment between voters’ policy preferences and the policies explicitly adopted by elected representatives on the more electorally significant issues? We address this question using a simple game theoretic model, where we demonstrate that greater salience …
Political science (15 works) · Law (14 works) · Economics (13 works) · Law (13 works) · Politics (12 works) · Law and economics (11 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (10 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance (6 works) · Incentive (6 works)