The Moral Hazard of Terrorism Prevention

Bibliographic Data

ID6396147
AuthorsTiberiu Dragu (0000-0002-8269-0724, New York University, corresponding author)
Year2017
Volume79
Issue1
Pages223-236
Publication date2017-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Journal of Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-3816 • E-ISSN: 1468-2508
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/687589
OpenAlexW2553357088
LanguageEN
Citations received14
References cited39

How does a policy of reacting to terrorist attacks with restrictions on free speech protections affect the likelihood of terrorism in the first place? In this article, I develop a dynamic model of an interaction between a security agency and a terrorist organization to study the dynamic consequences of adopting policies that curtail free speech protections and other rights when terror strikes. The article shows that in a world in which democratic governments respond to major terrorist attacks with restrictions on freedom of expression and other rights and liberties, such policies have perverse effects on the pre-attack incentives of terrorism prevention/occurrence, which can make a terrorist attack more likely. The analysis suggests that a commitment to respecting fundamental rights and liberties in times of duress can be security-beneficial: if liberal societies were to remain faithful to their fundamental values in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, such a strategy can decrease the probability of a terrorist attack in the first place

Agency (philosophy · Civil liberties · Computer security · Democracy · Economics · Incentive · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Terrorism · Computer Science · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

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